south-asian-militant-groups-and-global-jihad-in-2015

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QUILL IAM To reduce the appeal of extremism within schools and universities, we advise focusing on civic education, citizenship, pluralism, freedom of religion, and the mirroring of counter-extremism programs. We encourage content analysis of material within educational institutions, particularly entryism in tertiary education. Often, madrasah education can serve as a complement, and not as a substitute 112 for tertiary education. The negative implications of extremism must be advertised within all levels of education. Human rights should continue to be a core aim of the Pakistani Government’s initiative. Counter-extremism context should be promoted in Urdu, and be available in all vernacular languages. Pakistan should continue to focus on promoting democracy, and on building on the work of PILDAT. Strengthening democracy will weaken the military establishment’s independence. The Pakistani blasphemy law needs reform, as it strengthens the stance of Islamist extremists. The international community should continue to give aid to Pakistan so long as counter-extremist and human rights narratives are the drivers of both domestic and foreign policy. The Pakistani government must insist on greater transparency during counter-terror operations such as Zarb-e-Azb in FATA. If human rights abuses against civilians go unchecked, then defeating one wave of militancy is a temporary victory, as another will be created in the process. We recommend focusing on anti-sectarian counter-narratives. This is IS's market niche, and given that Jundullah (one of their new allies, traditionally sectarian and an offshoot of the TTP) has claimed credit for the Shia mosque bombing in January 2015, it is a theme increasingly coming to the fore, and one that counternarratives could specifically address. 42
NEW AG EN T S OF GLOB AL JIHAD Afghanistan We advise the state to focus on decreasing corruption, and increasing social assistance to families in need. Economic disenfranchisement increases the appeal of extremism. Although poverty is common throughout the Afghan population, it is most prevalent among rural Afghans. 44% say that there were times in the past year when they didn't have enough money to buy food for themselves or their families, whereas only 32% of urban residents found themselves in a similar position. 113 Islamist violence remains a problem in Afghanistan, even though IMU and its splinter group, the Islamic Jihad Union, have weakened. With Islamists from the Haqqani Network, the Taliban, and Hizb-i- Islami (HIG) still active, we urge the government to continue to devote more resources to intelligence and security efforts. We argue that the distrust between rural Afghans and the local and central government bodies should be eased through increased collaboration and grassroots reconciliation. We suggest that donors should be prepared to invest in projects that diversify the rural economy, and that promote reconciliation beyond a ‘grand peace plan’. We encourage short term, state-led security improvements, particularly in the form of grassroots reconciliation between factions, and especially those ethnic factions that have become politicized at the national level. While there are short term merits to be gained from disarmament programs, in the absence of alternative livelihood options and a ‘grand plan’ peace process with clear political direction, they will not create long-term security. A disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) program has been implemented in Afghanistan before. The program yielded mixed results; 62,376 AMF members were demobilized, and 57,629 weapons were collected. 114 We encourage repetition of a similar imitative, given a meaningful measure of success will be determined in the longerterm. Permanent demobilization hinges on the success of militant transitions to civilian life, which, in turn, is contingent on the attraction of the alternative livelihoods that can be offered by the Afghan government. 115 Although vocational courses were offered to those taking part in the previous program, a subsequent upsurge in insurgent activity, and a lack of economic stability, renders long- 43
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