Human Dignity and Bioethics

17
Two Arguments
from Human Dignity
Paul Weithman
S
ince World War II, it has been increasingly common for fundamental
international and European documents to begin with
ascriptions of human dignity. 1 In some of these documents, human
dignity is said to be concomitant with important human entitlements,
such as rights. Thus Article One of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights says that “All human beings are born free and equal in
dignity and rights.” 2
Sometimes, however, these documents seem to make a stronger
claim. They sometimes seem to imply that human dignity entails entitlements.
For example, Article One of the Charter of Fundamental
Rights of the European Union says that “Human dignity is inviolable.
It must be respected and protected.” The Charter proceeds immediately,
in the subsequent articles, to enumerate rights and liberties that
are to be accorded citizens of the member states. 3 The immediacy
of the Charter’s move from Article One’s assertion of dignity to the
enumeration of rights creates the clear impression that the dignity
ascribed to human beings in Article One entails, or is the basis for
asserting, the rights listed immediately afterwards. The German Basic
Law says explicitly that the ascription of dignity is the basis for inferring
rights-claims. The first clause of Article One in the Basic Law
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