Human Dignity and Bioethics

Two Arguments from Human Dignity | 453
premise of the Aristotelian Argument:
(2a)
A life in which someone lacks the threshold capacities is
not a life worthy of human beings.
Thus a life in which someone lacks the ability to play or to be sociable,
for example, is not a life worthy of a human being.
Like the Simple Argument from Dignity and the Fittingness Argument,
the Aristotelian Argument assumes that if human beings have
worth, they should not have to live lives that are not worthy of them.
Since human beings have worth by (1a), it follows that:
(3a)
But human beings should not have to live lives that are
not worthy of them.
And from (3a) and (2a), it follows that human beings should not
have to live lives in which they lack the threshold capacities. And so
it would seem to follow that:
C: Human beings are entitled to develop the threshold
capacities.
If living in conditions that are not conditions of gross material
deprivation is necessary for the development of their threshold capacities,
then human beings are entitled to access to living conditions
that are not conditions of gross material deprivation. And if
we assume—as we did when considering the Fittingness Argument—
that national governments are obliged to guarantee that people can
live in ways that befit their worth, then national governments are
obliged to guarantee that people do not live in conditions of gross
material deprivation. And so, proponents of the Aristotelian Argument
conclude, we can see why fundamental documents, laying out
the claims people can make on their governments, should include
second-generation rights.
I said that the Aristotelian Argument I want to look at is of interest
in part because it resembles a line of argument pursued by
Martha Nussbaum in her recent work. The assertion of resemblance
gains some confirmation from Nussbaum’s emphasis on developing