Human Dignity and Bioethics

Defending Human Dignity | 305
believes that the greatest threat we face comes in the form of death
and destruction—say, in the practices of euthanasia and assisted suicide,
embryo research, or even just denial of treatment to the less
than fully fit—then one will be primarily concerned to uphold the
equal dignity of every still-living human being, regardless of condition.
If, conversely, one thinks that the greatest threat we face comes
not from killing the creature made in God’s image but either from
trying to redesign him after our own fantasies or from self-abasement
owing to shrunken views of human well-being (à la Nietzsche’s “last
man”), then one will be primarily concerned to uphold the full dignity
of human excellence and rich human flourishing.
The two aspects of human dignity do not always have the same
defenders, especially when concerns for equality and life seem to be
at odds with concerns for excellence and living well. Indeed, defenders
of one aspect of dignity sometimes ignore the claims made on
behalf of the other. Certain pro-lifers appear to care little whether babies
are cloned or even “born” in bottles, so long as no embryo dies in
the process; and others insist that life must be sustained come what
may, even if it means being complicit in prolonging the degradation
and misery of loved ones. Conversely, certain advocates of so-called
“death with dignity” appear to care little whether the weak and the
unwanted will be deemed unworthy of life and swept off the stage, so
long as they get to exercise control over how their own life ends; and
patrons of excellence through biotechnological enhancement often
have little patience with the need to care, here and now, for those
whose days of excellence are long gone. Meanwhile, those who dream
of posthuman supermen appear to care not a fig either for the dignity
of human being or for the dignity of being human, since they esteem
not at all the dignity of us ordinary mortals, never mind those of us
who are even less than merely ordinary.
Yet there is no reason why friends of human dignity cannot be—
and, indeed, should not be—defenders of all aspects of human dignity,
both the dignity of “the low” and the dignity of “the high.”
Yes, there will be times when there will be tensions between them,
sion of universal “human-all-too-human”-ness, carried by the term “human,” the
latter to stress the vertical dimension of excellence or worthiness, carried by the
term “dignity.” Once again, the discussion below should clarify matters beyond
such attempts at finding the right shorthand phrases.