south-asian-militant-groups-and-global-jihad-in-2015

NEW AG EN T S OF GLOB AL JIHAD
Afghanistan
We advise the state to focus on decreasing corruption, and
increasing social assistance to families in need. Economic
disenfranchisement increases the appeal of extremism. Although
poverty is common throughout the Afghan population, it is most
prevalent among rural Afghans. 44% say that there were times in
the past year when they didn't have enough money to buy food for
themselves or their families, whereas only 32% of urban residents
found themselves in a similar position. 113
Islamist violence remains a problem in Afghanistan, even though
IMU and its splinter group, the Islamic Jihad Union, have weakened.
With Islamists from the Haqqani Network, the Taliban, and Hizb-i-
Islami (HIG) still active, we urge the government to continue to
devote more resources to intelligence and security efforts.
We argue that the distrust between rural Afghans and the local and
central government bodies should be eased through increased
collaboration and grassroots reconciliation.
We suggest that donors should be prepared to invest in projects
that diversify the rural economy, and that promote reconciliation
beyond a ‘grand peace plan’.
We encourage short term, state-led security improvements,
particularly in the form of grassroots reconciliation between
factions, and especially those ethnic factions that have become
politicized at the national level.
While there are short term merits to be gained from disarmament
programs, in the absence of alternative livelihood options and a
‘grand plan’ peace process with clear political direction, they will
not create long-term security. A disarmament, demobilization, and
reintegration (DDR) program has been implemented in
Afghanistan before. The program yielded mixed results; 62,376
AMF members were demobilized, and 57,629 weapons were
collected. 114 We encourage repetition of a similar imitative, given a
meaningful measure of success will be determined in the longerterm.
Permanent demobilization hinges on the success of militant
transitions to civilian life, which, in turn, is contingent on the
attraction of the alternative livelihoods that can be offered by the
Afghan government. 115 Although vocational courses were offered
to those taking part in the previous program, a subsequent upsurge
in insurgent activity, and a lack of economic stability, renders long-
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