south-asian-militant-groups-and-global-jihad-in-2015

QUILL IAM
term success of a DDR initiative unlikely. Furthermore, the late
implementation of the program, and the strategy of appeasing
commanders by offering them high level government and security
positions, allowed them to manipulate the DDR process, and
entrench their personal power in the new government
establishment. Moreover, the DDR program only targeted former
Afghan Military Forces (AMF).
A separate program for illegal militias, the Disbandment of Illegal
Armed Groups program (DIAG) attempted to use a mix of threats
of coercion, and community development projects to get militants
to disarm. Unlike the DDR program, it is widely agreed that the
DIAG had failed because the government officials that had
facilitated the process were generally reluctant to break their ties
with local militias. 116 A further difficulty that any future
disarmament initiative will have to contend with is the arms
culture of rural Afghanistan, where personal possession of arms is
a given, and there is limited trust in the state.
Quilliam believes a more promising avenue than top down
disarmament programs is that of grassroots reconciliation. The
Afghan government and parts of civil society have already taken
some initiatives to this effect. Thus far, grassroots initiatives have
largely been in the form of organizing “peace jirgas” - councils
between local warring factions. In 2007, the parliament created the
National Commission for Peace and Reconciliation (PTS), in which
officials in various provinces, coupled with civil society actors,
aimed to reconcile the state with factions of the Taliban. We
strongly urge the continuation of these collaborative efforts
because they present an important opportunity for longer-term
counter-extremism narratives to be fostered. An Afghan NGO
called the Tribal Liaison Office has also attempted to facilitate such
jirgas between local government, international forces, and local
communities, to try and improve relations. However, grassroots
reconciliation initiatives are generally unpopular with donors,
since producing measurable output is difficult, and they have not,
as hoped, facilitated departure of any high level Taliban
commanders thus far. Nevertheless, they offer a sustainable form
of positive reconciliation and collaboration, and we recommend
they should continue to be supported wherever possible. 117
Afghanistan’s vast opium trade has been a thorn in the side of ISAF
forces as they attempted to balance meeting legal obligations to
cease drug trade while building relations with communities for
whom that trade is an economic lifeline. Threats of seizing or
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