Deutsche Bank AG - Historische Gesellschaft der Deutschen Bank e.V.
Deutsche Bank AG - Historische Gesellschaft der Deutschen Bank e.V.
Deutsche Bank AG - Historische Gesellschaft der Deutschen Bank e.V.
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<strong>Deutsche</strong> Schutzvereinigung für Wertpapierbesitz has yiven the following reasons<br />
for its proposal:<br />
"The developments surrounding Feldmühle Nobel and AVA have strongly con-<br />
firmed DSW's fears that a restriction on voting rights is, firstly, not an effective way<br />
of warding off a large sharehol<strong>der</strong> and, secondly, can be very counterproductive.<br />
The blocking of rival sharehol<strong>der</strong> groups not only paralyzes the company, it also<br />
harrns its reputation in public.<br />
Commerzbank was right when it announced just recently: Through restrictions on<br />
voting rights companies ultimately pay for uncertain advantages with tangible dis-<br />
advantages.<br />
Since it is still uncertain whether protective mechanirns that conform rnore closely<br />
to market conditions will be introduced, maximum voting rights, which in any case<br />
are un<strong>der</strong>stood by the companies merely as a Signal, should be removed withour<br />
delay in view of the disadvantages which currently do exist in practice."<br />
Reply:<br />
The Board of Managing Directors proposes that the motion be rejected.<br />
It can also happen in cornpanies without a maximurn voting right that sharehol<strong>der</strong>s<br />
form groups that rival with each other and, in so doing, exert a negative influence on<br />
decision-rnaking processes in the cornpany. In the present legal situation, the rnaxi-<br />
mum voting right serves to protect the sharehol<strong>der</strong> against unequal treatment in the<br />
event of Shares being bought up and of takeover bids. We think it can only be dis-<br />
pensed with if greater transparency can be achieved in the anonymity of sharehol<strong>der</strong><br />
structures, so that investors can recognize at an early stage changes and intentions of<br />
a party buying upsharesand/or of a potential bid<strong>der</strong>. In ouropionion, this requires the<br />
implementation - as quickly as possible - of the EC Information Directive, which es-<br />
tablishes an obligation to disclose holdings at leastfrorn 10%. In addition, we are in fa-<br />
vour of binding rules for takeover bids, ensuring an or<strong>der</strong>ly and fair procedure with<br />
the aim of equal treatrnent for all sharehol<strong>der</strong>s. The maxirnurn voting right should be<br />
retained until these preconditions are fulfilled.<br />
Ms. Elis Sachau, Meckenheim-Merl, has given notice that with regard to ltem 2 of the<br />
Agenda she will propose the following motion:<br />
"The General Meeting is requested to resolve that of the available distributable<br />
profit in the amount of DM 556,702,734,<br />
a) DM 542,784,165.65, i.e. 97.5%,<br />
be used to distribute a dividend of DM 13.65 per share<br />
in the nominal amount of DM 50, and<br />
b) DM 13,917,568.35, i.e. 2.5%.<br />
be used as a donation to the<br />
Internationales Jugend- und Kin<strong>der</strong>hilfswerk <strong>der</strong> Salesianer<br />
Don Bosco - Missionsprokurator Pater Karl Oer<strong>der</strong> -<br />
Strässchenweg 3, 5300 Bonn 1."