Organizational Development: A Manual for Managers and ... - FPDL

aggression can make the trajectory of ‘independent’ individual behaviour too objectionable. On the
other hand, the very fact of pooling others into the socion changes the situation and can make
individual behaviour unprofitable (it drastically reduces the chances of gain).
Therefore, the forming socion can serve as an ‘attractor’, to attract trajectories of individual
behaviours and involve them in a kind of complex behaviour – that of an emerging entity. This
process will continue until the increase in the number of participating parts over a certain maximum
leads to reduced effectiveness of the entity – diminishing to the level of effectiveness of individual
behaviour. Then socion will refuse additional new members and even actively resist their possible
intervention. It is also possible that changing conditions will require society to diminish the size of
its membership in order to remain effective. Then it will eliminate the elements that play a less
important role in creating the general emergent effect of cooperation.
In socion/society, each element depends on others, thus cooperation creates specific vulnerability
that may be fatal for any one if others do not follow agreed upon patterns of behaviour. Therefore,
cooperation of any subject is only possible when they meet certain requirements related to
confidence. Some requirements are specific and are based on particular rules of coordinating
actions in this given socion/society. However, other requirements are general and do not depend
on the kind of entity. For example - providing others with correct information (telling the truth), or
following an agreed upon trajectory even when changing circumstances make it extremely
inconvenient (keeping promises). These simple requirements are common for any kind of
imaginable socion/society – for a team of astronauts in a satellite, or for a gang of criminals. A lack
of perceived mutual confidence makes cooperation highly risky for each subject, and therefore,
very irrational. On the other hand, excessive reliability with respect to partners creates serious
restrictions to flexibility in one’s own behaviour. In some cases, belonging to socion/society may be
disadvantageous. The only relevant issue may be – what is the pay off?
When the emergent effect of coordinated interaction is divisible, it is common to call this kind of
socion a cooperative. The total gain may be divided among participating parties in accordance with
their contribution, power, value as perceived by others, etc.
When the effect of co-operation is indivisible – then we are speaking about a commune. Some
specific benefits of cooperation between people who live together (at least in the same vicinity)
cannot be taken away – like clean and well-lighted streets, a healthy environment, safe public
places, etc. Access to the benefits of cooperation sometimes cannot be withheld from those who
did not contribute to creating the benefit. Then those who contributed may decide to use their
combined power to force ‘non-contributors’ to contribute.
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