south-asian-militant-groups-and-global-jihad-in-2015

south-asian-militant-groups-and-global-jihad-in-2015 south-asian-militant-groups-and-global-jihad-in-2015

15.06.2015 Views

QUILL IAM PART 1 PROFILING OF MILITANT GROUPS Nature o f t h re a t The governments of Pakistan and Afghanistan, as well as the Coalition forces, have generally succeeded in both fracturing and weakening the centralised structures of principal Taliban groups. However, it is unclear whether or not structural integrity is needed for either the survival of these groups’ ambitions, or their capacity for violence. This is the case because: Multiple social networks permeate different jihadist groups. Moreover, the new ‘wave’ of global jihadist enthusiasm (Part IV of our longer report) has been energized by the success of IS, allowing groups to latch onto its symbolic capital. The groups that are profiled in the sections below have an unstable and ambiguous central structure that makes them difficult to defeat. This is what has made it unlikely that military action alone will end jihadist violence; unaccountable military violence will entrench support for the jihadist cause. Therefore, we recommend: a) Fostering both local and regional civil society and grassroots initiatives, and guaranteeing their safety, whilst also providing them with financial support in order to provide effective counter narratives to the Islamist ideology, b) Monitoring the use of video and propaganda as a product of influence. Prior to 2001, the Taliban declared suicide bombing un- Islamic. However, it has become a regular component of their attacks and propaganda over the last ten years 4 . As such, we suggest that the media, the government, and the civil society should be enlisted to build awareness on counter-extremism responses within media outlets, and to prevent the circulation of these videos and to stop them from garnering appeal. Difficulties in isolating militant groups and determining the forces they represent become clear in our profiles, which document webs of complex relationships between fighters (see Figure 2). Judging the “significance” of a group is equally difficult since there are numerous criteria by which a group might present a security threat. Furthermore, there are hundreds of armed groups across our chosen areas of focus: Afghanistan, Pakistan, J&K, and India. These groups fracture, merge, and change their names on a regular basis, and can also seek out, or be courted by, globally oriented 12

NEW AG EN T S OF GLOB AL JIHAD jihadist organizations. An attempt to present a group as a static, and easily quantifiable, security threat, would be misleading. Our aim is to give accurate portraits of the most significant militancy’s in these nations, and assess the regional significance of “global jihad”, rather than make a theoretical or a comparative argument. This report is principally a product of qualitative research: groups profiled are identified as most dangerous via a methodology of cross-checks, qualitative indicators, and assessments of groups. An overview of the size, structure, and influence of the major Islamist terrorist organisations that are currently operating in J&K, Pakistan, Afghanistan and India will be offered below. Prominent attacks and the relationships between the relevant terrorist groups will be commented upon. This section will provide the reader with a broad understanding of the operations and nature of the various terrorist groups that operate within this region, and it will provide a contextual base for the proceeding discussions on both IS as a destabilising force in South Asia, and policy recommendations to combat Islamist extremism. This section is a brief summary of our longer report that can be referenced for further detail and analysis on each terrorist group mentioned forthwith. Given that the majority of South Asian countries have experienced some degree of jihadist violence in recent years, our focus on Pakistan, Afghanistan and India should certainly not be read as an exhaustive survey of the continent. Originally, we intended to focus on Pakistani groups alone, but we recognised that an attempt to explain the encroachment of global jihadist ideologies into Pakistan without examining India or Afghanistan would be futile. The inter-connected borders of these nations form the political nervecentre of the region; arguably, this has been the case since the partition of India in 1947, and it will continue to be so long after the withdrawal of international forces from Afghanistan. However, in spite of their overwhelming influence within the region, excluding some of the surrounding countries from our analysis was somewhat problematic. For example, we predict that Bangladesh will be a potential “hotspot” for radicalization in the immediate future; and as is evinced by the fact that some militant Pakistani outfits targeting India prefer to enter India through the poorly guarded Bangladeshi border, its logistical significance to groups in Pakistan and India should not be overlooked 5 . Furthermore, Al Qaeda has named Bangladesh as a country whose Muslims would be ideologically 13

QUILL IAM<br />

PART 1<br />

PROFILING OF MILITANT GROUPS<br />

Nature o f t h re a t<br />

The governments of Pakistan <strong>and</strong> Afghanistan, as well as the Coalition forces,<br />

have generally succeeded <strong>in</strong> both fractur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> weaken<strong>in</strong>g the centralised<br />

structures of pr<strong>in</strong>cipal Taliban <strong>groups</strong>. However, it is unclear whether or not<br />

structural <strong>in</strong>tegrity is needed for either the survival of these <strong>groups</strong>’<br />

ambitions, or their capacity for violence. This is the case because:<br />

Multiple social networks permeate different <strong>jihad</strong>ist <strong>groups</strong>.<br />

Moreover, the new ‘wave’ of <strong>global</strong> <strong>jihad</strong>ist enthusiasm (Part IV of<br />

our longer report) has been energized by the success of IS, allow<strong>in</strong>g<br />

<strong>groups</strong> to latch onto its symbolic capital.<br />

The <strong>groups</strong> that are profiled <strong>in</strong> the sections below have an unstable<br />

<strong>and</strong> ambiguous central structure that makes them difficult to<br />

defeat. This is what has made it unlikely that military action alone<br />

will end <strong>jihad</strong>ist violence; unaccountable military violence will<br />

entrench support for the <strong>jihad</strong>ist cause. Therefore, we recommend:<br />

a) Foster<strong>in</strong>g both local <strong>and</strong> regional civil society <strong>and</strong> grassroots<br />

<strong>in</strong>itiatives, <strong>and</strong> guarantee<strong>in</strong>g their safety, whilst also provid<strong>in</strong>g<br />

them with f<strong>in</strong>ancial support <strong>in</strong> order to provide effective counter<br />

narratives to the Islamist ideology,<br />

b) Monitor<strong>in</strong>g the use of video <strong>and</strong> propag<strong>and</strong>a as a product of<br />

<strong>in</strong>fluence. Prior to 2001, the Taliban declared suicide bomb<strong>in</strong>g un-<br />

Islamic. However, it has become a regular component of their<br />

attacks <strong>and</strong> propag<strong>and</strong>a over the last ten years 4 . As such, we<br />

suggest that the media, the government, <strong>and</strong> the civil society<br />

should be enlisted to build awareness on counter-extremism<br />

responses with<strong>in</strong> media outlets, <strong>and</strong> to prevent the circulation of<br />

these videos <strong>and</strong> to stop them from garner<strong>in</strong>g appeal.<br />

<br />

Difficulties <strong>in</strong> isolat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>militant</strong> <strong>groups</strong> <strong>and</strong> determ<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g the forces<br />

they represent become clear <strong>in</strong> our profiles, which document webs<br />

of complex relationships between fighters (see Figure 2). Judg<strong>in</strong>g<br />

the “significance” of a group is equally difficult s<strong>in</strong>ce there are<br />

numerous criteria by which a group might present a security<br />

threat. Furthermore, there are hundreds of armed <strong>groups</strong> across<br />

our chosen areas of focus: Afghanistan, Pakistan, J&K, <strong>and</strong> India.<br />

These <strong>groups</strong> fracture, merge, <strong>and</strong> change their names on a regular<br />

basis, <strong>and</strong> can also seek out, or be courted by, <strong>global</strong>ly oriented<br />

12

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