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[42] <strong>Final</strong> <strong>Judgment</strong> 103<br />

political attacks such a visit would bring from voters more sympathetic to<br />

Israel." 86<br />

(Unfortunately, however, as noted by Richard Curtiss, "As with most good<br />

intentions deferred, the invitation to Nasser for a personal meeting with<br />

Kennedy was never issued." 87 )<br />

Thus, it was that upon assuming office, Kennedy made positive<br />

attempts to contact Arab heads of state asking how the U.S. could help each<br />

country in its individual disputes with Israel.<br />

STANDING BY TRADITION<br />

However, Kennedy wanted one thing in particular understood by all sides<br />

in the conflict: the new U.S. president wanted "to make it crystal clear that the<br />

U.S. meant what it said in the Tripartite Declaration of 1950—that we will<br />

act promptly and decisively against any nation in the Middle East which<br />

attacks its neighbor." 88 This policy was directed not only to the Arabs, but<br />

Israel as well. Kennedy did indeed mean business.<br />

ISRAEL'S LOBBY REACTS<br />

Soon after Kennedy assumed office, Israel and its American lobby began to<br />

understand the import of Kennedy's positioning in regard to the Arab-Israeli<br />

conflict. Israel was not happy—to say the very least—and began putting<br />

heat on the White House through the egis of its supporters in Congress,<br />

many of whom relied upon support from the Israeli lobby for campaign<br />

contributions and political leverage.<br />

According to America's most noted longtime Jewish critic of Israel, Dr.<br />

Alfred Lilienthal: "While the President, more often through Vice President<br />

Lyndon Johnson, gave much lip service to Israelist aspirations, his<br />

administration continued to resist pressures, including a round-robin petition<br />

signed by 226 Congressmen of both parties (aided by a large New York<br />

Times advertisement on May 28, 1962) to initiate direct Arab-Israeli<br />

negotiations. Kennedy had decided to shelve his pledge in the Democratic<br />

platform to bring Israeli and Arab leaders together around a peace table in<br />

order to settle the Palestine question." 89<br />

ALGERIA, AGAIN<br />

It was mid-way into Kennedy's presidency that he had the satisfaction of<br />

seeing French President Charles DeGaulle grant independence to Algeria—<br />

something, of course, as we saw in Chapter 4 that was not looked favorably upon<br />

by Israel and its American lobby.<br />

Five years and one day after Kennedy's Senate speech calling for<br />

Algerian independence, Algeria became a sovereign state on July 3, 1962.<br />

According to former diplomat Richard Curtiss, "Algeria's [revolutionary]<br />

leaders had not forgotten the American senator who had championed their<br />

cause and they publicly hailed his election." 90

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