Human Dignity and Bioethics

Two Arguments from Human Dignity | 457
(1a)
Human beings have worth.
and that
(2a)
A life in which someone lacks the threshold capacities is
not a life worthy of human beings.
It assumes further that, if human beings have worth, then it is bad
that they should have to live lives that are unworthy of them. Since
(1a) says that people have worth, then (1a) together with this assumption
implies that:
(3a.1)
That human beings should have to live lives that are not
worthy of them is bad.
The Aristotelian Argument also assumes that if someone’s having
to live a life that is not worthy of her is bad, then—if government is
to be appropriately respectful of human worth—that bad is one that
government must avert. This assumption, when conjoined with (2a)
and (3a.1), implies that
(3a.2.1) The bad of a human being’s having to live a life in which
she lacks the threshold capacities is one that government
must avert if it is to be appropriately respectful of human
worth.
The proponent of the argument takes for granted that:
(3a.2.2) Government must be appropriately respectful of human
worth.
So it follows from (3a.2.1) that
(3a.2.3) The bad of a human being’s having to live a life in which
she lacks the threshold capacities is one that government
must avert.
(3a.2.3) seems to imply the conclusion of the Aristotelian Argument,