Human Dignity and Bioethics

178 | Nick Bostrom
term might have its own unique contribution to make to our normative
vocabulary, but it should not be identified with Morality. If
possessing Dignity as a Quality is a virtue, it is one out of many. The
concept is hardly a promising candidate for the central and pivotal
role in an ethical system that the idea of Human Dignity plays in
Kantian philosophy and in some international declarations.*
We can proceed further by describing the appropriate responses
to Dignity as a Quality. These seem to incorporate both aesthetic and
moral elements. According to Kolnai, the term subtly connotes the
idea of verticality, albeit tempered by also connoting a certain idea
of reciprocity:
Can we attempt at all to assign, to adumbrate at least, a distinctive
response to Dignity (or “the dignified”)? Whatever
such a response might be, it must bear a close resemblance to
our devoted and admiring appreciation of beauty (its “high”
forms at any rate) on the one hand, to our reverent approval
of moral goodness (and admiration, say, for heroic virtue) on
the other. Dignity commands empathic respect, a reverential
mode of response, an “upward-looking” type of the pro attitude:
a “bowing” gesture if I may so call it. 9
Next, let us consider what features call for such responses. What
characteristics are typically dignified? While not claiming to produce
an exhaustive list, Kolnai suggests the following:
First—the qualities of composure, calmness, restraint, reserve,
and emotions or passions subdued and securely controlled
without being negated or dissolved…. Secondly—the
qualities of distinctness, delimitation, and distance; of something
that conveys the idea of being intangible, invulnerable,
inaccessible to destructive or corruptive or subversive interference….
Thirdly, in consonance therewith, Dignity also
tends to connote the features of self-contained serenity, of a
certain inward and toned-down but yet translucent and perceptible
power of self-assertion…. With its firm stance and
* The related concept of to kalon, however, does have such a foundational role in
Aristotle’s ethics.