Rumbling on performativity_Frits Simon

methodological relativism. His relativism appears to be rather tolerant towards different
research methods, but not towards different philosophical points of view.
To clarify my point: Verschuren states that there are three approaches of science
which depart from different claims about what knowledge is. He differentiates among
an empirical-analytical, phenomenological and critical-emancipatory claim. For a critical-emancipatory
claim he recognizes that this perspective postulates the ideological
character of any sort of knowledge. He is even aware that it is debatable that “in the
standard picture of science universal valid knowledge is seen as a product of rational
acting, not disrupted by an opinion, emotion, subjectivity or a different typical feminine
trait.” (Verschuren, 2009: 151). However, instead of concluding that demanding
objectivity corresponding somehow with an ontological reality for any kind of research
is illogical, he could have concluded that even concepts as ‘objectivity’ and ‘an ontological
reality’ are ideologically bound. That these concepts belong to a specific - empirical-analytical
- claim regarding knowledge and thus are hard to compare on a (presumed)
general set of criteria. Assuming an ontological reality leads to demands for
internal and external validity as defined by Verschuren. In my opinion Verschuren’s
position exemplifies the fallacy of circular reasoning, which in the end of course concerns
every paradigm.
Paradoxically by doing that, Verschuren’s conclusion exemplifies how any kind of
analysis, model or classification is inescapably bound to basic knowledge claims about
the relation between ontology and epistemology. If one departs from a different point
of view regarding the relation between ontology and epistemology, it will lead to
different ideas about standards for the quality of research.
However, it goes without saying that other ways of doing research should advance
discussion about their own standards of quality and that the work of Verschuren
provokes a discussion about these standards. A discussion which sometimes may be
vehemently if auto-ethnographic research is accused of ideological narcissism (Shields,
2009) and empirical-analytical research of voyeurism (Denzin, 2014). I will introduce
the consequences of assuming a different relation between ontology and epistemology,
culminating in standards which are to be applied for an evaluation of my research.
Reconstructive social realistic knowledge claims from a complex responsive processperspective
Recapitulating what up till now I have written about a complex responsive processapproach
several key-words come to mind: radically reflexive concerning the position,
values and beliefs of the researcher, oriented on responsiveness, process-oriented,
critical with regard to the workings of micro-politics, oriented on the local and particular
and departing from a dynamical interpretation of social reality of which unpredictability
and emergence are characteristics.
2. Research from a complex responsive process-approach | 47