Human Dignity and Bioethics

Commentary on Nussbaum,
Shell, and Kass
Diana Schaub
T
he repellent results of a focus on developed quality-of-life capabilities
without an acknowledgment of either the equality
of human rights or the unique dignity of the human being are on
display in Martha Nussbaum’s essay. She characterizes her approach
as “Aristotelian/Marxian” (with a soupçon of Kant)—a philosophic
mutation that the thinkers themselves (as she freely admits) would
not have recognized or thought viable.
On the assumption that the proof is in the pudding, let me cut
straight to the policy outcomes she envisions. Nussbaum tells us that
it is impermissible for government to strive to rid communities of the
scourges of drugs and prostitution that destroy the lives of individuals
and families; however, the heroin-addled “sex workers” do have
a political entitlement to bicycle paths to promote their “health capabilities.”
It’s unclear whether helmets will be required, but should
you wind up in a bad state (brain-injured, or persistently vegetative
from all those legal drugs, or just terminally old and unhappy), the
health workers will be there to ease you off. As Nietzsche said of
Zarathustra’s last man: “A little poison now and then: that makes
for agreeable dreams. And much poison in the end, for an agreeable
death.” As Nussbaum sketches the future, there will be a choice of
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