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[122] <strong>Final</strong> <strong>Judgment</strong> 183<br />

Organization (OAS) that was fighting DeGaulle's decision to grant<br />

independence to Algeria.<br />

Although the Church Senate Committee hearings on clandestine CIA<br />

activities later concluded that there had been no CIA involvement with the<br />

OAS, 327 there is very strong evidence to the contrary.<br />

General Maurice Challe, former commander in chief of French forces in<br />

Algeria and leader of the military revolt against DeGaulle in April of 1961,<br />

emerged as one of the key figures in the OAS. Although Challe insisted that<br />

he "'had no contact personally with any foreign countries' and that in fact he<br />

had deliberately avoided all such contacts so as not to incur any possible<br />

charge of having been brought in on foreign bayonets.<br />

"Nevertheless," according to historian Alistair Horne, "some of<br />

[Challe's] subordinates appear to have made informal, and highly tentative,<br />

soundings with representatives of various countries that might be considered<br />

sympathetic, among them Portugal, Spain, Israel and South Africa." 328<br />

"Rumors of clandestine United States involvement ran extremely strong in<br />

France. Undeniably, during his time at NATO headquarters the popular Challe<br />

did make firm friends of a number of high-ranking United States generals<br />

who made no secret of their aversion to what DeGaulle was doing to NATO,<br />

going so far—over a plethora of Scotch—as to express enthusiasm for<br />

anyone who might rid France of her turbulent president, or, at least, force<br />

him to change his tune." 329<br />

"There were also rumors that the CIA had promised Challe United<br />

States recognition if they succeeded—in order to keep the communists out<br />

of North Africa. Any hopes, however, that all this may have engendered in<br />

the bosom of the conspiracy were to be swiftly dashed when [John F.<br />

Kennedy's] Ambassador to Paris, General James M. Gavin, firmly assured<br />

DeGaulle that if any rebels attempted to land on French bases where there<br />

were American troops, these would at once open fire." 330<br />

There is further evidence that the CIA was engaged in intrigue with the<br />

OAS. According to historian Alexander Harrison, "In early December 1961,<br />

a 'Colonel Brown' of the CIA station in France requested a meeting with<br />

[OAS leader General Raoul] Salan. Brown offered Salan enough weaponry to<br />

equip an army of 50,000 men." 331<br />

Although some have speculated that the purported CIA operatives were<br />

not, in fact, really with the CIA, General Salan himself said, "I was sure<br />

they were serious, because they knew all the right people, and their<br />

credentials were perfect." In fact, in the end, some arms were indeed<br />

delivered. 332 So there really is no question, really, that the CIA was indeed<br />

covertly supporting the OAS in its war against DeGaulle.<br />

We do know that during this same time frame, the CIA did have one<br />

liaison, at least, to the OAS. He was E. Howard Hunt, the agency's<br />

political handler for the anti-Castro Cuban exiles.<br />

In Chapter 15 and Chapter 16 we will examine Hunt's OAS<br />

connections further, particularly as they relate to the key players involved in<br />

the JFK assassination conspiracy.

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