south-asian-militant-groups-and-global-jihad-in-2015

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QUILL IAM November. Some other TTP local emirs such as that of Bajaur Agency have also declared allegiance, and are attempting to turn over their local authority to IS 64 . So far, the picture suggests the Shura has little control over scattered IS affiliates. Despite Shahidullah’s claim that Dost is at least ideologically within ISKP, confusion over the perpetrator of an April 2015 suicide attack on a Jalalabad bank, which killed 35, suggests otherwise. Hafiz Saeed Khan tweeted a photo of the bomber responsible and he claimed that the attack was ISKPs first. However, Dost later refuted the claim and they stated that IS wasn’t involved, but rather, that the attack was the work of Pakistani intelligence and was implemented in order to “damage the reputation of IS” 65 . This incident is indicative of militants capitalizing on a common brand, rather than sharing a common strategy. There are increasing reports that fighting between the Taliban and IS in Afghanistan has become common, such as 15 IS fighters and 12 Taliban militants killed over declarations of allegiance to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in May 2015. 66 2. The fracturing of the Taliban in Pakistan has provided the Islamic State with the opportunity to gain a foothold in the region. The Islamic State has peeled off disaffected or marginalized Taliban commanders from various Taliban groups to boost the leadership cadres of ISKP. However, until the ISKP Shura gains greater control of the vast number of largely independent IS affiliates in the region, IS will not exercise any significant territorial control. As such, an IS coordinated insurgency is unlikely. The limited IS “leadership” in Pakistan is unable to extract the same levels of control its Middle Eastern counterpart can in the short tomedium term; however, IS’ symbolic capital does have potential to galvanise and change Pakistani militant dynamics. While IS has led military offensives in Afghanistan, the group must contend with powerful and competing regional presences, including the Taliban. The Taliban has condemned the IS-led Jalalabad bombing in April 2015. 67 Though IS will not be able to annex South Asia into its “caliphate” in the foreseeable future, if new agents in Pakistan are successful, they will be able to rally support and further deteriorate the security situation. 26
NEW AG EN T S OF GLOB AL JIHAD 3. IS has launched some offensives in the region (albeit fairly small ones in Afghanistan), and established training camps and recruitment centres to bring local fighters to Syria. This has left a mark on Afghan and Pakistani national consciousness by instilling fear and a new wave of global jihadist inspiration. The takfiri ideology speaks to overtly sectarian militant groups. IS propaganda attracts some civilian support, and taps into the regional precedent of jihadist groups acting as proxy militants for larger forces. If IS “soldiers” are successful, they may galvanize a new, globally oriented, and increasingly sectarian, wave of violence. Forces that now identify with IS are examined in our longer report (Chapter IV). 4. Meanwhile, AQ is attempting to consolidate and expand its hold in Asia in response to the influence it has lost to IS in the Middle East. The most significant move by al Zawahiri in September 2014 was the establishment of a new branch of AQ: Al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS). Ayman al Zawahiri intends to recruit within India, Bangladesh, and Burma, increasingly fertile recruiting grounds for radicalization. In May 2015, AQIS claimed responsibility for the deaths of secular bloggers in Pakistan and Bangladesh. 68 Burma has experienced Buddhist-led attacks on the Rohingya Muslim minority for the last two years, and the Islamist minority in Bangladesh increasingly clashes with the secular Muslim majority. 69 As such, both countries must be considered as potential “hotspots” for radicalization in the immediate future, and their logistical significance to groups in Pakistan and India should not be underestimated. Some militant Pakistani outfits targeting India prefer to enter India through the poorly guarded Bangladeshi border. 70 Al Qaeda named Bangladesh a country where Muslims would be ideologically targeted by AQIS. India’s election of a ruling party with Hindu nationalist sympathies, in tandem with increasing home-grown Islamist extremism, may play to AQ’s advantage as increasing numbers of Indian Muslims feel marginalized in Indian society. The issue of coercive conversions to Hinduism is one that has particularly exacerbated fears of Muslim subjugation 71 . 27
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