Human Dignity and Bioethics

Commentary on Churchland
Gilbert Meilaender
“H
uman Dignity from a Neurophilosophical Perspective” is
about many things, but the concept of “human dignity” does
not seem to be one of them. No reader of this essay could possibly
come away from it with a clearer notion of what we might mean by
dignity. It is, of course, true, as Churchland notes, that dignity is not
a precise concept and that it is sometimes a matter of dispute. But that
is no excuse for failing to help us think better about it. This is the paper’s
fundamental flaw, but there are a few others worth noting here.
The paper breathes a spirit of condescension entirely at odds with
its rhetoric. Seldom will one find attitudes of “unwavering moral certitude”
rejected with such certitude, or “humility” endorsed in language
so permeated by its opposite. Indeed, the paper is a reminder
that the “calmly tolerant person,” while certain of his or her own
rectitude and good will, can be extraordinarily intolerant. The bad
effect of this on moral argument is that such a “calmly tolerant person”
tends to confuse assertion with argument. Those of us who are
not fully persuaded by Churchland’s paper may at least take some
comfort in the fact (stated in her concluding sentence) that “feeling
certain is itself inconclusive evidence for truth.”
Churchland’s account of the origins of morality relies upon the
importance of social cooperation, which each of us requires if we
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