Human Dignity and Bioethics

Commentary on Dennett
Alfonso Gómez-Lobo
In this note I would like to address a single issue in Professor Dennett’s
paper. I decided to do it not because I consider his views
on this particular question in any way offensive or subversive, but
because I find them rather perplexing on his own assumptions. First,
I should say in truly Socratic fashion where I think there is sufficient
agreement for the conversation to take place. I have a positive appreciation
of science and I do not see scientific truth as in any way a
threat to anything I hold dear. I wholeheartedly admit bona fide scientific
evidence as a valid move in the dialogue. On the other hand,
I hesitate to accept the extrapolation of scientific results beyond the
self-imposed limits of science itself, as well as arguments based on the
mere existence of a technological practice.
The issue I want to examine is whether the following claims by
Professor Dennett are true or false:
The questions of when (human) life begins and ends…are,
according to science, more like the question of the area of
a mountain than its altitude above sea level: it all depends
on what can only be conventional definitions of the boundary
conditions. Science promises—or threatens—to replace
the traditional absolutes about the conditions of human life
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