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14.02 Principles of Macroeconomics: Problem Set 5 - MIT ...

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<strong>14.02</strong> <strong>Principles</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Macroeconomics</strong><br />

<strong>Problem</strong> <strong>Set</strong> #5<br />

Due: November 20, 2009 at 4pm<br />

1 Intergenerational altruism and Ricardian Equivalence (50<br />

points)<br />

The country <strong>of</strong> Bequestia has only two consumers, Joe Senior and Joe Junior. At time t = 0; Joe<br />

Senior is young, and Joe Junior has not been born yet. At time t = 1; Joe Senior is old and Joe<br />

Junior is born, and at t = 2 Joe Junior is old and Joe senior is dead. They are both PIH consumers<br />

with preferences given by:<br />

U(c young ; c old ) = ln c young + ln c old<br />

where 2 [0; 1]: Both Joes have an income <strong>of</strong> y young = 10 when young and y old = 10 when old. The<br />

interest rate is r > 0:<br />

1. (5 points) Write both consumers’intertemporal budget constraints.<br />

2. (5 points) Using the optimality condition c old = (1 + r)c young and the budget constraint, …nd<br />

each consumers’consumptions as a function <strong>of</strong> r and :<br />

3. (6 points) Find the aggregate consumption C t and savings S t <strong>of</strong> the economy at times t = 0; 1; 2:<br />

4. (7 points) Now assume that the government <strong>of</strong> Bequestia decides to spend G = 5 at t = 0 and<br />

give it as gift to Joe Senior. The gift will be …nanced by lump-sum taxes T at t = 2. Since the<br />

government must satisfy its intertemporal budget constraint,<br />

G +<br />

T<br />

(1 + r) 2 = 0:<br />

Find the level <strong>of</strong> consumption and saving for the economy at t = 0; 1; 2 as a function <strong>of</strong> r and<br />

:<br />

5. (6 points) Does Ricardian equivalence hold in this economy? Why?<br />

From now on, assume Joe Senior cares about Joe Junior’s future, and his utility function is<br />

now<br />

U(c young;sr ; c old;sr ; c young;jr ; c old;jr ) = ln c young;sr + ln c old;sr + ln c young;jr + 2 ln c old;jr<br />

where c young;sr is Senior’s consumption when young, c young;jr is junior’s consumption when<br />

young and so on. Junior does not solve a consumption problem, he simply follows the consumption<br />

path that Senior picks for him. Income <strong>of</strong> Senior and Junior remain the same as<br />

1


efore. Government spending and taxes are zero in all periods. Also assume from now on that<br />

r = 0 and = 1:<br />

6. (5 points) Find the consumption <strong>of</strong> Joe Senior and his bequest to (consumption <strong>of</strong>) Joe Junior.<br />

[Hint: with = 1; r = 0 you need to do very little math. Why?]<br />

7. (5 points) How does Senior’s consumption pattern in part 6 compare to that in part 2?<br />

8. (5 points) Now the government implements the same spending pattern as in part 4, with G = 5<br />

at t = 0 …nanced by taxes at time t = 2: Find Senior and Junior’s consumption pattern.<br />

9. (6 points) Does Ricardian equivalence hold in this economy? Why?<br />

10. BONUS (10 points) Would Ricardian equivalence hold if Senior’s utility function is<br />

What about<br />

a) U(c young;sr ; c old;sr ; c young;jr ; c old;jr ) = ln c young;sr + ln c old;sr + 2 ln c old;jr ?<br />

b) U(c young;sr ; c old;sr ; c young;jr ; c old;jr ) = ln c young;sr + ln c old;sr + ln c young;jr ?<br />

2 Rules <strong>of</strong> thumb and Ricardian Equivalence (50 points)<br />

Consider an economy where savings follow the rule <strong>of</strong> thumb that they are a constant fraction s <strong>of</strong><br />

income, i.e. S t = sY t with s 2 (0; 1): The production function is Y t = A t L 1=2 ; and the labor force<br />

is …xed at L = 1: The growth rate <strong>of</strong> productivity is g; i.e. A t+1 = (1 + g)A t ; with A 0 = 1: The<br />

government spends G t each period and collects a lump-sum tax <strong>of</strong> T t : The economy exists for three<br />

periods t = 0; 1; 2:<br />

1. (8 points) Find the path for private savings S pvt<br />

t = Y t T t C t and public savings S gov<br />

t = T G<br />

if G t = T t = 0 for all t:<br />

2. (8 points) Find the path for private savings if government spending is …xed at a fraction<br />

p 2 (0; 1) <strong>of</strong> GDP and the government is running a balanced budget every period.<br />

3. (8 points) Now consider the case where the government spends G 0 = pY 0 and zero in all other<br />

periods, and collects taxes T 2 = pY 2 in period 2: Find private and public savings. Find the<br />

path for consumption.<br />

4. (8 points) In order to implement the policy in part 3, the government borrows in period 0<br />

and re-pays its debt in period 2 using the money collected from taxes. Find the maximum<br />

per-period interest rate r that the government is willing to pay.<br />

2


5. (8 points) Is there Ricardian equivalence in this economy? Explain. [Hint: Ricardian equivalence<br />

has to do with aggregate savings and consumption].<br />

6. (10 points) Now assume that aggregate savings S is allowed to depend on G (as well as Y as<br />

before.) Find a dependence that S must have on G so that Ricardian equivalence holds in this<br />

economy.<br />

3


<strong>MIT</strong> OpenCourseWare<br />

http://ocw.mit.edu<br />

<strong>14.02</strong> <strong>Principles</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Macroeconomics</strong><br />

Fall 2009<br />

For information about citing these materials or our Terms <strong>of</strong> Use, visit: http://ocw.mit.edu/terms.

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