Human Dignity and Bioethics

488 | Daniel P. Sulmasy, O.F.M.
on this view, is precisely the opposite of what it means to face death
with dignity.
The argument from intrinsic dignity suggests that the fundamental
basis for the duty to build up the inflorescent dignity of sick
human beings—the root of any motivation to attribute dignity to
them—is the intrinsic value of the human, the value human beings
have by virtue of being the kinds of things that they are. As
argued above, no circumstances can eliminate that intrinsic dignity.
As Duty P-VI states, there is a duty of perfect obligation, in carrying
out PP‐I‐V, never to act in such a way as directly to undermine
the intrinsic dignity that gives the other duties their binding force.
Thus, while one might, out of human sympathy, suggest that a duty
to build up attributed dignity legitimizes euthanasia, the conception
of dignity presented in this essay would argue that this cannot be
permitted because it undermines the fundamental basis of morality
itself—respect for intrinsic dignity.
A conception of dignity with the explanatory power to understand
the basis for arguments on both sides of the debate about euthanasia
as well as the normative power to settle that argument in
favor of prohibiting the practice seems much more than a “useless”
concept.
The Care of the Disabled
The proper treatment of persons with disabilities has become a matter
of great controversy in bioethics, with significant implications for
our society. A famous philosopher has even argued with a disability
rights activist about these issues in the pages of the New York Times
Sunday Magazine. 33 Could the conception of dignity presented here
illuminate these debates?
First, it is clear that disability does not transform a human being
into another natural kind. One classifies a person as disabled because
one has first picked that individual out as a member of the human
natural kind, noting the kind-typical features that the individual does
not express. The disabled therefore have intrinsic dignity. Respect for
intrinsic dignity would dictate, as argued above, that one recognize
the radically equal intrinsic dignity of a severely mentally retarded