south-asian-militant-groups-and-global-jihad-in-2015

QUILL IAM
PART 2
GLOBAL JIHADIST FORCES IN SOUTH ASIA
Building on the analysis of the aforementioned Islamist terrorist groups in
J&K, Pakistan, Afghanistan and India, Part 2 of this report will explore the
influence of the “global jihadist” network that is being propagated by IS
throughout South Asia, and it will analyse the role of IS as an ‘ideological
destabiliser’ within the region. In this section, particular attention will be
paid to the relationship between Al-Qaeda and IS within Afghanistan and
Pakistan. The implications of this changing power dynamic for the security
of South Asia will be explored. Furthermore, Al-Qaeda’s newest branch, Al-
Qaeda in the Indian subcontinent (AQIS) will be introduced.
Introduction
Global jihad, i.e. the jihadist aim of creating a global caliphate, is a galvanizing
force behind jihadist recruitment and radicalization. However, while current
jihadist movements are becoming increasingly globalized, they do not
represent an ideologically unified or coordinated force. The global caliphate
is a primary and strategic objective during periods when a charismatic global
jihadist leader or force makes it appear tangible. This report maintains that
while global actors such as IS and AQ profoundly impact the security
situation in South Asia, “global jihad” is not an irreversible mind-set. When
local concerns loom large, so do opportunities for counter-radicalization and
counter-narrative strategies at the local level.
I S as an ide o logi cal de s t a b i liser
Given that there is a regional precedent of jihadist groups acting as proxy
forces, either for states, or for organizations that act as ideological “brands”
such as the Taliban or Pakistani Taliban, the security implications of the
global jihadist (and particularly IS) presence should be considered as an
“ideological destabiliser” rather than a coordinated force. It is important to
keep in mind that high levels of propaganda released by IS may exaggerate
their range of influence, and that IS has a precedent of accepting international
pledges of affiliation, even without practical mutual support (as in the case
of Boko Haram). As a result, militants adopting their ‘brand’ are able to gain
symbolic power, and this can provide momentum to their cause that
subsequently exacerbates security concerns for international government
agencies. This must not be read as downplaying the security concerns IS
presents. Its ideological influence risks invigorating a sectarian jihadist
cause, and inspiring fighters to mimic its notoriously violent tactics.
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