south-asian-militant-groups-and-global-jihad-in-2015

South Asian Militant Groups and Global Jihad in 2015 

By Nikita Mali k & Eleano r Beevor 

Foreword b y Haras Ra fiq

QUILL IAM 

Quilliam is the world’s first counter-extremism think tank, set up to address 

the unique challenges of citizenship, identity, and belonging in a globalized 

world. Quilliam stands for religious freedom, equality, human rights, and 

democracy. Challenging extremism is the duty of all responsible members of 

society. Not least because cultural insularity and extremism are products of 

the failures of wider society to foster a shared sense of belonging and to 

advance democratic values. Quilliam seeks to challenge what we think and 

the way we think. It aims to generate creative, informed, and inclusive 

discussions to counter the ideological underpinnings of terrorism, whilst 

simultaneously providing evidence-based recommendations to 

governments for related policy measures. 

For further information contact: 

Quilliam 

Email: information@quilliamfoundation.org 

Tel: +44 (0)207 182 7280 

www.quilliamfoundation.org 

South Asian Militant Groups and Global Jihad in 2015, June 2015 

© Quilliam 2015 – All rights reserved 

ISBN number – 978-1-906603-11-3 

Disclaimer: The views of individuals and organisations used in this report do not 

necessarily reflect those of Quilliam. 2

NEW AG EN T S OF GLOB AL JIHAD 

South Asian Militant Groups and Global Jihad in 2015 

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

Glossary 5 

Foreword 6 

Executive Summary 8 

PART 1 12 

PROFILING OF MILITANT GROUPS 12 

Nature of threat 12 

Jammu and Kashmir 15 

Pakistan 18 

Afghanistan 20 

India 22 

PART 2 24 

GLOBAL JIHADIST FORCES IN SOUTH ASIA 24 

IS as an ideological destabiliser 24 

PART 3 30 

STATE OF PLAY 

Interaction between terrorist groups and national, regional, 

and international forces 30 

PART 4 35 

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 35 

Jammu and Kashmir 38 

Pakistan 40 

Afghanistan 43 

India 46 

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AUTHORS’ NOTE 

The authors would like to thank David Rapp for this assistance on this 

report, as well as our colleague Jonathan Russell for his support, 

assistance, and input. 

GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS 

Centre for Disease Control (CDC) 

Al Qaeda (AQ) 

Al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) 

Ansar al-Tawhid fi Bilad al-Hind (AUT) 

Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) 

Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) 

National Intelligence Grid (NATGRID) 

Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration (DDR) 

Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM) 

Harket-ul Jihad al-Islami (HuJI) 

Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HM) 

International Classification of Diseases (ICD) 

Islamic State (IS) 

Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) 

National Investigation Agency (NIA) 

National Security Guard (NSG) 

NATO International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) 

North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) 

Tehrik-e-Taliban (TTP) 

Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) 

United Jihad Council (UJC) 

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) 

Afghan Military Forces (AMF) 

Jamaat ul-Furqan (Juf) 

Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) 

Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and 

Transparency (PILDAT) 

National Action Plan (NAP) 

World Health Organisation (WHO) 

Disarmament of Illegal Armed Groups (DIAG) 

Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) 

Jamrat-e-Islami (JEI) 

Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) 

Hezb-i-Islami (HIG) 

Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) 

Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) 

Indian Mujahideen (IM) 

Defence Framework Agreement (DFA) 

Peoples’ Democratic Party (PDP) 

National Commission for Peace and Reconciliation (PTS) 

Students’ Islamic Movement of India (SIMI) 

Jam’at-ud-Dawa (Jud) 

Khaddam-ul-Islam (KuI) 

Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) 

4


GLOSSARY OF KEY TERMS 

Barelvi: A movement within Sunni Islam, of the Hanafi school of jurisprudence, originating 

in Bareilly with over 200 million followers in South Asia. Followers of the movement prefer 

to be known by the title of Ahle Sunnat wal Jama'at. The movement is influenced by Sufism 

and the traditional Islamic practices of South Asia, having formed as a reaction to the 

reformist attempts of Deobandi movement, which was influenced by the Wahhabi 

movement in Arabia. 

Deobandi: A term used for a revivalist movement within Hanafi Islam. Centred primarily in 

India, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Bangladesh, it has recently spread to the United Kingdom, 

and has a presence in South Africa. Many Pakistani terrorist outfits including the Taliban 

(TTP), Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP), Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM), 

and Jundallah follow the Deobandi interpretative tradition of Islam. As a result, they share 

common organizational infrastructure in the form of mosques and madrassahs. 

Extremism: An ideology, which when implemented, would significantly and negatively 

impact the human rights of certain sectors of society, such as women, religious or ethnic 

groups, persons with disabilities, and so on. By extension, violent extremism is an ideology 

that would justify the use of violence against such sectors of society. 

Hawala: Also known as hundi, hawala is an informal value transfer system based on the 

performance and honor of a huge network of money brokers, operating outside of, or 

parallel to, traditional banking, financial channels, and remittance systems. 

Islamism: The belief that Islam is a totalitarian political ideology. It claims that political 

sovereignty belongs to God rather than the people. Islamists believe that their reading of 

Shariah should be state law, and that it is the religious duty of all Muslims to work towards 

and pledge allegiance to an Islamic state that reflects these principles. 

Jihad: Literally ‘to struggle’ but often used to refer to armed struggle. 

Jihadism: Non-state violence used in the cause of Islamism. Just as Islamism is the 

politicisation of Islam, jihadists take the traditional concept of jihad and use it as a political 

and military tool to achieve a political end. 

Radicalisation: The process by which individuals and/or groups come to adopt extremist 

ideologies. Scholars often distinguish between ‘radicalisation’ and ‘violent radicalisation’ 

to highlight the difference between engaging in violent activities and radicalised nonviolent 

thinking. 

Terrorism: The use of violence or illegal force targeted at civilians by non-state actors, 

which seeks to bring about political/societal changes. 

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FOREWORD 

2015 has been a tumultuous year for Pakistan, Afghanistan, and India. Al 

Qaeda’s position as the most feared global jihadist network has been 

usurped by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, who have claimed to 

have formed the Islamic State (IS). Although Al Qaeda has expanded into 

India with the launch of a new branch, Al Qaeda in the Indian 

Subcontinent (AQIS), assessments of its strength vary, with some 

analysts arguing it will lose recruiting ground to IS. That said, the threat 

that AQIS presents in Pakistan and Afghanistan remains significant, less 

in terms of sheer fighting capacity, and more in terms of its stature as an 

ideological banner, propaganda arm, trainer, mediator, and dispenser of 

the “global jihadist narrative” or “global jihad”. IS’ gradual encroachment 

into South Asia can be considered in similar terms. 

In December 2014, NATO formally ended combat operations in 

Afghanistan, transferring full security responsibility to the Afghan 

government. The war came to an official, yet ambiguous conclusion. 

Although the majority of NATO-led International Security Assistance 

Force (ISAF) troops will withdraw, a mission titled Resolute Support, 

also led by NATO, will see 12,000 troops remain in a non-combat role. 

Furthermore, although the new Government of National Unity, led by 

President Ashraf Ghani and CEO (of Afghanistan) Abdullah Abdullah, 

shows signs of greater willingness to work with its neighbours to combat 

regional terrorism than that of President Ghani’s predecessor, President 

Hamid Karzai, its potential was hampered for several months by 

difficulties in forming a Cabinet. While the possibility of negotiations 

with the Taliban is not yet off the table for President Ghani, incentives to 

talk will depend on them being prevented from gaining the upper hand 

in military affairs after the ISAF withdrawal. In 2015, two rounds of 

informal talks between the Taliban and representatives of the civil 

society may improve confidence in President Ghani’s Government of 

National Unity. 

Meanwhile Pakistan is reeling from the Pakistani Taliban’s attack on a 

military-run school in December 2014 that left 146 people, most of 

which were children, dead. This was the deadliest attack that the 

Pakistani Taliban have ever committed. Nevertheless, there are high 

hopes that this attack will mark a turning point in Pakistan’s history of 

selectively tolerating militant groups. This would be a key step in 

ensuring durable regional peace. However, not only does this depend on 

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Pakistan’s domestic policy, but also on the future actions of its 

neighbours Afghanistan and India as well. 

India’s Prime Minister, Narendra Modi of the Bharatiya Janata Party 

(BJP), raised hopes of better relations with Pakistan when he invited 

Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to attend his swearing-in 

ceremony in May, 2014. However, disputes with the Pakistani 

Government over which nation the Muslim majority Kashmir ought to 

belong to, either India, or Pakistan, remain far from resolved, and India 

is increasingly having to deal with ‘home-grown’ threats from Islamist 

extremist groups as they seek to influence the decision making processes 

at an executive level. These threats will not be quelled so long as there is 

the perception that Muslims are being subjugated by the Indian 

Government. 

Global jihadism can be considered a culture, a network, and a cause. It is 

a culture in the sense that it contains a shared set of ideals, values, and 

beliefs that motivate and shape the actions of its members. However, 

despite several significant cultural similarities that exist between 

different global jihadist groups, the reasons why people are attracted to 

the idea of global Jihadism vary, dependant on the geographical location 

of the individual in question, the socio-political context within which 

said individual is operating, and the disposition of that individual. 

Interestingly, global jihadism is also in many ways a youth culture, and it 

attracts young, adventurous, and disaffected people in search of purpose. 

In this atomized but networked landscape, unaccountable military 

violence, particularly against civilians, will only entrench support for the 

jihadist cause. Therefore, Quilliam recommends fostering regional and 

local civil society and grassroots initiatives, promoting counternarratives 

that focus on anti-extremist messages, and increasing focus 

on mental health policy and care distribution. This report will serve as 

field guide on the strategies of, and interactions between, major actors 

within both IS and Al Qaeda, as well as the other major militant groups 

in the region during a turning point in South Asian geopolitics. 

Haras Rafiq 

Managing Director of Quilliam 

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

This report is designed as a field guide to the most significant militant groups 

in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India. It illustrates regional and international 

trends, and it explains the strategies that have been used by various global 

jihadist actors at a turning point in South Asian geopolitics. 

Due to a combination of military operations against them, internal 

fractionalisation, and the shifting influence of “global jihad”, terrorist groups 

in South Asia are far from structured, cohesive units. As such, Quilliam 

advocates a new approach in policy. It is now crucial to revisit and reemphasise 

the potential for counter-radicalization strategies, as well as 

mental health policy to reduce the risk of radicalisation. Moreover, we 

maintain that by coupling civil society initiatives with local, regional, and 

international policies, the affected Governments will be able to counter these 

violent ideologies. 

Based on our findings, Quilliam has developed the following set of counterterrorism 

and counter-extremism recommendations: 

T o the Inte rn a t i o n a l Comm unity: 

 

 

 

 

 

Make counter-extremism and human rights principles the 

cornerstone of all related aid that is provided to Pakistan and 

Afghanistan. 

Continue to focus on human rights as a core aim. Strongly insist on 

greater transparency during counter-terror operations such as 

Zarb-e-Azb in FATA. If human rights abuses against civilians go 

unchecked, then defeating one wave of militancy is a temporary 

victory, as another will be created in the process in response to 

perceived injustices. 

Support grassroots reconciliation efforts and civil society 

initiatives which offer positive, sensitive, and sustainable forms of 

post-conflict solutions. 

Better engage with Muslim communities in India, Pakistan, Jammu 

and Kashmir (J&K), and Afghanistan to decrease the appeal of an 

Islamic caliphate by promoting democratic cultures and 

addressing grievances to prevent militant ideologies exploiting 

them. 

Help foster stronger micro-finance charity relationships, banking 

systems, and schemes in South Asia in order to provide conduits to 

micro-credit for smaller villages and communities that will 

facilitate economic and social development, and reduce the risks of 

radicalisation within the relevant communities. The informal 

8


 

 

‘value transfer’ system that is known as the hawala system, tends 

to thrive when the banking sector is weak. We recommend 

requirements on hawaladar, such as licensing and registration. 

Support economic policies that will reduce income inequality in 

Afghanistan, India, and Pakistan, and avoid the implementation of 

financial measures that disproportionately impact the poor in the 

way that structural adjustment schemes have done so in the past. 

Critically review the legal, moral, and military arguments for 

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) in operations over Pakistan and 

Afghanistan. Associated grievances can be exploited by extremists 

to radicalize or recruit local populations. 

T o t he Gove rn m e n t s o f Pa kistan, India, and Af g hanis t a n : 

Reduce corruption to legitimize state institutions. This includes 

implementing different policies (education, training, job search assistance) 

to provide livelihoods for citizens. 

 

 

 

 

 

Increase focus on prisons and prison care, where staff should be 

trained to tackle arguments of extremists, and inmates can be 

recruited to help in this process. 

Encourage the implementation of new education measures within 

schools and universities that focus on more secular curriculums 

and the role of civil tolerance. 

Promote the rule of law and investigate the role of a dual-justice 

system within Pakistan, whereby the state legally recognises 

dispensers of, and decisions by, more traditional justice systems, 

provided they follow proscriptions to bring them under the remit 

of state law 1 . 

Take steps to establish a non-profit initiative that harvests Afghan 

opium at prices beneficial to Afghan producers, and redistributes 

its constituent medical products to hospitals in need, an initiative 

that has potential for conflict appeasement and palliative care. As 

we illustrate in this report, one of the main challenges 

governments face is competing with terrorist organizations that 

also offer effective social services. One way of doing this is by filling 

the gap of legitimate philanthropic organisations. 

Restructure and increase transparency of hawala systems of 

finance, which are often used for the financing of terrorism, by 

encouraging regulated banking structures that are shariahcompliant, 

charities such as FINCA, and charitable arms of banking 

systems, to provide low-interest loans, and implement minimum 

regulation standards to be in line with rules imposed on 

conventional banks. 

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Reform laws on blasphemy, as they strengthen the stance of 

Islamist extremists. 

Undertake research based on public health frameworks to 

investigate the causes and consequences of violent and non-violent 

extremism, following new initiatives to treat violent extremism as 

a public health issue. The WHO’s Violence Prevention Alliance has 

recently provided a public health framework to investigate and 

understand the causes and consequences of violence. These 

include individual, relationship, community-based, and societal 

approaches to prevent violence. Extending such work to tackle 

violent radicalization and terrorism is a natural next step, though 

not yet done. Routine health surveys and censuses might ask about 

aspects of violent radicalization and group cohesion as relevant 

health and social issues, and not only as criminal justice issues 2 . 

This is crucial in an environment of widespread violence, where 

there are low levels of social and political education. 

Foster and facilitate counter-narratives in countries where 

Islamism as an ideology is more potent, such as in Pakistan and 

Afghanistan. The main risk behind the power of the IS brand is that 

its narratives on apostasy (takfiri) will go mainstream and 

exacerbate the sectarianism that is presently growing in South 

Asia. This is IS's market niche, and given that Jundullah - a 

traditionally sectarian, newly declared ally of IS - has claimed 

credit for the Shia mosque bombing in January 2015, as well as 

several other attacks on the Shia community, it is increasingly a 

theme that is coming to the fore, and one that counter-narratives 

could address specifically. 

Encourage cooperation between the states of India, Pakistan, and 

Afghanistan to defeat the new transnational terrorist force of the 

Islamic State, which differs ideologically from entrenched and 

established terrorist groups in the region. Sharing of information, 

and social and political initiatives between bordering states, would 

reduce the threat of extremism spilling over from one nation to 

another. 

T o C i v i l Society C o m m unities and Gro ups : 

 

The threat to civil society activities and activists in Pakistan and 

Afghanistan is becoming increasingly worrying. Following the 

murder of Sabeen Mahmud in April 2015, we strongly encourage 

governments to assume responsibility for increasing the security 

of its citizens as well as to provide the institutional and financial 

support to help develop initiatives that create safe spaces for 

activism, engagement and debate, such as Mahmud’s The Second 

Floor (T2F). 

10


 

 

 

 

 

 

Deny sectarian preachers unchallenged platforms in mosques in 

order to avoid the propagation of ideologies that incite violence. 

Treat Islamist extremism as a damaging political ideology, not a 

religious one. Similarly, treat jihadist violence as criminal, not 

religious violence. We encourage civil society to not only condemn 

acts of terror, but also to reject ideology that legitimizes terrorism 

as ‘jihad’. 

Deny extremists a platform in the media, in the form of column 

spaces or interview slots. 

Set up deradicalisation and mental health rehabilitation centers in 

South Asia where extremist ideology can be countered, and 

pluralistic interpretations of Islam can be promoted. Encourage 

uniting people with differing religious preferences on the basis of 

a common opposition to Islamist extremism. Educate about the 

differences between the faith of Islam and the political nature of 

Islamism, emphasising that rejecting an Islamist agenda does not 

mean rejecting Islam. 

Focus attention on university campuses as well as institutions of 

Islamic learning, called madrassahs, in all three countries where 

ideological drivers of Islamist extremism are likely to be active. 

Empower educated youth and civil society actors to foster social 

movements that challenge Islamist extremism through the 

promotion of pluralistic values. 

Direct international assistance to strengthen the capacity building 

of civilian institutions. 

South Asia cannot be analysed as a monolithic whole for the presentation of 

policy and programmatic interventions. However, countries and groups with 

shared roots benefit from allying on different issues if such approaches are 

kept multi-pronged. For example, recent efforts to strategize the use of 

shared resources such as water development plans in Pakistan and India 3 

require a physical and psychological paradigm shift to end hostilities, and a 

change in the way in which resource sharing, trust, cooperation, and social 

and economic development is managed. In order to reduce the long-term 

financial and opportunity costs of persistent non-cooperation, we advocate 

synergies and cooperation between countries wherever possible. 

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PART 1 

PROFILING OF MILITANT GROUPS 

Nature o f t h re a t 

The governments of Pakistan and Afghanistan, as well as the Coalition forces, 

have generally succeeded in both fracturing and weakening the centralised 

structures of principal Taliban groups. However, it is unclear whether or not 

structural integrity is needed for either the survival of these groups’ 

ambitions, or their capacity for violence. This is the case because: 

Multiple social networks permeate different jihadist groups. 

Moreover, the new ‘wave’ of global jihadist enthusiasm (Part IV of 

our longer report) has been energized by the success of IS, allowing 

groups to latch onto its symbolic capital. 

The groups that are profiled in the sections below have an unstable 

and ambiguous central structure that makes them difficult to 

defeat. This is what has made it unlikely that military action alone 

will end jihadist violence; unaccountable military violence will 

entrench support for the jihadist cause. Therefore, we recommend: 

a) Fostering both local and regional civil society and grassroots 

initiatives, and guaranteeing their safety, whilst also providing 

them with financial support in order to provide effective counter 

narratives to the Islamist ideology, 

b) Monitoring the use of video and propaganda as a product of 

influence. Prior to 2001, the Taliban declared suicide bombing un- 

Islamic. However, it has become a regular component of their 

attacks and propaganda over the last ten years 4 . As such, we 

suggest that the media, the government, and the civil society 

should be enlisted to build awareness on counter-extremism 

responses within media outlets, and to prevent the circulation of 

these videos and to stop them from garnering appeal. 

 

Difficulties in isolating militant groups and determining the forces 

they represent become clear in our profiles, which document webs 

of complex relationships between fighters (see Figure 2). Judging 

the “significance” of a group is equally difficult since there are 

numerous criteria by which a group might present a security 

threat. Furthermore, there are hundreds of armed groups across 

our chosen areas of focus: Afghanistan, Pakistan, J&K, and India. 

These groups fracture, merge, and change their names on a regular 

basis, and can also seek out, or be courted by, globally oriented 

12


 

jihadist organizations. An attempt to present a group as a static, 

and easily quantifiable, security threat, would be misleading. 

Our aim is to give accurate portraits of the most significant 

militancy’s in these nations, and assess the regional significance of 

“global jihad”, rather than make a theoretical or a comparative 

argument. This report is principally a product of qualitative 

research: groups profiled are identified as most dangerous via a 

methodology of cross-checks, qualitative indicators, and 

assessments of groups. 

An overview of the size, structure, and influence of the major Islamist 

terrorist organisations that are currently operating in J&K, Pakistan, 

Afghanistan and India will be offered below. Prominent attacks and the 

relationships between the relevant terrorist groups will be commented 

upon. 

This section will provide the reader with a broad understanding of the 

operations and nature of the various terrorist groups that operate within this 

region, and it will provide a contextual base for the proceeding discussions 

on both IS as a destabilising force in South Asia, and policy recommendations 

to combat Islamist extremism. This section is a brief summary of our longer 

report that can be referenced for further detail and analysis on each terrorist 

group mentioned forthwith. 

Given that the majority of South Asian countries have experienced some 

degree of jihadist violence in recent years, our focus on Pakistan, Afghanistan 

and India should certainly not be read as an exhaustive survey of the 

continent. Originally, we intended to focus on Pakistani groups alone, but we 

recognised that an attempt to explain the encroachment of global jihadist 

ideologies into Pakistan without examining India or Afghanistan would be 

futile. The inter-connected borders of these nations form the political nervecentre 

of the region; arguably, this has been the case since the partition of 

India in 1947, and it will continue to be so long after the withdrawal of 

international forces from Afghanistan. However, in spite of their 

overwhelming influence within the region, excluding some of the 

surrounding countries from our analysis was somewhat problematic. For 

example, we predict that Bangladesh will be a potential “hotspot” for 

radicalization in the immediate future; and as is evinced by the fact that some 

militant Pakistani outfits targeting India prefer to enter India through the 

poorly guarded Bangladeshi border, its logistical significance to groups in 

Pakistan and India should not be overlooked 5 . Furthermore, Al Qaeda has 

named Bangladesh as a country whose Muslims would be ideologically 

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targeted by its newly established branch in the Indian subcontinent (AQIS) 6 , 

and the recent murder of a secular blogger has raised national concern about 

Bangladesh’s future with Islamism 7 . However, while Bangladesh does have 

some militant groups, they have not yet committed many significant attacks, 

and the attacks that have been committed are certainly not on the scale that 

would place them alongside the groups that we profile in this report. 

Although Bangladeshi groups are not profiled here, its strategic significance 

to militants should not be ignored by policy-makers. 

Figure 1: Map of South Asia 

14


Jammu and Kashmir 

1. In theory, Kashmir-oriented jihadists operate under the umbrella of the 

United Jihad Council (UJC). However, several offshoot members are 

significant in their own right, and occasionally fight each other. As such, 

the UJC does not have the power to control them, and is of questionable 

importance in directing their actions. 

Numerous UJC members have strong links with AQ, as well as with 

IS. 

UJC regularly changes its position on the Kashmir issue, moving 

from pro-accession to Pakistan, to a pro-separatist stance. 

Its principle relevance comes from its close ties to the All Parties 

Hurriyat Conference, the principle political organ advocating 

Kashmiri separatism. 

UJC is officially headed by Syed Salahuddin, who is also the leader 

of Hizb-ul-Mujahideen. 

Militants that operate within the UJC and declare J&K status a 

principle motivation do not only operate there; many operate in 

Pakistan and simply carry out attacks in Kashmir. 

2. Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HM) is an influential terrorist group that redefines 

the ‘Kashmir question’ as one of Islamic identity: 

HM initially gained Kashmiri Muslim support for its Islamist 

message, but the group’s condemnatory stance on Sufi traditions 

such as praying at shrines alienated some of its following. 

Despite setbacks, HM is a well-disciplined, well trained force. Its 

most recent activity includes nineteen attacks on hard targets in 

India in 2013. 8 

The group has roughly 1,500 fighters. 9 

HM is purportedly funded by numerous charities, through a system 

of hawala and cash couriers. Jammu and Kashmir Affectees Relief 

Trust (JKART) is said to have funded approximately $16 million. 10 

HM also has a female wing, Dukhtaran-e-Millat (Daughters of the 

Faith) who run an Islamic relief organisation. 11 

They have recently been accused of being behind the intimidation 

and shutdown of J&K’s telecommunication sector, an allegation 

they deny. Another suspect is a new and little known group, 

Lashkar-e-Islam (this group is unrelated to the TTP offshoot of the 

same name) 12 . 

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3. Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) stems from its above-ground parent organisation, 

Jam’at-ud-Dawa (JuD). It has recently shifted focus from J&K and India to 

an international audience: 

This group is feared for its links to AQ and the Taliban. Some see 

LeT as a part-time ally of AQ, others see the two as great rivals. The 

group has several cells in Middle Eastern countries, as well as in 

the US and in Germany. The majority of LeT operatives are 

Pakistanis (often Punjabis) and it is cited as the most ‘lethal’ 

terrorist group that is operating from South Asia. 13 

JuD leader Hafiz Saeed lives freely in Pakistan, to the chagrin of 

India, and, although he denies his association with LeT, he 

maintains that LeT leader Zakiur Rehman Lakhvi was not involved 

in the Mumbai attacks 14 . 

The group is purported to have carried out reconnaissance 

missions intending to target a Danish cartoonist. 15 They began 

operations in India in 1993, and since then, they have been 

implicated in hundreds of attacks in India; the most famous of 

which are the 2008 attacks in Mumbai, where LeT killed over 164 

people in a series of 12 targeted attacks that lasted a total of four 

days. 

LeT is said to have a force of approximately 750 fighters. 16 

LeT is also a widespread social welfare organization, with more 

than 50,000 registered members spreading its influence and 

raising funds. 17 It also operates several important social welfare 

programmes, including but not limited to the development and 

maintenance of hospitals, blood banks, and food banks. 

Within Europe, Britain is a major centre for its fundraising among 

the Pakistani immigrant population 18 . LeT's illegal fundraising 

activities include false trade invoicing, counterfeiting, extortion, 

and involvement in the drug trade. 

4. Harket-ul Jihad al-Islami (HuJI) is a parent organization of several 

important offshoots (see Figure 2): 

At one point, HuJI had merged with its own offshoot Harkat-ul- 

Mujahideen (HuM) under the name Harkat-ul-Ansar, however the 

two groups eventually parted. 

HuJI is an AQ member and founder of Brigade 313, Al Qaeda’s 

military arm in Pakistan. 

Comprising of 700 cadres, HuJI has not claimed the most casualties, 

nor is it the largest group; however, it is recognised as the parent 

16


organisation of several important offshoots. Brigade 313 is a 

coalition of three militant organisations: HuJI, LeT and LeJ. 19 

5. Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM): 

In 1997, HuM was proscribed a terror organization by the US due 

to its links with AQ. Its leader, Fazal ur Rehman Khalil, is a 

signatory to Bin Laden’s 1998 fatwa that declared war on both the 

US and Israel. 20 HuM works closely with the head of AQIS, Asim 

Umar, and in conjunction with JeM, they are believed to be 

responsible for training militants for operations in Jammu and 

Kashmir. 21 

HuM’s most notorious attack was the hijacking of the Indian 

Airlines Flight IC814 on Christmas Eve, 1999. 

HuM currently runs training camps in east Afghanistan, and may 

be part of an AQ “syndicate” of Pakistani militants. It may have 

several thousand members in Jammu and Kashmir. 22 

6. Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) 

JeM split into two separate factions in 2003. One is led by Mualana 

Abdul Jabbar, and is called Jamaat ul-Furqan (JuF), the other is led 

by Mufti Abdul Rauf Asghar, and is called Khuddam-ul-Islam (KuI). 

Both offshoots have since been banned, but continue to be referred 

to as JeM. 

JeM has well-known “suicide attack” modus operandi; their most 

famous attack was on the Indian Parliament in New Delhi in 2001, 

which also involved LeT militants. 

JeM is a core faction of the “Punjabi Taliban Network.” 23 Other core 

factions are LeJ and SSP 24 (see Figure 2). The collection of militants 

inside JeM is believed to comprise of 300-400 fighters 25 though 

they may have a larger membership beyond their core fighters. 

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Pakistan 

1. Originally a sectarian militant organization in Pakistan, Sipah-e-Sahaba 

Pakistan (SSP), has become largely a political pressure group. 

However, this group is eclipsed by its more radical offshoot, 

Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ). SSP uses religious politics to tie its history 

with the history of Sunni-Shia, Deobandi-Barelvi tensions, in 

Pakistan in general and in Punjab in particular. SSP wishes to 

establish a Sunni Islamic state in Pakistan, of its own Deobandi 

kind, raising fears that its purist view of Sunni Islam will see it 

ideologically aligned to IS and trigger mutual cooperation (it may 

already, at least in name, be supporting them. 26,27 ) 

The SSP has been linked to Ramzi Ahmed Yousuf, the mastermind 

of the February 1993 bombing of the World Trade Centre in New 

York. 

2. Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) is explicitly militant. Ideologically, its hard-line 

Deobandism is similar to the Taliban’s ideology: 

LeJ worked closely with both Afghan and Pakistani factions of AQ. 

LeJ remains a core of the Punjabi Taliban (a faction that offers 

logistical support to the TTP). 

Both SSP and LeJ militants fought alongside the Taliban against the 

Northern Alliance. 

Their takfiri ideology has seen a number of their cadres form close 

alliances with IS elements in Pakistan 28 . Indeed, some analysts say 

they have been operating in Iraq since 2013. They are now the 

prime suspects in the May 2015 attack on a bus in Karachi, in which 

gunmen killed 45 members of the Ismaili Shia community, an 

attack that was initially claimed by a TTP splinter, and new IS 

loyalists Jundullah; (LeJ have previously avoided claiming credit 

for their own attacks). It is feared that the attack amounts to a plea 

for IS attention and funding 29 . 

In 1999, LeJ attempted to assassinate Pakistani Prime Minister 

Nawaz Sharif twice, and they were responsible for the 2009 attack 

on the Sri Lankan cricket team. 

The LeJ are also reportedly close to Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM), 

and they have attended their training camps in Jammu and 

Kashmir. 30 The group has roughly 1,000 fighters. 31 

18


3. The Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), or Pakistani Taliban, is the 

greatest threat to the security of the Pakistani state: 

Historically, TTP fighters were members of the Afghan Taliban; 

however, they parted ways in 2007 due to disagreements over 

their policy toward the Pakistani government. Afghan Taliban 

leader Mullah Omar maintained a degree of cooperation with 

Islamabad, while TTP founder Baitullah Mehsud and his cadres had 

developed a consuming hostility to the Pakistani state under the 

rule of Pervez Musharraf. However, Afghan Taliban and TTP 

continue to cooperate closely, and the TTP maintains loyalty to 

Mullah Omar. As such, the TTP’s existential reasoning remains the 

overthrow of the Pakistani state 32 . 

In the past year, TTP cohesion has been severely compromised due 

to leadership changes. Baitullah Mehsud was killed in a UAV strike 

in 2009 and was succeeded by his Mehsud clan-mate, Hakimullah 

Mehsud. Hakimullah was also killed in a UAV attack in 2012 and 

was controversially succeeded by a non-Mehsud, Maulana 

Fazlullah. This provoked a clan-based split, and Mehsud leaders 

broke away with their own followers. There are currently two 

main Mehsud breakaway factions. A further split occurred in 

August 2014, when Jammat ul-Ahrar, led by Maulana Kasim 

Khorosani, emerged, (as well as a number of other splinters, some 

of which have now pledged allegiance to IS, such as Jundullah). 

However, Al Qaeda has taken on a mediating role, leading to the 

reconciliation of Jamaat ul-Ahrar with the main TTP umbrella 

earlier this year. (This mediation may have been an attempt to 

buffer IS influence) 33 . 

The TTP is not as hierarchical as it may appear, and may be more 

accurately understood as a coalition of militant clusters, each of 

which has different connections to other local militant groups. 

The current size of its force ranges from 500-8,000 fighters. 34 

TTP militants claimed responsibility for the December 2014 

attacks in the Army Public School in Peshawar, which left 145 

people, 132 of which were children, dead. 

TTP has extensive involvement in criminal enterprise, and may be 

involved in the sale of narcotics to fund its activities. 35 

19

QUILL IAM 

Afghanistan 

1. After the Taliban, Hezb-i-Islami (HIG) is the second largest terrorist 

group in Afghanistan: 36 

The group’s ideology stems from both the ideologues of the Muslim 

Brotherhood, and Abul A’la Maudadi’s Jamaat-e-Islami (JEI). The 

group seeks to emulate the Ikhwan of Saudi Arabia, and replace 

various tribal factions with one unified Islamic state. This ideology 

is in direct contrast to the Taliban’s approach in Afghanistan, which 

focuses on the sustenance of tribal structures and orientations. 

Today, the non-violent faction of HIG is registered as a political 

party in Afghanistan. 

HIG has been responsible for two major attacks: a suicide attack in 

Kabul in 2010, carried out by a young woman who killed nine 

people, and an attack in Kabul in May 2013, which killed 16 people. 

It is estimated that the group’s military component consists of 

1,000 fighters, including part-time fighters. 37 

2. Haqqani Network is an Islamist insurgent group: 

Initially, the group was nurtured by the CIA and ISI during the 

1980’s Soviet War in Afghanistan. It was banned by Pakistan in 

January 2015, following the Peshawar school attacks by the 

Taliban in December 2014. The group is seen as an important 

Taliban ally, and has collaborated with Al-Qaeda. 38 Al-Qaeda’s 

goals are global and use global means; whereas Haqqani Network 

is interested in Afghanistan and the Pashtun Tribal regions. 

Previous attacks have included suicide bombings in the 

Intercontinental Hotel in Kabul in 2011, and bombings in Kabul in 

late 2014 that killed two US soldiers. In total, the group has 

conducted 66 terrorist attacks from September 2006 to September 

2013. 39 

The number of fighters within the Haqqani Network varies 

between 4,000 and 12,000 people, with up to 10,000-15,000 

fighters claiming allegiance. 40 

The New York Times reported that in September 2011, the 

Haqqanis have set up a "mini-state" in Miranshah with courts, tax 

offices and madrassahs, and that the network runs a series of front 

companies selling automobiles and real estate. 41 They also receive 

funds from extortion, kidnappings, and smuggling operations 

throughout eastern Afghanistan. 

20


3. Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) operates through militants in 

Pakistan’s tribal areas: 

The group’s headquarters are located in Afghanistan, and they are 

linked with the Taliban and AQ. Last September, leaders of IMU 

reportedly announced that the group was joining IS. 42 However, 

given a lack of IMU activity under the IS banner, and a later 

declaration of IS allegiance by IS commanders, this is unlikely to be 

a blanket policy for the movement 43 . 

The IMU has conducted 9 attacks between 2000 and 2013, and they 

often couple with Hizb-al-Tahrir-al-Islami in order to execute 

attacks. 

The number of fighters in IMU is unclear. With each consequent 

reshuffle of leadership, members of IMU have left the movement 

and partnered with groups in Afghanistan: some of them retain the 

IMU name, others have mixed with the Taliban, the AQ or other 

groups. 

The group likely obtains its funds through drug trafficking. 44 

4. The Afghan Taliban focuses on national rather than international goals, 

and contrary to perceived wisdom, should not be characterized by its 

conservatism alone: 

The influence of AQ and that of “global jihad” has rubbed off on the 

Taliban, which is now attempting to muster these narratives for 

support in Islamist-nationalist goals. There are fears that the youth 

will not succumb easily to the nationalist sentiments of 

mujahedeen predecessors, particularly with glamorously radical 

and globally oriented alternatives such as IS. 45 

Despite the remaining international forces in Afghanistan, the 

Taliban remains a highly active force that mounts attacks on a 

regular basis. Having once condemned suicide bombing as un- 

Islamic they have now embraced the technique and its 

accompanying opportunities for propaganda. It is likely that this is 

due to AQ influence. In the last few months, its forces may have 

been boosted by foreign fighters from Chechnya and Central Asia. 

Their territorial ambitions are not diminished, as was shown in a 

June 6 th 2015 attack in which they overran Badakhshan Province 46 . 

There are over 36,000 Afghan Taliban fighters. 47 These fighters are 

led by the elusive Mullah Omar, who founded the Taliban from a 

group of former mujahedeen-turned-vigilantes in the wake of the 

Soviet withdrawal. The Taliban were eventually able to take over 

the majority of the country thanks to their ability to restore order; 

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QUILL IAM 

 

 

however, they were ousted in 2001 by a joint U.S. and Northern 

Alliance effort. Mullah Omar has not been seen in public since that 

invasion. That reclusiveness helped him cultivate a charismatic 

mystique that aided Taliban cohesiveness for much of the past 

decade. However, recently it appears to be working against him. 

Though the Taliban is theoretically presided over by the Quetta 

Shura council, it may in fact have split into factions as well. A group 

of IMU fighters formerly allied to the Taliban recently declared 

their allegiance to IS on the grounds of Omar’s lack of visible 

authority 48 . 

There are strong divisions in attitudes to negotiation within the 

movement. There are ongoing unofficial talks in Oslo between 

Taliban members, female civil society and government 

representatives, to discuss the rights of women under a possible 

power sharing agreement - a significant concern for the architects 

of a prospective peace deal between the Taliban and the Afghan 

government. In the talks, the Taliban have indicated that they 

would allow female education, and that they would allow women 

to work in “male dominated professions”. However, such views are 

unlikely to hold true across the whole of the Taliban, which has 

seen divisions among its leadership about whether or not to 

participate in government proceedings before 49 . 

The Taliban was originally provided arms by the United State due 

to their opposition to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the 

weapons are still in the hands of many insurgents today. 50 Pakistan 

also supported the Taliban heavily during their 5-year control of 

Afghanistan, providing millions in aid money and ISI assistance. 51 

Much of the Taliban's current finances come from drug trade. 

India 

1. Ansar al-Tawhid fi Bilad al-Hind (AUT) acts within India and across the 

borders of Kashmir, though its precise location, whereabouts, and 

scope of activity is unknown: 

It is likely that group is based in Afghanistan, and it threatened 

India shortly before their consulate was attacked in Afghanistan 

in May, 2014. 52 

It is unclear whether the group has successfully carried out any 

operations, or whether it is part of an umbrella group in Central 

and Southern Asia. In October 2013, the group released a video 

through its media arm in order to appeal to Indian Muslims. The 

video was titled, ‘In the Land of the Hind: Lions of India – ‘Usud 

22


 

 

al Hind ‘’ and it stated that Muslims in India have been living 

under ‘fear and dread of the Hindus, who worship cows.’ 

It is uncertain exactly how many fighters occupy its ranks, and it 

is unclear whether or not these members overlap with other 

jihadi factions. 

The group is linked to AQIS, and it is likely that it receives funding 

from that source. 53 

2. The Indian Mujahideen (IM) has engaged in several terrorist attacks 

in India and had regional aspirations with the ultimate aim of creating 

an “Islamic caliphate;” 54 

The group has more regional than international aims. 

Investigators believe that the IM is one of many groups 

composed of lower-tier Students’ Islamic Movement of India 

(SIMI) members. IM is linked by training to al-Qaeda in Pakistan. 

The IM has executed at least 11 major terrorist attacks. It is 

responsible for orchestrating a bombing that killed 16 people in 

Hyderabad in 2013, as well as a bomb blast in New Delhi’s high 

court that left 15 people dead in 2011. 55 

The number of fighters in IM is unknown, but is expected to be 

growing rapidly. 56 

IM secures funding from its affiliations with both AQ and IS. 57 

3. Deendar Anjuman is an Islamist group based in Hyderabad, India: 

The group claims it is a response to mass Muslim conversion to 

Hinduism in the 1920s. The goals of its founder, Hazrath Syed 

Siddique Hussain, was that “All India will embrace Islam” and that 

India would be the capital for the next Islamic Caliphate. 58 

The group has very little recent activity. 

Deendar Anjuman has claimed responsibility for the role of its 

followers in the church bombings in India in 2000. 

The group has committed robberies to secure funds for its 

activities. 59 

23

QUILL IAM 

PART 2 

GLOBAL JIHADIST FORCES IN SOUTH ASIA 

Building on the analysis of the aforementioned Islamist terrorist groups in 

J&K, Pakistan, Afghanistan and India, Part 2 of this report will explore the 

influence of the “global jihadist” network that is being propagated by IS 

throughout South Asia, and it will analyse the role of IS as an ‘ideological 

destabiliser’ within the region. In this section, particular attention will be 

paid to the relationship between Al-Qaeda and IS within Afghanistan and 

Pakistan. The implications of this changing power dynamic for the security 

of South Asia will be explored. Furthermore, Al-Qaeda’s newest branch, Al- 

Qaeda in the Indian subcontinent (AQIS) will be introduced. 

Introduction 

Global jihad, i.e. the jihadist aim of creating a global caliphate, is a galvanizing 

force behind jihadist recruitment and radicalization. However, while current 

jihadist movements are becoming increasingly globalized, they do not 

represent an ideologically unified or coordinated force. The global caliphate 

is a primary and strategic objective during periods when a charismatic global 

jihadist leader or force makes it appear tangible. This report maintains that 

while global actors such as IS and AQ profoundly impact the security 

situation in South Asia, “global jihad” is not an irreversible mind-set. When 

local concerns loom large, so do opportunities for counter-radicalization and 

counter-narrative strategies at the local level. 

I S as an ide o logi cal de s t a b i liser 

Given that there is a regional precedent of jihadist groups acting as proxy 

forces, either for states, or for organizations that act as ideological “brands” 

such as the Taliban or Pakistani Taliban, the security implications of the 

global jihadist (and particularly IS) presence should be considered as an 

“ideological destabiliser” rather than a coordinated force. It is important to 

keep in mind that high levels of propaganda released by IS may exaggerate 

their range of influence, and that IS has a precedent of accepting international 

pledges of affiliation, even without practical mutual support (as in the case 

of Boko Haram). As a result, militants adopting their ‘brand’ are able to gain 

symbolic power, and this can provide momentum to their cause that 

subsequently exacerbates security concerns for international government 

agencies. This must not be read as downplaying the security concerns IS 

presents. Its ideological influence risks invigorating a sectarian jihadist 

cause, and inspiring fighters to mimic its notoriously violent tactics. 

24


Below, the key areas of concern for South Asia as IS expands its global 

influence will be outlined. As noted above, particular attention will be paid 

to the relationship between Al-Qaeda and IS, and the implications of this 

shifting balance of power for the greater South Asia region. This section will 

also introduce Al-Qaeda’s affiliate group, Al-Qaeda in the Indian subcontinent 

(AQIS). 

1. IS is challenging AQ’s presence as the architects of global jihad: 

AQ has a historical and territorial advantage in South Asia, but this 

has not discouraged IS’ efforts in the region. 

IS recruiters hailing from the Middle East are focusing more on 

recruiting Pakistani fighters for the war in Syria and Iraq. Local 

sources in Peshawar say IS started recruitment in Pakistan in 2012 

even before they emerged as IS themselves, and more than 200 

fighters have left from Pakistan to join IS. Most of these fighters 

were from the Pakistani Taliban, LeJ, and other militant groups, 

who went to fight Bashar al Assad in Syria, and eventually joined 

IS. 60 

A worrying number of home-grown Afghan and Pakistani militants 

are beginning to operate locally under the IS brand. The first to 

pledge allegiance to IS was former Guantanamo detainee Abdul 

Rahim Muslim Dost, and he continues to work as a recruiter and 

propagandist. He is currently described as leader of IS affiliates in 

Afghanistan. 

There is now a leadership council, or Shura, for IS Khorosan 

Province (ISKP) (Khorosan referring to both Afghanistan and 

Pakistan) that was established in January 2015 by a group of 

former TTP commanders, including their former spokesman 

Shahid Shahidullah. However, the Shura’s power over regional IS 

affiliates in questionable. 

Recently, Abdul Rahim Muslim Dost warned that the Taliban 

fought on behalf of ISI, and he issued a warning to those seeking to 

fight IS 61 . However, he isn’t known to be a member of the ISKP 

Shura. An IS spokesman officially recognized the group and its new 

Emir, Hafiz Saeed Khan, another ex-TTP fighter. However, the 

Shura itself now contains a mix of ex-TTP and Afghan Taliban 62 . 

Shahidullah has announced that all IS’s regional affiliates, including 

Dost, had consented to the Shura’s leadership. 

ISKP has had setbacks; it lost its deputy emir to a UAV strike in 

March, and a month later it lost that deputy’s replacement 63 . It is 

not known if the Shura has links to other self-declared IS affiliates, 

such as TTP splinter Jundullah, which declared allegiance last 

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QUILL IAM 

 

 

November. Some other TTP local emirs such as that of Bajaur 

Agency have also declared allegiance, and are attempting to turn 

over their local authority to IS 64 . 

So far, the picture suggests the Shura has little control over 

scattered IS affiliates. Despite Shahidullah’s claim that Dost is at 

least ideologically within ISKP, confusion over the perpetrator of 

an April 2015 suicide attack on a Jalalabad bank, which killed 35, 

suggests otherwise. Hafiz Saeed Khan tweeted a photo of the 

bomber responsible and he claimed that the attack was ISKPs first. 

However, Dost later refuted the claim and they stated that IS wasn’t 

involved, but rather, that the attack was the work of Pakistani 

intelligence and was implemented in order to “damage the 

reputation of IS” 65 . This incident is indicative of militants 

capitalizing on a common brand, rather than sharing a common 

strategy. 

There are increasing reports that fighting between the Taliban and 

IS in Afghanistan has become common, such as 15 IS fighters and 

12 Taliban militants killed over declarations of allegiance to Abu 

Bakr al-Baghdadi in May 2015. 66 

2. The fracturing of the Taliban in Pakistan has provided the Islamic State 

with the opportunity to gain a foothold in the region. 

The Islamic State has peeled off disaffected or marginalized 

Taliban commanders from various Taliban groups to boost the 

leadership cadres of ISKP. However, until the ISKP Shura gains 

greater control of the vast number of largely independent IS 

affiliates in the region, IS will not exercise any significant territorial 

control. As such, an IS coordinated insurgency is unlikely. 

The limited IS “leadership” in Pakistan is unable to extract the same 

levels of control its Middle Eastern counterpart can in the short tomedium 

term; however, IS’ symbolic capital does have potential to 

galvanise and change Pakistani militant dynamics. 

While IS has led military offensives in Afghanistan, the group must 

contend with powerful and competing regional presences, 

including the Taliban. The Taliban has condemned the IS-led 

Jalalabad bombing in April 2015. 67 

Though IS will not be able to annex South Asia into its “caliphate” 

in the foreseeable future, if new agents in Pakistan are successful, 

they will be able to rally support and further deteriorate the 

security situation. 

26


3. IS has launched some offensives in the region (albeit fairly small ones in 

Afghanistan), and established training camps and recruitment centres 

to bring local fighters to Syria. This has left a mark on Afghan and 

Pakistani national consciousness by instilling fear and a new wave of 

global jihadist inspiration. 

The takfiri ideology speaks to overtly sectarian militant groups. 

IS propaganda attracts some civilian support, and taps into the 

regional precedent of jihadist groups acting as proxy militants for 

larger forces. 

If IS “soldiers” are successful, they may galvanize a new, globally 

oriented, and increasingly sectarian, wave of violence. 

Forces that now identify with IS are examined in our longer report 

(Chapter IV). 

4. Meanwhile, AQ is attempting to consolidate and expand its hold in Asia 

in response to the influence it has lost to IS in the Middle East. 

The most significant move by al Zawahiri in September 2014 was 

the establishment of a new branch of AQ: Al Qaeda in the Indian 

Subcontinent (AQIS). Ayman al Zawahiri intends to recruit within 

India, Bangladesh, and Burma, increasingly fertile recruiting 

grounds for radicalization. In May 2015, AQIS claimed 

responsibility for the deaths of secular bloggers in Pakistan and 

Bangladesh. 68 

Burma has experienced Buddhist-led attacks on the Rohingya 

Muslim minority for the last two years, and the Islamist minority 

in Bangladesh increasingly clashes with the secular Muslim 

majority. 69 As such, both countries must be considered as potential 

“hotspots” for radicalization in the immediate future, and their 

logistical significance to groups in Pakistan and India should not be 

underestimated. Some militant Pakistani outfits targeting India 

prefer to enter India through the poorly guarded Bangladeshi 

border. 70 Al Qaeda named Bangladesh a country where Muslims 

would be ideologically targeted by AQIS. 

India’s election of a ruling party with Hindu nationalist sympathies, 

in tandem with increasing home-grown Islamist extremism, may 

play to AQ’s advantage as increasing numbers of Indian Muslims 

feel marginalized in Indian society. The issue of coercive 

conversions to Hinduism is one that has particularly exacerbated 

fears of Muslim subjugation 71 . 

27

QUILL IAM 

 

 

It is possible that the LeT will compete with AQ for prominence in 

South Asia; LeT may use AQ silence on Kashmir to focus on Indian 

targets in Kashmir. 72 

AQ is also taking steps to consolidate its connection to the TTP, and 

the two organizations have made their relationship increasingly 

public in the last few months. It is likely that this decision has been 

made in order to emphasise their opposition to IS. For instance, the 

TTP eulogized two AQ leaders killed in UAV strikes in early 2015 73 . 

5. AQIS’ structural differences to IS include the following advantages: 

Legitimacy in controlling territory from first-mover advantages. 

Close partnerships with networks who have fought in the region. 

Powerful allies in the TTP, Mullah Omar, and the Afghan Taliban, 74 

28


Figure 2: Jihadist Networks in South Asia 

Legend 

White boxes i nd ica te gro ups in Ka shmir , Y ello w in Pa k istan , B lue i n India and P in k in Afgh anis ta n 

Blu e arr o ws sho w offs hoo t gr oups (arro w po i nts f rom pa re nt o rga nisatio n to s plinter) 

Red l in e s il l us tra te o pe ra tio na l l i nks a nd/o r m utual ass is ta nce 

Green l in es s ho ws umbre lla orga nisa tio n assoc ia tio n a nd no t nec ess ari l y o pe ra tional coordina tio n 

Brow n li n es i ll us tra te a n i deo logical aff i li atio n, whe re a poss i bl e o pe ra tio nal associatio n is unkno wn 

Ye ll o w li ne s re prese nt a tac tic al a ll ia nce under a n umbr ella orga nis atio n 

Text i n gr ee n are gro ups tha t have ma de the i r na me o n sec ta r ia nis m 

Text i n pi nk are gro ups that s ta rted o ut as Kas hmir foc use d 

29

QUILL IAM 

PART 3 

STATE OF PLAY 

I n t e ra c t i o n b e t w e e n t e r ro rist groups a n d n a t i o n a l, 

re g i o n a l, and i n t e rn a t i o n a l forces 

In this section, the ways that Pakistan, Afghanistan, and India are combatting 

the threat of Islamist extremism will be outlined. In particular, this report 

will provide a brief summary of the counter-terrorism, judicial, educational, 

military, and finance orientated policies that are being implemented within 

the aforementioned regions. Due to the status of Jammu and Kashmir as a 

contested territory, it will be subject to a different set of analytical criteria. 

From our findings, gaps will be identified in the counter-extremism policies 

that are being used by each country - or state, as is the case in Indian and 

Pakistani administered Jammu and Kashmir - in order to combat the spread 

of Islamist extremism; a series of region specific policy suggestions will be 

made in Part 4 of this report. 

Jammu and Kashmir 

Although Jammu and Kashmir was a princely state in its own right up to the 

conclusion of British rule in the Indian subcontinent in 1947, it has been a 

heavily contested territory ever since, with both India and Pakistan vying for 

its ownership. 75 It is currently under Indian administration, as a federal state 

with a degree of autonomy guaranteed under Article 370 of the Indian 

Constitution. A small proportion of it, known as Azad Kashmir, is under 

Pakistani administration. As such, the interactions between terrorist groups 

and national, regional, and international forces have been complicated, and 

in many ways dictated, by the wars that have been, and are being fought 

between the Indian army, and proxy militant groups such as Hizb-ul- 

Mujahideen (HM), Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), and Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM) 

(see Part 2 of this report). 76 

As such, the counter-terrorism initiatives that are taken within this region 

are divided amongst the Indian and the Pakistani administrations. The 

details of these initiatives are not explicitly relevant to this report, however, 

an analysis on how these Governments can directly develop their policies in 

order to restore peace to the region, and to mitigate the proliferation of said 

militant groups, will be offered in Part 4 of this report. 

30


Pakistan 

Counter-terrorism policy: Pakistan’s new national policy to combat 

terrorism, the NAP, was released in 2014. Part of this plan includes Operation 

Zarb-e-Azb, a military offensive by the Pakistan Armed Forces against 

various militant groups: TTP, LeJ, Jundallah, AQ, IMU, and the Haqqani 

Network. The operation in North Waziristan (part of the Federally 

Administered Tribal Areas along the Afghan border) is a renewed effort 

against militancy in the wake of the 8 June attack on Jinnah International 

Airport in Karachi, for which the TTP and the IMU claimed responsibility. 

Judicial system: Pakistan has lifted the death penalty moratorium for 

terrorists, ordered the military to escalate attacks on terrorist hideouts, and 

targeted ‘extremism’ in Karachi and Punjab. 

Education: The NAP has emphasised the need to study the role of Pakistan’s 

education system in developing extremist mind-sets. Fiscal constraints have 

meant that the government partly relies on religious institutes to fill a 

vacuum in education and governance. Pakistan’s counter-terrorism and 

counter-extremism strategies hinge on Afghanistan’s cooperation, as well as 

the promotion of a clear narrative that unequivocally condemns terrorism 

and suicide bombings on both sides of the border. The Pakistani government 

has mandated the regulation of madrassahs. It has also forbidden banned 

groups to operate under different names, and strengthened the country’s 

National Counter Terrorism Authority. However, clerics who openly 

challenge the government, preach extremism, and sympathize with the 

Taliban are actively countering these initiatives. 

Military: Pakistan’s intelligence is focused on increasing cooperation 

between federal intelligence agencies and provinces, and on a newly 

launched anti-terrorism helpline. 

Funding (internal and external): The Pakistani government has implemented 

a ban on hate speech, and on literature preaching sectarianism and 

extremism. Furthermore, it has evoked sanctions on those spreading 

sectarianism. However, the implementation of these counter-extremism 

policies remains ineffective because of a low terror conviction rate; for 

example, the leader of the JuD/LeT, Hafiz Saeed, remains a free man in 

Pakistan. 

31

QUILL IAM 

Afghanistan 

Counter-terrorism policy: As far as the Taliban is concerned, the immediate 

future of Afghanistan’s counter-terrorism and counter-extremism strategy 

depends on whether or not Mullah Omar resurfaces, how hawkish he will be 

upon his return, and how much authority he has left over his Taliban. 

Judicial system: A recent study in the Anti-Terrorism Prosecutors’ 

Department (ATPD) of Afghanistan found weaknesses in critical thinking, 

indictment drafting, and case preparation. Because judges did not 

necessarily understand changes that were made to the legal framework in 

2013 and 2014, there were a high number of failed prosecutions, and cases 

vulnerable to appeal. Some of these changes included the passage of a new 

Criminal Procedure Code, as well as the implementation of anti-terrorism 

and anti-money laundering legislation. Over 30% of the prosecutors 

surveyed reported that they did not have the training that was necessary in 

order to do their job to a high standard. 77 

Education: Despite efforts to change the national school curriculum, and 

replace textbooks containing extremist teachings with new ones, policy 

remains to be finalized. There remains no standard curriculum for secondary 

school textbooks, and high school textbooks remain inadequate in both 

number and in content. For many years, the Taliban and other groups have 

attacked schools, teachers, and students. In May, 2012, the Ministry of 

Education reported that more than 590 schools were closed in areas at risk; 

most of these schools were in the Helmand, Kabul, and Kandahar provinces. 78 

Military: The Taliban will be the chief factor in the ISAF/NATO strategy for 

reducing troop levels in Afghanistan. Factions have emerged among the 

Taliban in recent years, largely due to Mullah Omar’s invisibility, and this 

appears to be leading to a stagnation of loyalty, particularly among younger 

fighters. 79 Although the Taliban “brand” risks being seen as tired, in contrast 

to the wave of fear and publicity that has greeted the rise of IS, the Taliban 

may be able to recover some of their former prestige if they make significant 

gains in the wake of the ISAF force withdrawal. 80 It is feared that this is a real 

possibility. 81 Levels of terrorist activity along the Afghanistan-Pakistan 

border are also contingent on the relationship between India and Pakistan. 

For example, an active effort to resolve the Kashmir issue could result in a 

reduction of Indian and Pakistani security forces along common borders, and 

a bilateral agreement on nuclear and conventional forces. This would bolster 

Pakistan’s ability to act against militants in border areas between 

32


Afghanistan and Pakistan, and it would significant improve the success of 

counter-terrorism efforts. 

Funding (internal and external): Afghanistan benefits from a US special 

operation force to conduct counterterrorism missions as part of new NATO 

training and advisory mission. The training mission will focus on the larger 

Afghan Army and police headquarters, as well as the ministries of defense 

and interior in Kabul. Afghanistan still requires assistance in working within 

a wide range of sectors (including education, criminal justice, faith, charities, 

online and health) where there are risks of radicalization. 

India 

Counter-terrorism policy: No comprehensive national policy on countering 

radicalization exists. This creates gaps in long-term effectiveness. India’s 

upper house of Parliament banned IS in December 2014, after detaining IS 

operative Mehdi Biswaas who ran the popular Twitter account 

@ShamiWitness from Karnataka, Bengaluru 82 . However, India is studying 

the applicability of an ‘extremism counseling hotline’ set up by Austrian 

authorities in India that would enable parents, teachers, and friends of 

“vulnerable and indoctrinated” youth to seek help. 83 

Judicial system: The 1987 Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) 

Act was India’s first attempt at a counter-terrorism law. It was replaced by 

the Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2002. Under these statutes, individuals 

were prosecuted for, amongst other things, the use of hawala for the 

financing of terrorism. However, both these statutes have since been 

repealed, and it does not look as though India has a specific anti-terrorism 

law, although the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Amendment Act (2008) 

makes it illegal to support both secessionist movements, and any claims to 

Indian territories that are made by foreign powers. 84 

Education: Following fears that Bangladeshi nationals were radicalizing 

Indian Muslims in two madrassahs in West Bengal, a recent report by the BJP 

released in November 2014 found that “the main danger" of radicalization 

comes from foreign teachers employed in madrassahs, not madrassahs 

where Indian Muslims teach children. 85 

Military: States along India’s border, namely in North-East India, Punjab, and 

J&K, have aired grievances by taking up arms against the central Indian 

government. The central government has responded with mostly military 

action. India’s counter-terrorism program is intelligence heavy: it 

33

QUILL IAM 

incorporates agencies such as the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI), the 

National Security Guard (NSG), and the National Investigation Agency (NIA), 

as well as implementation of the National Intelligence Grid (NATGRID) 86 . 

Funding (internal and external): India’s counter-terrorism strategy is reliant 

on its relationship with its neighbors: the nation’s borders with Pakistan and 

Bangladesh, especially in rural areas, remains extremely porous and 

susceptible to illegal border crossings. According to the Institute of Conflict 

Management, 27 youths were arrested or detained in 2014 for attempting to 

join IS, with 10 Indians fighting amongst IS ranks. 87 

34


PART 4 

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 

Having reviewed the efforts that are being made on behalf of the Pakistani, 

Afghan, and Indian administrations in order to combat the proliferation of 

Islamist extremism, this report will now provide a series of nation-specific 

policy recommendations that ought to be implemented in order to expedite 

this process. Again, Jammu and Kashmir present a special case, and in light 

of the balance of power that exists within this region, this report has 

differentiated between Indian and Pakistani administered Jammu and 

Kashmir, and has made policy recommendations accordingly. However, 

before our nation specific policy recommendations are presented, a series of 

general policy recommendations will be made that can be used to inform the 

development of future counter-terrorism and counter-extremism efforts in 

South Asia. 

It is important to remember that this affects policy makers in Britain because 

43.4% of Muslims in Britain are of British Asian descent 88 , making issues in 

India and Pakistan of particular importance to a large segment of Britain’s 

population. 

Ge n e ra l Poli cy Re commen da t i o n s 

We recommend governments reinforce legitimate state institutions to 

counter the appeal of radicalisation: 

 

 

 

We believe that one of the main causes of radicalization in South 

Asia, besides ideological appeal and group networks, is 

disillusionment with the state. According to Transparency 

International, South Asia is the most corrupt region in the world, 89 

and until steps are taken to improve Governmental transparency, 

culture, and accountability, counter-extremism efforts will be 

significantly limited. 

Additionally, there is a strong positive correlation between poverty 

and a susceptibility to extremist narratives, and because 

corruption undermines the propensity for individuals to cross the 

“barrier of poverty,” 90 the need for a reduction in institutionalized 

corruption is stressed. 

The appeal of movements such as IS is financial as well as 

ideological: for many in rural, low income areas of South Asia the 

IS wage of $400 per month 91 could be attractive. If this monetary 

incentive is extended to IS’ self-declared allies in South Asia, 

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QUILL IAM 

countering the group’s appeal will be more difficult, unless 

incomes and employment opportunities are improved throughout. 

To understand this financial incentive, the mean monthly incomes 

(real GDP per capita/12; USD) for India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and 

Jammu and Kashmir are provided below: 

Country/ State* Monthly income (real GDP per capita/12), USD 

2013 (1 dp) 92 

India 124.9 

Afghanistan 55.4 

Pakistan 106.3 

Jammu and Kashmir* 43.1 †93 

†A different dataset for 2011 was used for these figures 

 

 

 

 

The disparity between mean monthly incomes and the $400 salary 

that is offered by IS is significant. 

Even well-off and well educated youth can be attracted to jihadist 

causes due to a sense of injustice and frustrated expectations. This 

attraction is emphasized if these individuals feel that their 

education will not bring them opportunities. LeJ (a potential IS 

ally) is known for having a significant number of university 

graduates among its fighters. 94 We suggest that education, training, 

and job search assistance should be extended to tackle economic 

and labour inactivity in South Asia. 

As part of its state-building project, IS in the Middle East includes 

all of the services one might expect from a local government: 

distribution of water, collection of charity, and the provision of 

health care services. If the relevant South Asian administrations do 

not improve service infrastructure, then this element of the IS 

campaign may appeal to economically disenfranchised individuals, 

and help to explain the attraction of joining the fight in Iraq and 

Syria: “extremist violence is more likely to arise wherever 

governments are unable to provide for their citizens.” 95 

However, in certain countries such as Pakistan, there is a negative 

correlation between poverty and the support of terrorism. 96 This 

is because the elites find that some of their interests align with 

those of the terrorist organisations (for example, the annexation of 

Jammu and Kashmir), and – unlike the poor - they are not as 

exposed to the violent implications of their decisions. 

In order to ameliorate this occurrence, ‘track II diplomacy’ – i.e. 

Diplomacy that is either overseen, facilitated, or carried out by 

‘non-state actors’ - should be encouraged. Studies on track II 

diplomacy 97 have illustrated that dialogue of this kind usually 

36


encourages groups of influential elites to think in cooperative 

ways, and it could encourage them to consider the implications of 

their decision to support certain terrorist organizations on poorer 

Pakistani communities. As such, track II diplomacy would help to 

close the gap of individuals in Pakistan that are affected by 

terrorism. Such discussions could focus on the religious 

inconsistencies that are advocated in terrorist rhetoric, and the 

role of terrorists in the killings of civilians. 

We suggest that counter-extremist narratives should be presented 

in local languages such as Urdu, and that the true cost of terrorism 

are highlighted by informing sympathisers of all economic classes 

that these groups do not provide social benefits, (or exaggerate 

their provision), or the possibility of increased positive 

representation. 

Groups that claim responsibility for terrorist actions selectively 

invoke religious rhetoric to justify politically motivated violence, 

but they do not generally represent Muslim populations. 

Governments should focus on propagating counter narratives from 

within the Islamic framework in order to delegitimize their 

Islamist cause. 

Government funding should focus on undertaking public health 

research initiatives in order to investigate and understand the 

causes and the consequences of violence. The WHO Violence 

Prevention Alliance (VPA) has recently provided a public health 

framework 98 that examines the public health impact of terrorist 

acts arising from violent radicalization, including direct 

consequences such as deaths, physical injuries and psychological 

or mental trauma. 99 These public health frameworks should be 

implemented in South Asia, and their findings on the implications 

of radicalization and terrorism should be publicized. 

Current public health frameworks focus on individual, 

relationship, community, and society-centered approaches in 

order to prevent violence. We strongly urge governments to 

employ social development, therapeutic, and treatment programs 

to focus on people at risk of harming themselves and others, and 

use a group format to address issues such as anger management 

and drug abuse. 

WHO VPA programs focus on training in relationship skills, family 

therapy, parenting, home visitation and mentoring. Similar 

approaches are used by the Centre for Disease Control (CDC) in the 

United States. These have positive, long-term effects in reducing 

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QUILL IAM 

 

violent and delinquent behavior. Extending such work to monitor 

and tackle violent radicalization and terrorism is a natural next 

step, but not yet done. We encourage governments to take steps to 

provide health surveys and censuses that ask about aspects of 

violent radicalization and group cohesion as relevant health and 

social issues, and not only as a criminal justice issue. 100 

The International Classification of Diseases and CDC now has codes 

for deaths and injuries from terrorist acts; 101 this offers a system of 

monitoring that is closely aligned to other public health 

surveillance programs. Its implementation can offer governments 

in South Asia an objective, apolitical look at global terrorismrelated 

deaths and circumstances in which they occur. This is 

crucial in an environment of widespread violence, coupled with 

low levels of social and political education. 

In the sections that follow, we provide region and country-specific 

approaches to monitoring the terrorist groups that have been presented in 

Part 1 of this report, and we outline how the problems that they present can 

be mitigated. This is not a comprehensive blueprint for the implementation 

of working policies, rather, it will serve to inform the relevant parties of the 

desired direction for future policy decisions. 

Nation-Spe cific Policy Re c o m m e n da t i o n s 

Indian administered Jammu and Kashmir 

 

With a high electoral turnout at the Legislative Assembly elections 

in December 2014, Kashmir has indicated that it is prepared to give 

democratic politics under Indian rule a chance. This is an 

opportunity to stabilize the situation in Jammu and Kashmir that 

must not be wasted. The new Legislative Assembly government, 

under Indian appointed governor Narinder Nath Vohar, and a 

power sharing agreement between the Peoples’ Democratic Party 

(PDP) and the BJP must: 

a) Invest significant efforts in tackling unemployment. J&K has the 

highest rate of unemployment in North India, 102 combining 

frustration, and poverty disenfranchisement. 

b) Implement policies to reduce poverty and inequality, as well as 

improve support for families, including but not limited to: 

increasing social assistance and economic development 

schemes, employment creation, improved education, parental 

leave, maternal employment and child care arrangements; all of 

which are likely to reduce the appeal of violence. 103 

38


 

 

Local militancy is closely linked to political organs such as the prosecession 

Hurriyat Council. These political organs depend on 

popular opinion, and are prepared to use influence to quell militant 

activity. This is what occurred during the December 2014 

assembly elections. The most effective way to guarantee security 

and avoid increasing sympathy for the secessionist cause is 

sustainable economic and social development. There may be 

opportunities to engage the Hurriyat and address some of the more 

immediate grievances of its supporters. Pro-independence or 

secession sentiments will not be erased in the short-term, but, 

given the Hurriyat’s reliance on public support and its close links 

with UJC, it may be able to help maintain peace if the citizens of J&K 

are confident their quality of life will improve. 

The new Legislative Assembly government consists of the PDP and 

the BJP. The PDP are Kashmiri moderates, and their wish for “selfrule” 

in the philosophical sense can be accommodated under the 

terms stipulated in Article 370, and it could be used to guarantee 

J&K’s partial autonomy. We strongly encourage the BJP to quell the 

fear that they plan to rescind Article 370, a move which would 

infuriate Kashmiris and is likely to usher in a new wave of 

militancy. 

Pakistan administered Jammu and Kashmir 

In Pakistan-administered Kashmir, efforts must be taken to: 

a) Ensure electoral freedoms of the Kashmir Legislative Assembly. 

b) Ensure adequate representation in Northern Kashmir, where 

demands for a more formal inclusion into Pakistan, or secession, 

will lead to a greater degree of accountability over Kashmir’s 

affairs. 

The Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif recently pledged 11 

billion Rupees for “mega projects” to develop Kashmir, including 

expressways between towns. Pains must be taken to ensure 

successful implementation and avoidance of corruption. 104 

We encourage both the media and state institutions in Pakistan to 

refrain from endorsing terrorist groups in Kashmir as “freedom 

fighters” who push democratic values, or provide social welfare. In 

fact, whilst groups such as JuD/LeT do offer social services, they 

are prone to exaggerating their social contributions through 

propaganda with the help of various media institutions. 105 

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QUILL IAM 

Pakistan 

 

 

 

 

 

A report that was published by the Pakistan Institute of Legislative 

Development (PILDAT) in August 2014 indicates that 76% of 

Pakistanis see the Federal Government’s attempts to eradicate 

corruption as ‘bad; and ‘very bad’, while 55% believe there is very 

little or no chance that the government will be able to tackle 

terrorism. Interestingly, 71% see little or no chance that poverty 

can be alleviated. 106 With that said, this report suggests that the 

Pakistani government should take significant steps to combat 

cynicism by engaging with grassroots organisations to reduce 

corruption, as well as the media to focus a campaign against 

terrorism. 

Corruption and bad governance is indicative of a political system 

where access to justice is limited and the rule of law is weak. In 

2013, Pakistan scored 127 out of 175 on the Corruption 

Perceptions Index. Therefore, we stress that an immediate priority 

for policy makers must be to aid judicial reform, provision and 

expansion. We also encourage the use of online corruption reports 

stemming from grassroots initiatives to increase transparency 

(such a ipaidabribe.com) 

The media should be encouraged to make a concerted effort to 

describe designated terrorist organisations as such, and to avoid 

branding these groups as charities or organisations that provide 

social services, as well as share statistics of disillusionment with 

these groups amongst the general population. 

Recent large scale terrorist attacks against the Pakistani state have 

incentivized the Pakistani government to increase its campaign 

against terrorism, focusing on the use of military courts to speed 

up terrorism trials and accelerate the executions of those 

convicted. This approach has been largely ineffective in combating 

terrorism. Pakistan has more than 8,000 prisoners on death row, 

most of whom have exhausted the appeals process. The courts 

system is slow, there is a heavy reliance on witness testimony, and 

little protection for judges and prosecutors. In July 2014, 150 

heavily armed Taliban easily overwhelmed prison guards and 

freed 25 dangerous terrorists. 107 As such, efforts should be made 

to research justice systems and better prepare security forces to 

respond to domestic threats. 

We recommend conducting research on legislation to link formal 

and informal justice systems, so that both deliver proportionate 

punishments for particular crimes. This research will also be used 

40


 

 

to ensure that the state retains the power to try the most serious 

offenders. Transferring more minor cases to the traditional system 

will relieve pressure on the justice sector, and help prevent cases 

of detention without trial. Culturally, this may not be easy given 

that customs such as Pashtunwali allow lethal violence as 

retribution. However, traditional justice practitioners have 

expressed a desire to be more closely linked to the state, 108 and if 

effective links between formal and informal justice were 

established in the isolated and troubled regions of FATA and 

Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, it would be a valuable step towards greater 

state integration. Nonetheless, more research will be vital to assess 

how the Pakistani dual justice system might work. Examples of 

post-conflict nations that have implemented dual justice systems, 

such as Liberia, can demonstrate the benefits of such a system, and 

inform the challenges they face. Local justice could potentially be 

state-subsidised, so as to give local authority systems an incentive 

to work against terror networks rather than with them. Powerful 

anti-corruption measures would have to accompany any 

government subsidies, in order to protect the integrity of the 

traditional system. 

The low conviction rate for terror in Pakistan is partly due to 

judicial fear of reprisal from militant groups; therefore, efforts 

should be made to improve the safety and security of these state 

institutions. 

Another important area to focus on is in prisons and prison care: 

a) In Pakistan, 92,000 prisoners share 41,000 prison places, 109 and 

juvenile and adult, as well as minor and hardened or politically 

motivated criminals are often mixed. There are few staff, and 

there is frequent mistreatment and torture. Therefore, state 

support and recognition of traditional justice is further 

recommended. 

b) The government’s recent successes in fighting domestic 

militancy have produced 4,000 additional inmates, 3,700 of 

which are thought to be affiliated with either AQ or the 

Taliban. 110 Militants represent the fastest growing part of the 

Pakistani prison population, making overcrowding worse and 

exposing non-radical inmates to increasing numbers of battlehardened 

jihadists. 111 As such, sending less serious cases for 

trial by traditional justice will speed up the process, meaning an 

offender’s punishment will not include disproportionate time in 

prison while they wait for trial, and there will be less exposure 

to radical militants. 

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QUILL IAM 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

To reduce the appeal of extremism within schools and universities, 

we advise focusing on civic education, citizenship, pluralism, 

freedom of religion, and the mirroring of counter-extremism 

programs. We encourage content analysis of material within 

educational institutions, particularly entryism in tertiary 

education. Often, madrasah education can serve as a complement, 

and not as a substitute 112 for tertiary education. The negative 

implications of extremism must be advertised within all levels of 

education. 

Human rights should continue to be a core aim of the Pakistani 

Government’s initiative. Counter-extremism context should be 

promoted in Urdu, and be available in all vernacular languages. 

Pakistan should continue to focus on promoting democracy, and on 

building on the work of PILDAT. Strengthening democracy will 

weaken the military establishment’s independence. 

The Pakistani blasphemy law needs reform, as it strengthens the 

stance of Islamist extremists. 

The international community should continue to give aid to 

Pakistan so long as counter-extremist and human rights narratives 

are the drivers of both domestic and foreign policy. 

The Pakistani government must insist on greater transparency 

during counter-terror operations such as Zarb-e-Azb in FATA. If 

human rights abuses against civilians go unchecked, then defeating 

one wave of militancy is a temporary victory, as another will be 

created in the process. 

We recommend focusing on anti-sectarian counter-narratives. 

This is IS's market niche, and given that Jundullah (one of their new 

allies, traditionally sectarian and an offshoot of the TTP) has 

claimed credit for the Shia mosque bombing in January 2015, it is 

a theme increasingly coming to the fore, and one that counternarratives 

could specifically address. 

42


Afghanistan 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

We advise the state to focus on decreasing corruption, and 

increasing social assistance to families in need. Economic 

disenfranchisement increases the appeal of extremism. Although 

poverty is common throughout the Afghan population, it is most 

prevalent among rural Afghans. 44% say that there were times in 

the past year when they didn't have enough money to buy food for 

themselves or their families, whereas only 32% of urban residents 

found themselves in a similar position. 113 

Islamist violence remains a problem in Afghanistan, even though 

IMU and its splinter group, the Islamic Jihad Union, have weakened. 

With Islamists from the Haqqani Network, the Taliban, and Hizb-i- 

Islami (HIG) still active, we urge the government to continue to 

devote more resources to intelligence and security efforts. 

We argue that the distrust between rural Afghans and the local and 

central government bodies should be eased through increased 

collaboration and grassroots reconciliation. 

We suggest that donors should be prepared to invest in projects 

that diversify the rural economy, and that promote reconciliation 

beyond a ‘grand peace plan’. 

We encourage short term, state-led security improvements, 

particularly in the form of grassroots reconciliation between 

factions, and especially those ethnic factions that have become 

politicized at the national level. 

While there are short term merits to be gained from disarmament 

programs, in the absence of alternative livelihood options and a 

‘grand plan’ peace process with clear political direction, they will 

not create long-term security. A disarmament, demobilization, and 

reintegration (DDR) program has been implemented in 

Afghanistan before. The program yielded mixed results; 62,376 

AMF members were demobilized, and 57,629 weapons were 

collected. 114 We encourage repetition of a similar imitative, given a 

meaningful measure of success will be determined in the longerterm. 

Permanent demobilization hinges on the success of militant 

transitions to civilian life, which, in turn, is contingent on the 

attraction of the alternative livelihoods that can be offered by the 

Afghan government. 115 Although vocational courses were offered 

to those taking part in the previous program, a subsequent upsurge 

in insurgent activity, and a lack of economic stability, renders long- 

43

QUILL IAM 

 

 

 

term success of a DDR initiative unlikely. Furthermore, the late 

implementation of the program, and the strategy of appeasing 

commanders by offering them high level government and security 

positions, allowed them to manipulate the DDR process, and 

entrench their personal power in the new government 

establishment. Moreover, the DDR program only targeted former 

Afghan Military Forces (AMF). 

A separate program for illegal militias, the Disbandment of Illegal 

Armed Groups program (DIAG) attempted to use a mix of threats 

of coercion, and community development projects to get militants 

to disarm. Unlike the DDR program, it is widely agreed that the 

DIAG had failed because the government officials that had 

facilitated the process were generally reluctant to break their ties 

with local militias. 116 A further difficulty that any future 

disarmament initiative will have to contend with is the arms 

culture of rural Afghanistan, where personal possession of arms is 

a given, and there is limited trust in the state. 

Quilliam believes a more promising avenue than top down 

disarmament programs is that of grassroots reconciliation. The 

Afghan government and parts of civil society have already taken 

some initiatives to this effect. Thus far, grassroots initiatives have 

largely been in the form of organizing “peace jirgas” - councils 

between local warring factions. In 2007, the parliament created the 

National Commission for Peace and Reconciliation (PTS), in which 

officials in various provinces, coupled with civil society actors, 

aimed to reconcile the state with factions of the Taliban. We 

strongly urge the continuation of these collaborative efforts 

because they present an important opportunity for longer-term 

counter-extremism narratives to be fostered. An Afghan NGO 

called the Tribal Liaison Office has also attempted to facilitate such 

jirgas between local government, international forces, and local 

communities, to try and improve relations. However, grassroots 

reconciliation initiatives are generally unpopular with donors, 

since producing measurable output is difficult, and they have not, 

as hoped, facilitated departure of any high level Taliban 

commanders thus far. Nevertheless, they offer a sustainable form 

of positive reconciliation and collaboration, and we recommend 

they should continue to be supported wherever possible. 117 

Afghanistan’s vast opium trade has been a thorn in the side of ISAF 

forces as they attempted to balance meeting legal obligations to 

cease drug trade while building relations with communities for 

whom that trade is an economic lifeline. Threats of seizing or 

44


destroying opium poppy crops were not heeded, and when such 

threats were carried out, they were followed by a spike in local 

Taliban units, as locals flooded to join the insurgency. 

Controversially, British forces in Helmand were eventually forced 

to back down and tacitly allow poppy growing, even sending some 

forces to attend demonstrations of how to process the crop as a 

goodwill gesture. 118,119 

Hopes of quasi-legalizing the crop to produce medical supplies 

such as morphine and codeine have been put forward. 120 As 

appealing as this idea is, given the shortage of powerful painkillers 

in hospitals across the developing world, the unfortunate truth is 

that neither the opium poppy nor morphine in Afghanistan are 

particularly competitive. Strict regulations and security that guard 

legal opium crops, coupled with the fact that morphine is not 

patented and so cannot be sold very expensively, make for an 

uncompetitive drug. Afghanistan does not have the agricultural 

advantages in the way of machinery and manpower that legal 

producers such as Australia has. Furthermore, it cannot compete 

in terms of commercial production costs, and at present, there are 

several obstacles that stand in the way of making this crop a 

valuable way of helping its producers rise out of poverty. 121 

Despite lack of commercial incentive to legally harvest Afghan 

opium poppy, there is still demand for its presence in global 

medical markets. Therefore, we suggest a non-profit initiative to 

harvest Afghan opium at prices that are beneficial to Afghan 

producers, and to redistribute its medical products to hospitals in 

need; this way, potential for both conflict appeasement and 

palliative care will be fulfilled. Failing that, the temptation to 

engage in coercive narcotics restriction must be resisted in favor 

of a long-term strategy to make the opium trade less desirable by 

diversifying the Afghan rural economy. 

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QUILL IAM 

India 

 

 

 

 

 

 

We urge India to co-operate with to Indian, Pakistani, and Afghan 

intelligence sharing initiatives in order to boost regional security. 

India’s relationship with the US and the information sharing and 

synergy in security that is likely to result from it will have 

important positive implications for counter-terrorism. Equally 

important are the potential spillover effects that can be gained 

from increased security to India’s neighbors. 

President Obama’s visit to India in January 2015 resulted in India 

and the United States moving towards joint production and codevelopment 

of weapon systems, along with intensifying counterterror 

cooperation and undertaking joint military exercises under 

the Defence Framework Agreement (DFA). 122 Major developments 

include the United States and India “placing each other at the same 

level as their closest partners,” 123 and discussions included 

strengthening process-related difficulties in defence trade, and 

collaborating with technology. Such initiatives would address 

India’s two prominent and overlapping terrorist groups – IM and 

SIMI, both of which focus on cybercrime. 

We strongly encourage the Indian government to better engage 

with its Muslim community and to decrease the appeal of IS’ 

projections of an Islamic caliphate, as well as to reduce the appeal 

of militant ideologies that cater to Indian Muslims’ grievances. We 

ask the BJP to take swift, proactive steps to clamp down on coercive 

conversions to Hinduism, and allay fears that state welfare is 

conditional on Hinduism. 

We advise the Indian government to focus on sources of 

corruption, including but not limited to, entitlement programs and 

social spending schemes. Corruption stifles economic growth and 

inhibits the output of state services. We ask that state government 

efforts to reduce corruption across India are fostered, and civic 

anti-corruption organizations such as Bharat Swabhiman Trust are 

supported. 

The government should take steps to invest in long-term counterextremism 

work, focusing on cyber extremism as well. Such efforts 

would help combat the popularity and the ease of cyber-crime. 

Quality education that focuses on integration within India, and on 

strengthening human rights commitments to religious freedoms, 

should be fostered within schools, colleges, and universities. 

46


There are myriad ways in which jihadist organizations can retain some of 

their original structure and character while under the banner of a would-be 

caliphate creator. Militant groups may declare allegiance to their chosen 

organization, while retaining the essence of their original organizational 

identity, and indeed the power of their leaders. 

While IS is powerfully challenging, or, arguably, has already taken Al Qaeda’s 

crown as the architects of global jihad, Al Qaeda remains a significant entity 

for militants who are globally aligning themselves with a choice between the 

two. This report has illustrated that in South Asia, entrenched terrorist 

groups have a historical, and in some ways a territorial, advantage. However, 

this is unlikely to discourage IS’ efforts in the region in the future. 

47

QUILL IAM 

Works Cited and Notes 

1 Study on Informal Justice System in Pakistan, Sindh Judicial Academy, Available at: 

http://www.sja.gos.pk/Publicaiton/Misc/Report%20Informal%20Justice%20System%20in% 

20Pakistan.pdf, Accessed: 15/02/15 

2 Bhui, K. S., Hicks, M. H., Lashley, M., & Jones, E. (2012). A public health approach to 

understanding and preventing violent radicalization. BMC medicine, 10(1), 16. 

3 Strategic Foresight Group. (2011) “The Indus Equation”. Available online at: 

http://www.strategicforesight.com/publications.php?page=8#.VW78AlLbJ2Y. Accessed on 3 rd 

June 2015. 

4 Now, one of the key types of Taliban propaganda video are “pre-martyrdom” films of suicide 

bombers. Suicide bombing is portrayed in these films as the ultimate form of martyrdom, and 

the domain of elite fighters. The videos are partly praises of the individuals who undertake it, 

mostly religious justifications for the attack, but also an opportunity to dispel ideas of what 

might drive an individual to suicide bombing, other than sheer religious devotion. The fiyadeen 

(those who sacrifice) take great pains in the video to say that they are sound of mind and welloff, 

and so are not undertaking the bombing out of desperation or madness. The reasoning for 

the attack is overwhelmingly religious rather than political, and where it is political, it is in the 

most general of anti-western and anti-imperialist terms. 

5 The Subverted Indo-Bangladesh Border, May 7 th 2014, VK Shashikumar, India Defence Review, 

Available at: http://www.indiandefencereview.com/news/the-subverted-indo-bangladeshborder-i/, 

Accessed: 23/03/15 

6 New Al Qaeda Franchise Also Sets Sights on US, September 4 th 2014, Lee Ferran, Yahoo News, 

Available at: http://news.yahoo.com/al-qaeda-franchise-sets-sights-us-175343212--abc-newstopstories.html, 


7 Prominent Bangladeshi-American blogger Avijit Roy killed, February 28 th 2015, Ray Sanchez, 

CNN, Available at: http://edition.cnn.com/2015/02/27/asia/bangladeshi-american-bloggerdead/, 


8 Incidents and Statements involving Hizb-ul-Mujahideen: 2014, South Asia Terrorism Portal, 

Available 

at: 

http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/jandk/terrorist_outfits/hizb_ul_muja 

hideen2014.htm, Accessed 08/01/2014 

9 Hizb-ul-Mujahideen, South Asia Terrorism Portal, Available at: 

http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/jandk/terrorist_outfits/hizbul_mujahi 

deen.htm, Accessed: 08/01/15 

10 “Front charity JKART funds Hizbul Mujahideen”. (2013) Money Jihad. Available online at: 

https://moneyjihad.wordpress.com/2013/08/21/front-charity-jkart-funds-hizbulmujahideen/. 

Accessed on 17 th April 2015. 

11Demystifying Kashmir, Navnita Chadha Behera, 2006, Brookings Institution Press 

12 Who Is Responsible For Attacks On Mobile Towers In Kashmir?, Jehangir Ali and Gowhar 

Geelani, 2 nd June 2015, The Citizen, Available at: 

http://www.thecitizen.in/NewsDetail.aspx?Id=3848&Who/Is/Responsible/For/Attacks/On/ 

Mobile/Towers/In/Kashmir?, Accessed: 6 th June 2015 

13 Fair, Christine C. (2011) “Lashkar-e-Tayiba and the Pakistani State”. Survival. 53:4, 29-52. 

14 Interview: Hafiz Muhammed Saeed, Hanne Couderé and Aftab Chaudry, 4 th June 2015, The 

Diplomat, Available at: http://thediplomat.com/2015/06/interview-hafiz-muhammad-saeed/, 

Accessed: 6 th June 2015 

15 India furious as UN calls Hafiz Saeed 'Sahib', India Today, December 21 st 2014, Available at: 

http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/nda-government-un-hafiz-saeed-sahib-jud-garyquinlan/1/408064.html, 


16 Muttahida Jihad Council, Pakistan: Perilous Outreach, Sanchita Bhattacharya, 18 th August 

2014, New Age Islam, Academia.edu, Available at: 

http://www.academia.edu/8150694/Muttahida_Jihad_Council, Accessed: 08/01/2015 

48


17 Tankel, S. (2009). Lashkar-e-taiba: From 9/11 to Mumbai. Developments in Radicalisation and 

Political Violence, 6. 

18 Kambere, G. Hock Go, P. Kumar, P., Msafir, F. (2011) “The Financing of Lashkar-e-Taiba”. 

Available online at: https://globalecco.org/en_GB/ctx-v1n1/lashkar-e-taiba. Accessed on 28 th 

April 2015. 

19 313 Brigade, Mapping Militant Organizations, Stanford University, Available at: 

http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgibin/groups/view/453?highlight=taliban, 


20 US adds Harakat-ul-Mujahideen's emir to terrorism list , Bill Roggio, September 30 2014, The 

Long War Journal, Available at: 

http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2014/09/us_adds_harakat-ul-m.php, Accessed: 

08/01/15 

21 Harkat-ul-Mujahideen, South Asia Terrorism Portal, 

http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/jandk/terrorist_outfits/harkatul_muj 

ahideen.htm 

22 Harakat-ul-Mujahideen 'operates terrorist training camps in eastern Afghanistan', Bill Roggio, 

August 8 2014, The Long War Journal, Available at: 

http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2014/08/harakat-ul-mujahidee.php, Accessed: 

08/01/15 

23 Different from the Punjabi branch of the TTP 

24 Defining the Punjabi Taliban Network, Hassan Abbas, April 2009, CTC Sentinel, Volume 2, 

Issue 4, 

25 Jaish-e-Mohammed, Australian National Security, Available at: 

http://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/Listedterroristorganisations/Pages/JaisheMohammedJe 

M.aspx 

26 "They don't negotiate, they don't make partners", 2014, Qantara.de, Available at: 

http://en.qantara.de/content/the-emergence-of-islamic-state-in-pakistan-they-dontnegotiate-they-dont-make-partners, 


27 Pakistan's Sipah-e-Sahabah militants recognizes Abu-Bakkar al-Baghdadi as Caliph, AhlulBayt 

News Agency, July 2 2014, Available at: http://www.abna.ir/english/service/centeral-asiasubcontinent/archive/2014/07/02/620755/story.html 

, Accessed: 07/01/2015 

28 Pakistani Fighters Joining the War in Syria, Zia ur Rehman, CTC Sentinel, September 2013, 

Volume 6, Issue 9, https://www.ctc.usma.edu/v2/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/CTCSentinel- 

Vol6Iss93.pdf 

29 Karachi bus attack points to growing IS influence, AFP, 5 th June 2015, The Express Tribune, 

Available at: http://tribune.com.pk/story/898184/pakistan-bus-attack-points-to-growing-isinfluence/, 


30 Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, South Asia Terrorism Portal, 

http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/terroristoutfits/lej.htm 

31 “Lashkar-e-Jhangvi”. Mapping Militant Organizations. Stanford University. Available online at: 

http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/215. Accessed 17 th 

April 2015. 

32 Pakistan’s War on Terrorism: Strategies for combating jihadist armed groups since 9/11, 

Samir Puri, 2012, Routledge. 

33 Pakistani jihadist groups, Lashkar-i-Islam merge into the Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan, 

Bill Roggio, March 12 th 2015, The Long War Journal, Available at: 

http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2015/03/pakistani-jihadist-groups-lashkar-iislam-merge-into-the-movement-of-the-taliban-in-pakistan.php, 


34 Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan – Analyzing the Network of Terror, Sana Jamal and M. Ahsa, 

International Relations Insights and Analysis, Report no. 6, January 2015 

49

QUILL IAM 

35 Miraj, N. (2014) “Funding TTP: ANF official rebuffs US allegations”. The Express Tribune. 

Available online: http://tribune.com.pk/story/807507/funding-ttp-anf-official-rebuffs-usallegations/. 

Accessed 17 th April 2015, 

36 Hizb-I-Ismali Gulbuddin. Institute for the Study of War. Available at: 

http://www.understandingwar.org/hizb-i-islami-gulbuddin-hig. Accessed: 22 nd January 2015. 

37 Hizb-I-Ismali Gulbuddin. Institute for the Study of War. Available at: 

http://www.understandingwar.org/hizb-i-islami-gulbuddin-hig. Accessed: 22 nd January 2015. 

38 Brown, V., Rassler, D., (2013) Fountainhead of Jihad: The Haqqani Network, 1973-2012. 

Columbia University Press. 

39 Mullen, M. (2011) Pakistan ‘backed Haqqani attack on Kabul” BBC. Available at: 

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-15024344. Accessed 26 th January 2015. 

40 Brown, V., Rassler, D., (2013) Fountainhead of Jihad: The Haqqani Network, 1973-2012. 

Columbia University Press. 

41 Gopal, Anand; Mansur Khan Mahsud; Brian Fishman (3 June 2010). "Inside the Haqqani 

network". Foreign Policy. The Slate Group, LLC. Retrieved 23 November 2011. 

42 Isis recruiter goes on trial in Uzbekistan. (2014) Available at: 

http://rapsinews.com/judicial_news/20141128/272672067.html. Accessed 26 th January 2015. 

43 Isis recruiter goes on trial in Uzbekistan. (2014) Available at: 

http://rapsinews.com/judicial_news/20141128/272672067.html. Accessed 26 th January 2015. 

44 Stein, M. “The Goals of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and its impact on Central Asia and 

the United States”. FMSO. Available online at: 

http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/documents/IMU-Goals.pdf. Accessed 16 th April 2015. 

45 David Drissel (2014): Reframing the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan: new communication 

and mobilization strategies for the Twitter generation, Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and 

Political Aggression 

46 Taliban Overrun Remote District in Northeastern Afghanistan, Joseph Goldstein, 6 th June 

2015, The New York Times, Available at: 

http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/07/world/asia/taliban-overrun-remote-district-innortheastern-afghanistan.html?_r=0, 


47 Hamilton, F.; Coates, S.; Savage, M.; (2010) "Major General Richard Barrons puts Taleban 

fighter numbers at 36000". The Sunday Times. Available online at: 

http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/news/world/asia/afghanistan/article2462136.ece. Accessed 

on 17 th April 2015. 

48 Does Mullah Omar Still Matter?, Michael Kugelman, April 13 th 2015, War on the Rocks, 

Available at: http://warontherocks.com/2015/04/does-mullah-omar-still-matter/, Accessed: 

7 th June 2015, and Uzbek Group In Afghanistan Pledge Allegiance To Islamic State, RFE/RL's 

Uzbek Service, March 30 th 2015, Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, Available at: 

http://www.rferl.org/content/uzbek-group-in-afghanistan-behead-afghansoldier/26928658.html, 


49 Afghan women hold historic talks with the Taliban, BBC News, 6 th June 2015, Available at: 

http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-33035268, Accessed: 7 th June 2015, Taliban admit 

holding informal Afghan talks in Norway, AFP, June 5 th 2015, The Express Tribune, Available at: 

http://tribune.com.pk/story/898352/taliban-admit-holding-informal-afghan-talks-innorway/ 

, Violence, The Taliban, and Afghanistan’s 2014 Elections, Antonio Giustozzi and Silab 

Mangal, PeaceWorks, December 2014, No. 103 

50 Ibid 

51 Atkins, S.E., (2011) “The 9/11 Encyclopaedia”. ABC-CLIO: p. 540. 

52 Gunmen attack Indian Consulate in Afghanistan, three assailants killed in gun battle. Daily 

News. Available at: http://www.nydailynews.com/news/world/gunmen-attack-indianconsulate-afghanistan-article-1.1803555. 

Accessed: 26 th January 2015. 

53 Laskar, R. (2014) “Pakistani group with links to al-Qaeda calls on militants to join jihad against 

India” Daily Mail India. Available online at: 

http://www.dailymail.co.uk/indiahome/indianews/article-2789468/pakistani-group-links-alqaeda-calls-militants-join-jihad-against-india.html. 


50


54 Schweiger, M. India’s Cyber Challenge: Indian Mujahideen. (2014). The Diplomat. Available at: 

http://thediplomat.com/2014/12/indias-cyber-challenge-indian-mujahideen/. Accessed 23 rd 

January 2015. 

55 UK bans Indian mujahideen. (2012). NDTV. Available at: 

http://www.ndtv.com/article/world/uk-bans-indian-mujahideen-239945?pfrom=homeworld. 

Accessed: 26 th January 2015. 

56 “Indian Mujahideen has grown beyond imagination, see how” (2014) One India. Available 

online at: 

http://www.oneindia.com/india/indian-mujahideen-has-grown-beyond-imagination-seehow-1552177.html. 


57 Ibid 

58 Deendar Anjuman declared unlawful. (2007). The Times of India. Available at: 

http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/hyderabad/Deendar-Anjuman-declaredunlawful/articleshow/2481965.cms?referral=PM. 

Accessed on 26 th January 2015. 

59 “Deendar Anjuman” (2000) Hindunet. Available online at: 

http://hindunet.org/hvk/articles/0800/69.html. Accessed 16 th April 2015. 

60 Stated by member of the jihadist group Lashkar-e-Jhangvi said, on condition of anonymity. 

“The Islamic State is Pushing into Pakistan” (2014). Available online at: 

http://www.newrepublic.com/article/119535/isis-pakistan-islamic-state-distributing-flagsand-flyers. 


61 ISIS leader in Afghanistan says Taliban fights for Pakistani intelligence, Friday June 5 th 2015, 

Khaama Press, Available at: https://www.khaama.com/isis-leader-in-afghanistan-says-talibanfights-for-pakistani-intelligence-1172, 


62 Islamic State appoints leaders of ‘Khorasan province,’ issues veiled threat to Afghan Taliban, 

LWJ Staff, January 27 th 2015, Available at: 

http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2015/01/islamic_state_appoin.php, Accessed: 7 th 

June 2015 

63 Leader Of ISIS Khorasan Province Vows Revenge After Mullah Abdul Rauf Khadim Killed In 

Airstrike, Alessandria Masi, March 17 th 2015, International Business Times, Available at: 

http://www.ibtimes.com/leader-isis-khorasan-province-vows-revenge-after-mullah-abdulrauf-khadim-killed-1850256, 


64 Pakistani Taliban emir for Bajaur joins Islamic State, Bill Roggio, 2 nd February 2015, The Long 

War Journal, Available at: 

http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2015/02/pakistani_taliban_em.php, Accessed: 7 th 

June 2015 

65 ISIS Now Says It Didn’t Bomb Afghanistan, Nancy A. Yousef, 21 st April 2015, The Daily Beast, 

Available at: http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/04/21/isis-now-says-it-didn-tbomb-afghanistan.html, 


66 Tammana, Z. (2015) “Taliban clash with Daesh over Afghan recruitment”. Turkish Weekly. 

Available online at: http://www.turkishweekly.net/2015/05/26/news/taliban-clash-withdaesh-over-afghan-recruitment/. 

Accessed on 1 st June 2015. 

67 USA Today. April 18 th 2015. Afghan suicide bombing claimed by Islamic State kills 35. 

Available online at: http://www.usatoday.com/news/. Accessed on 28 th April 2015. 

68 Shankar, S. (2015). “Al Qaeda's South Asia Arm Blames India's Modi, Charlie Hebdo For War 

Against Muslims”. IB Times. Available online at: http://www.ibtimes.com/al-qaedas-south-asiaarm-blames-indias-modi-charlie-hebdo-war-against-muslims-1906679. 

Accessed on 7 th May 

2015. 

69 Southeast Asian Fronts Loom Closer to Jihad, Insite Blog on Terrorism and Extremism, 19 th 

January 2014, Available at: https://news.siteintelgroup.com/blog/index.php/entry/346- 

southeast-asian-fronts-loom-closer-to-jihad, Accessed: 26/01/15 

70 The Subverted Indo-Bangladesh Border, May 7 th 2014, VK Shashikumar, India Defence 

Review, Available at: http://www.indiandefencereview.com/news/the-subverted-indobangladesh-border-i/, 


71 “India parliament uproar over conversions by Hindu groups, BBC News, 22 nd December 2014, 

Available at: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-30573796, Accessed: 12 th June 2015 

51

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72 Is Pakistan in ISIS’s Crosshairs?, C. Christine Fair, October 16, 2014, Boston Review, Available 

at: http://www.bostonreview.net/world/c-christine-fair-isis-pakistan-militant-foreign-policy, 


73 Pakistani Taliban praises slain al Qaeda leaders, Bill Roggio, April 15 th , The Long War Journal, 

Available at: http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2015/04/pakistani-taliban-praisesslain-al-qaeda-leaders.php, 

Accessed: June 7 th 2015 

74 However, the Taliban is no longer the ally of AQ as it once was, and arguably has not been 

since 9/11 (Part I of our longer report), moreover, the group has not denounced AQ on takfiri 

grounds, unlike IS. 

75 “Q&A: Kashmir dispute”. BBC News. Available online at: 

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/2739993.stm. Accessed on 10 th June 2015. 

76 Terrorist/extremist/insurgent groups: Jammu and Kashmir. South Asia Terrorism Portal. 

Available online at: 

http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/jandk/terrorist_outfits/terrorists_list 

_j&k.htm. Accessed on 10 th June 2015. 

77 Adam Smith International. Needs Assessment Survey in Afghanistan. Available online at: 

http://www.adamsmithinternational.com/explore-our-work/centralasia/afghanistan/counter-terrorism-legal-training. 

Accessed on 20th April 2015. 

78 UNAMA and Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), Afghanistan Mid- 

Year Report 2012 on Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict. Kabul, Afghanistan: UNAMA and 

OHCHR: 33. 

79 Ex-Gitmo detainee leads contingent of Islamic State fighters in Afghanistan, Thomas Jocelyn, 

January 17 th 2015, The Long War Journal, Available at: 

http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2015/01/exguantanamo_detain_2.php#ixzz3Q3HI186D, 


80 Islamic State Arrives in Pakistan: Implications for South Asia – Analysis, Divya Kumar Soti, 

December 18th 2014, Eurasia Review, Available at: http://www.eurasiareview.com/18122014- 

islamic-state-arrives-pakistan-implications-south-asia-analysis/, Accessed: 27/01/15 

81 Afghanistan’s Insurgency After the Transition, International Crisis Group, Asia Report no. 256, 

12 th May 2014 

82 Ahmad, J. and Stanekzai, M. (2015). “Disenchanted Militants in South Asia Eye Islamic State 

with Envy.” Reuters. Accessible online at: http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/01/21/usmideast-crisis-southasia-insight-idUSKBN0KU2VC20150121 

/ Accessed on January 22nd 2015. 

83 Singh, A.K. (2015) “Islamic State: Lurking Dangers in India – Analysis”. Eurasia Review. 

Available online: http://www.eurasiareview.com/25052015-islamic-state-lurking-dangers-inindia-analysis/. 

Accessed on 30 th May 2015. 

84 “The unlawful activities (prevention) amendment bill”. 2008. As passed by Lok Sabha on 17 

December, 2008. Bill no. 76-c of 2008. Accessed online at: 

https://www.unodc.org/tldb/pdf/India/THE_UNLAWFUL_ACTIVITIES_BILL2008.pdf. 10 th 

June 2015. 

85 Sharma, A. (2014) “Madrasas with Indian Muslim teachers are not nurseries of terrorism, says 

report”. The Economic Times. Available online at: 

http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2014-11-12/news/56025564_1_indianmuslims-madrasas-young-muslims. 

Accessed on 17 th April 2015, 

86 Kaplan, E. and Bajoria, J. (2008) “Counterterrorism in India” Council on Foreign Relations. 

Available online at: http://www.cfr.org/india/counterterrorism-india/p11170#p4. Accessed 

on 17 th April 2015. 

87 87 Singh, A.K. (2015) “Islamic State: Lurking Dangers in India – Analysis”. Eurasia Review. 

Available online: http://www.eurasiareview.com/25052015-islamic-state-lurking-dangers-inindia-analysis/. 

Accessed on 30 th May 2015. 

88 "Datablog: UK Census: religion by age, ethnicity and country of birth". The Guardian. 16 May 

2013. Retrieved 5 June 2015. Of British Muslims of British Asian ethnic group, 14% are Indian, 

91.5% are Pakistani, and 90% are Bangladeshi, as per a census in 2011. 

52


89 “South Asia is World’s most corrupt region: Transparency International”. 22 nd May 2014. 

NDTV. Available:http://www.ndtv.com/india-news/south-asia-is-worlds-most-corruptregion-transparency-international-563198. 

Accessed 4 th February 2015. 

90 “South Asia is World’s most corrupt region: Transparency International”. 22 nd May 2014. 

NDTV. Available:http://www.ndtv.com/india-news/south-asia-is-worlds-most-corruptregion-transparency-international-563198. 

Accessed 4 th February 2015. 

91 Barel, Z. September 1 st , 2014. “How the Islamic State buys power”. Haaretz. Available at: 

http://www.haaretz.com/news/middle-east/.premium-1.613395. Accessed 5 th February 2015. 

92Google Public Data. GDP per capita for India. Available online at: 

https://www.google.co.uk/publicdata/explore?ds=d5bncppjof8f9_&met_y=ny_gdp_pcap_cd& 

idim=country:IND:PAK&hl=en&dl=en. Accessed on 10 th June 2015. 

93 Knoema. World Data Atlas. GDP per capita for Jammu and Kashmir. Accessed online at: 

http://knoema.com/atlas/India/Jammu-and-Kashmir/GDP-Per-capita-Income. Accessed on 

10 th June 2015. 

94 Karachi bus attack points to growing IS influence, AFP, 5 th June 2015, The Express Tribune, 

Available at: http://tribune.com.pk/story/898184/pakistan-bus-attack-points-to-growing-isinfluence/, 

Accessed: 6 th June 2015. 

95 Pg. 77 http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2010/3/confrontingpoverty-graff/2010_confronting_poverty.pdf 

96 Fair, Christine C. (2011) “Lashkar-e-Tiaba beyond Bin Laden: Enduring Challenges for the 

Region and the International Community. Hearing on “Al Qaeda, the Taliban, and Other 

Extremist Groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan.”. 

97 Kaye, Dalia D. (2007) “Talking to the Enemy: Track Two Diplomacy in the Middle East and 

South Asia”. RAND National Security Division. 

98 WHO. 2014. “Global status report on violence prevention 2014” Available at: 

http://www.who.int/violence_injury_prevention/violence/world_report/en/. Accessed on 5 th 

February 2015. 





101 Available at: http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/icd/icd9cm.htm. Accessed 5 th February 2015. 

102 JK has highest unemployment rate in north India, Greater Kashmir News Network, Available 

at: http://www.greaterkashmir.com/news/2013/Mar/10/jk-has-highest-unemployment-ratein-north-india-42.asp, 


103 WHO. (2014) “Global status report on violence prevention 2014” Available at: 

http://www.who.int/violence_injury_prevention/violence/world_report/en/. Accessed on 5 th 

February 2015. 

104 PM issues Rs 11 billion for three mega projects in AJK, January 25 th 2015, The News Tribe, 

Available at: http://www.thenewstribe.com/2015/01/20/pm-issues-rs-11-billion-for-threemega-projects-in-ajk/, 

Accessed: 09/02/2015 

105 Byman, D. (2013) “The Foreign Policy Essay: C. Christine Fair of “Lashkar-e-Taiba: Pakistan’s 

Domesticated Terrorists”. Lawfare. Available online at: 

http://www.lawfareblog.com/2013/12/the-foreign-policy-essay.com. Accessed on 1 st June 

2015. 

106 PILDAT 2014 “Public Opinion on Quality of Governance in Pakistan” Available online: 

http://www.pildat.org/Publications/publication/Democracy&LegStr/PublicOpiniononQuality 

ofGovernanceinPakistan_Sep2014.pdf. Accessed on 6 th February 20145. 

107 “150 heavily-armed Taliban members overwhelmed guards at Pakistan prison, freeing over 

250 prisoners”. July 30 th , 2013. New York Post. Available at: 

http://nypost.com/2013/07/30/150-heavily-armed-taliban-members-overwhelmed-guardsat-pakistan-prison-freeing-over-250-prisoners/. 

Accessed on 6 th February 2015. 

108 Study on Informal Justice System in Pakistan, Sindh Judicial Academy, Available at: 

http://www.sja.gos.pk/Publicaiton/Misc/Report%20Informal%20Justice%20System%20in% 

20Pakistan.pdf, Accessed: 15/02/15 

53

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109 International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence (ICSR). (2010) 

“Prisons and Terrorism Radicalisation and De-radicalisation in 15 Countries”. Report available 

online: 

http://icsr.info/wpcontent/uploads/2012/10/1277699166PrisonsandTerrorismRadicalisationandDeradicalisati 

onin15Countries.pdf. Accessed on 6 th February 2015. 

110 Ibid 

111 Ibid 

112 See: Fair, C. C. (2012). The enduring madrasa myth. South Asia. 

113 Crabtree, S. December 5 th 2014. “Suffering in Afghanistan Hits Record High – for any country”. 

Gallup. Available at: http://www.gallup.com/poll/179897/suffering-afghanistan-hits-globalrecord-high.aspx?utm_source. 

Accessed on 5 th February 2015. 

114 DDR in Afghanistan When State-building and insecurity collide, Small Arms Survey, 2009 

115 Missed Opportunities The Impact of DDR on SSR in Afghanistan, Caroline A. Hartzell, Special 

Report 270, April 2011, United States Institute for Peace 

116 Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration and Security Sector Reform Insights from 

UN Experience in Afghanistan, Burundi, the Central African Republic and the Democratic 

Republic of the Congo, Allen Bryden and Vincenza Scherrer, Geneva Center for the Democratic 

Control of Armed Forces 

117 Missed Opportunities The Impact of DDR on SSR in Afghanistan, Caroline A. Hartzell, Special 

Report 270, April 2011, United States Institute for Peace 

118 An Intimate War: An Oral History of the Helmand Conflict, Mike Martin, 2014, Hurst and 

Company 

119 “Afghan Fury over UK troops telling farmers they can grow poppies” 28th April 2007. The 

Guardian. Accessed at: 

http://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/apr/28/afghanistan.declanwalsh. Accessed on 

10th February 2015. 

120 Peter van Ham & Jorrit Kamminga (2007) Poppies for Peace: Reforming Afghanistan's Opium 

Industry, The Washington Quarterly, 30:1, 69-8 

121 Licensing Afghanistan’s opium: solution or fallacy?, Pierre-Arnaud Chouvy, Caucasian Review 

of International Affairs, Vol. 2 (2) 

122 Chaudry, D.R. (2015) Obama in India: Counter-terror cooperation, military exercises also 

part of Obama-Modi agreement. Available at: 

http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/articleshow/46016157. Accessed on 27 th January 2015. 

123 India US Defence Relations (2015). Available on the Indian Embassy website: 

https://www.indianembassy.org/pages.php?id=53. Accessed 27 th January 2015. 

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