south-asian-militant-groups-and-global-jihad-in-2015

QUILL IAM
PART 3
STATE OF PLAY
I n t e ra c t i o n b e t w e e n t e r ro rist groups a n d n a t i o n a l,
re g i o n a l, and i n t e rn a t i o n a l forces
In this section, the ways that Pakistan, Afghanistan, and India are combatting
the threat of Islamist extremism will be outlined. In particular, this report
will provide a brief summary of the counter-terrorism, judicial, educational,
military, and finance orientated policies that are being implemented within
the aforementioned regions. Due to the status of Jammu and Kashmir as a
contested territory, it will be subject to a different set of analytical criteria.
From our findings, gaps will be identified in the counter-extremism policies
that are being used by each country - or state, as is the case in Indian and
Pakistani administered Jammu and Kashmir - in order to combat the spread
of Islamist extremism; a series of region specific policy suggestions will be
made in Part 4 of this report.
Jammu and Kashmir
Although Jammu and Kashmir was a princely state in its own right up to the
conclusion of British rule in the Indian subcontinent in 1947, it has been a
heavily contested territory ever since, with both India and Pakistan vying for
its ownership. 75 It is currently under Indian administration, as a federal state
with a degree of autonomy guaranteed under Article 370 of the Indian
Constitution. A small proportion of it, known as Azad Kashmir, is under
Pakistani administration. As such, the interactions between terrorist groups
and national, regional, and international forces have been complicated, and
in many ways dictated, by the wars that have been, and are being fought
between the Indian army, and proxy militant groups such as Hizb-ul-
Mujahideen (HM), Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), and Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM)
(see Part 2 of this report). 76
As such, the counter-terrorism initiatives that are taken within this region
are divided amongst the Indian and the Pakistani administrations. The
details of these initiatives are not explicitly relevant to this report, however,
an analysis on how these Governments can directly develop their policies in
order to restore peace to the region, and to mitigate the proliferation of said
militant groups, will be offered in Part 4 of this report.
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