south-asian-militant-groups-and-global-jihad-in-2015

QUILL IAM
countering the group’s appeal will be more difficult, unless
incomes and employment opportunities are improved throughout.
To understand this financial incentive, the mean monthly incomes
(real GDP per capita/12; USD) for India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and
Jammu and Kashmir are provided below:
Country/ State* Monthly income (real GDP per capita/12), USD
2013 (1 dp) 92
India 124.9
Afghanistan 55.4
Pakistan 106.3
Jammu and Kashmir* 43.1 †93
†A different dataset for 2011 was used for these figures
The disparity between mean monthly incomes and the $400 salary
that is offered by IS is significant.
Even well-off and well educated youth can be attracted to jihadist
causes due to a sense of injustice and frustrated expectations. This
attraction is emphasized if these individuals feel that their
education will not bring them opportunities. LeJ (a potential IS
ally) is known for having a significant number of university
graduates among its fighters. 94 We suggest that education, training,
and job search assistance should be extended to tackle economic
and labour inactivity in South Asia.
As part of its state-building project, IS in the Middle East includes
all of the services one might expect from a local government:
distribution of water, collection of charity, and the provision of
health care services. If the relevant South Asian administrations do
not improve service infrastructure, then this element of the IS
campaign may appeal to economically disenfranchised individuals,
and help to explain the attraction of joining the fight in Iraq and
Syria: “extremist violence is more likely to arise wherever
governments are unable to provide for their citizens.” 95
However, in certain countries such as Pakistan, there is a negative
correlation between poverty and the support of terrorism. 96 This
is because the elites find that some of their interests align with
those of the terrorist organisations (for example, the annexation of
Jammu and Kashmir), and – unlike the poor - they are not as
exposed to the violent implications of their decisions.
In order to ameliorate this occurrence, ‘track II diplomacy’ – i.e.
Diplomacy that is either overseen, facilitated, or carried out by
‘non-state actors’ - should be encouraged. Studies on track II
diplomacy 97 have illustrated that dialogue of this kind usually
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