Human Dignity and Bioethics

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Kant’s Concept of Human
Dignity as a Resource for
Bioethics
Susan M. Shell
Is “human dignity” a vacuous concept—a mere placeholder for
varying ethical commitments and biases—or has it a useful role to
play in bioethics? The former impression is seemingly confirmed by
the disparate uses to which “human dignity” is put by opposing sides
in contemporary bioethical debates. For the liberal and secular left,
it is generally associated with personal “autonomy” and expanded
individual choice.* For the conservative and religious right, it is generally
associated with the sanctity of “life” and related limits on such
choice. Does the term “human dignity” merely encourage each side
to talk past the other, or can it supply fruitful common ground?
The purpose of this paper is to explore Kant’s concept of human
dignity as a potential resource for contemporary bioethical debates.
The name of Kant is frequently invoked in such discussions, but generally
only in passing. On the one hand, Immanuel Kant is surely the
philosopher who put the concept of human dignity on the map of
* Thus Ruth Macklin has urged that the concept be abandoned as “useless” on
the grounds that it adds nothing to that of “autonomy,” which itself suffices. See
Macklin, “Dignity is a Useless Concept,” BMJ 327 (2003): 1419-1420.
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