south-asian-militant-groups-and-global-jihad-in-2015

NEW AG EN T S OF GLOB AL JIHAD
PART 4
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
Having reviewed the efforts that are being made on behalf of the Pakistani,
Afghan, and Indian administrations in order to combat the proliferation of
Islamist extremism, this report will now provide a series of nation-specific
policy recommendations that ought to be implemented in order to expedite
this process. Again, Jammu and Kashmir present a special case, and in light
of the balance of power that exists within this region, this report has
differentiated between Indian and Pakistani administered Jammu and
Kashmir, and has made policy recommendations accordingly. However,
before our nation specific policy recommendations are presented, a series of
general policy recommendations will be made that can be used to inform the
development of future counter-terrorism and counter-extremism efforts in
South Asia.
It is important to remember that this affects policy makers in Britain because
43.4% of Muslims in Britain are of British Asian descent 88 , making issues in
India and Pakistan of particular importance to a large segment of Britain’s
population.
Ge n e ra l Poli cy Re commen da t i o n s
We recommend governments reinforce legitimate state institutions to
counter the appeal of radicalisation:
We believe that one of the main causes of radicalization in South
Asia, besides ideological appeal and group networks, is
disillusionment with the state. According to Transparency
International, South Asia is the most corrupt region in the world, 89
and until steps are taken to improve Governmental transparency,
culture, and accountability, counter-extremism efforts will be
significantly limited.
Additionally, there is a strong positive correlation between poverty
and a susceptibility to extremist narratives, and because
corruption undermines the propensity for individuals to cross the
“barrier of poverty,” 90 the need for a reduction in institutionalized
corruption is stressed.
The appeal of movements such as IS is financial as well as
ideological: for many in rural, low income areas of South Asia the
IS wage of $400 per month 91 could be attractive. If this monetary
incentive is extended to IS’ self-declared allies in South Asia,
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