Human Dignity and Bioethics

The Nature and Basis of Human Dignity | 433
Kane (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 158-170.
22
The argument here is indebted to Thomas Aquinas. See, e.g., Summa Theologiae,
I-II, q. 10, aa. 1-2.
23
This claim is derived from Thomas Aquinas and has been developed by Thomists
and Aristotelians of various types. It is not necessary here to assume one particular
development of that view against others. We need only the point that the basic
principles of practical reason come from an insight—which may be interpreted in
various ways—that what is to be pursued, what is worth pursuing, is what is fulfilling
or perfective of me and others like me. For more on this see: Germain Grisez,
Joseph Boyle, and John Finnis, “Practical Principles, Moral Truth and Ultimate
Ends,” American Journal of Jurisprudence 33 (1988): 99-151; John Finnis, Joseph
M. Boyle, Jr., Germain Grisez, Nuclear Deterrence, Morality and Realism (Oxford:
Oxford Univer sity Press, 1987), chapters 9-11; John Finnis, Fundamentals of Ethics
(Washington, D.C.: George town University Press, 1983); John Finnis, Aquinas:
Moral, Political, and Legal Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998); Timothy
D. J. Chappell, Understanding Human Goods: A Theory of Ethics (Edinburgh:
Edinburgh University Press, 1998); David S. Oderberg, Moral Theory: A Non-
Consequentialist Approach (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2000); Ralph McInerny,
Aquinas on Human Action: A Theory of Practice (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University
of America Press, 1992) and Mark C. Murphy, Natural Law and Practical
Rationality (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
24
The argument presented here is similar to the approaches found in the following
authors: Louis G. Lombardi, op. cit.; Michael Goldman, “A Transcendental
Defense of Speciesism,” Journal of Value Inquiry 35 (2001): 59-69; and William J.
Zanardi, “Why Believe in the Intrinsic Dignity and Equality of Persons?” Southwest
Philosophy Review 14 (1998): 151-168.
25
The position that the criterion for full moral worth cannot be an accidental
attribute, but is the rational nature, that is, being a specific type of substance, is
defended in Patrick Lee, “The Pro-Life Argument from Substantial Identity: A
Defense,” Bioethics 18 (2004): 249-263. See also Dean Stretton, “Essential Properties
and the Right to Life: A Response to Lee,” Bioethics (18) 2004: 264-282, and
Patrick Lee, “Substantial Identity and the Right to Life: A Rejoinder to Dean
Stretton,” in Bioethics 21 (2007): 93-97.
26
Dean Stretton, op. cit.