Human Dignity and Bioethics

Dignity and Bioethics | 497
they are severely ill. Even an argument, for example, for euthanizing
such patients, based on their profound loss of attributed dignity,
presumes, as I have argued, that they are members of the human
natural kind and still have intrinsic dignity. All duties to build up or
to create conditions conducive to a patient’s possibilities for inflorescent
dignity depend upon respect for intrinsic dignity. Likewise,
any perceived duty to build up diminished attributed dignity also
depends upon respect for intrinsic dignity. Respect begins with recognition,
and recognition does require an act of attribution, yet this
attribution does not create the value. Rather, recognition is best described
as an act of attributing correctly, an acknowledgement of the
intrinsic dignity of the patient that cannot be eliminated even should
it go unrecognized. The dignity here acknowledged is an objective
value that presents itself as worthy of respect. Before we can attribute
any additional values to human beings, whether sick or well,
and call those values “dignities,” we must first recognize and respect
them as bearers of intrinsic dignity. Those suffering from PCU may
represent a limiting case. They have severely diminished attributed
dignity, and extremely limited possibilities for inflorescent dignity.
Yet it is only by virtue of having first picked them out as members of
the human natural kind and having recognized their intrinsic value
that we concerned about either their attributed or their inflorescent
value. Those who strive to build up the attributed dignity of patients
suffering from PCU have already conceded that there is such a thing
as intrinsic dignity by the very fact that they show concern for these
patients. While extraordinarily impaired, these individuals still have
intrinsic dignity by virtue of being the kinds of things that they are—
members of the human natural kind. Therefore, according to the
moral duties that follow from a fundamental duty to respect intrinsic
dignity, someone suffering from PCU cannot be euthanized or experimented
upon without consent (P-VI).
Such individuals have an intrinsic dignity that also demands
equality of treatment. Accordingly, such individuals cannot be denied
access to care that other ill human beings would be afforded merely
on the basis of their medical conditions. Treatment might be refused,
but treatment must be offered. Comfort, care, and respect must never
be abandoned. As discussed above, this duty to provide care is
limited by the individual’s physical, psychological, social, spiritual,