Rumbling on performativity_Frits Simon

human behavior and examine it frame by frame, as it unfolds.” (Ariely, 2009: 51). In a
manner of speaking the experimental psychologist positions himself as the candle that
lights up the hidden psychological mechanisms. But in real life my superior and I have
an interdependent working relation in which during all of our conversations we are
and get more committed to each other, in which we figure out how to interpret things
and in which my preparations for him have to be prepared in a way that connects to
his points of view. I think it would be wise to approach psychology not as a natural but
a moral science through which we should study how we treat each other in everyday
life (Shotter, 1993). If my superior would not be co-creative in some way – and he is -
and if I would be unable somehow to commit myself to his views, I better look for
another position. Apparently one can only sell phrases (frames) to someone else if they
reflect the values of the other (Bai, 2005). The weight of a given advice declines the
greater the distance between the advice and the initial opinions of the receiver is,
especially if the receiver is high-knowledgeable regarding the subject (Yaniv, 2004).
The other included
So before even of thinking of unilaterally re-programming my superior’s mind, our
minds are related and committed in a way which makes working together possible.
And it works both ways: in working together there is a mutual influence so who could
possibly decide who is qualifying who?
From this perspective the position of a supposed shrewd re-programmer (and the
experimental psychologist) is to compare with the supposed outsider’s position which
is attributed to or claimed by managers. As if managers have a Janus face through
which it is possible to step out of real life, to design interventions and then to step
back and change life in trying to frame the subordinates with new insights. According
to Stacey this doubling of processes - in the situation itself and in the presumed stepped
back situation - is a fallacy as there are “… only processes of human interaction
and no one can take an external vantage point in relation to this.” (Stacey, 2007: 265).
Moreover, I would add, supposing that you can control a situation from outside is
practically impossible and ascribes naivety to your fellow human beings. Whatever the
differences between individual competences may be, in my view a human’s mind is so
complicated that the social interaction between two or more people in a given situation
is far too fleeting and complex to pretend any kind of controllability or predictability
(Simon, 2000).
Again some thirty years before representationalism became much-discussed due the
rise of cognitive sciences, Mead argued against a representationalist stance in psychology.
Although one might compare the me of a person – “the organized sets of attitudes”
(Mead, 1934) – with a representationalist perspective on the socializing process of
a person, as stated before, according to Mead what a person actually does is depending
on the interaction in a real situation. The ‘I’ never walks alone, even if the ‘I’
wanted to. During the discussions in the coordination team the opinions of the members
of the board and a lot of other people were in our minds and we often estimated
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