south-asian-militant-groups-and-global-jihad-in-2015

QUILL IAM
Afghanistan
Counter-terrorism policy: As far as the Taliban is concerned, the immediate
future of Afghanistan’s counter-terrorism and counter-extremism strategy
depends on whether or not Mullah Omar resurfaces, how hawkish he will be
upon his return, and how much authority he has left over his Taliban.
Judicial system: A recent study in the Anti-Terrorism Prosecutors’
Department (ATPD) of Afghanistan found weaknesses in critical thinking,
indictment drafting, and case preparation. Because judges did not
necessarily understand changes that were made to the legal framework in
2013 and 2014, there were a high number of failed prosecutions, and cases
vulnerable to appeal. Some of these changes included the passage of a new
Criminal Procedure Code, as well as the implementation of anti-terrorism
and anti-money laundering legislation. Over 30% of the prosecutors
surveyed reported that they did not have the training that was necessary in
order to do their job to a high standard. 77
Education: Despite efforts to change the national school curriculum, and
replace textbooks containing extremist teachings with new ones, policy
remains to be finalized. There remains no standard curriculum for secondary
school textbooks, and high school textbooks remain inadequate in both
number and in content. For many years, the Taliban and other groups have
attacked schools, teachers, and students. In May, 2012, the Ministry of
Education reported that more than 590 schools were closed in areas at risk;
most of these schools were in the Helmand, Kabul, and Kandahar provinces. 78
Military: The Taliban will be the chief factor in the ISAF/NATO strategy for
reducing troop levels in Afghanistan. Factions have emerged among the
Taliban in recent years, largely due to Mullah Omar’s invisibility, and this
appears to be leading to a stagnation of loyalty, particularly among younger
fighters. 79 Although the Taliban “brand” risks being seen as tired, in contrast
to the wave of fear and publicity that has greeted the rise of IS, the Taliban
may be able to recover some of their former prestige if they make significant
gains in the wake of the ISAF force withdrawal. 80 It is feared that this is a real
possibility. 81 Levels of terrorist activity along the Afghanistan-Pakistan
border are also contingent on the relationship between India and Pakistan.
For example, an active effort to resolve the Kashmir issue could result in a
reduction of Indian and Pakistani security forces along common borders, and
a bilateral agreement on nuclear and conventional forces. This would bolster
Pakistan’s ability to act against militants in border areas between
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