A Users' Guide to Measuring Local Governance

findings of the assessment in ways that emphasise
local ownership of the reform agenda.
1.12 Using assessment results to strengthen
downward and upward accountability
There are several broad areas in which the tools for
comparative performance measurement of local
governance can be ‘operationalised’ by using the
results to impact on public policy formulation and
implementation. What they have in common is
that they all seek, in different ways, to activate
and/or strengthen the various accountability
mechanisms that are implicit in a devolved system
of local government – downward accountability to
citizens and upward accountability to central
government.
Strengthening the downwards accountability of
local government to its citizens
The assembly and dissemination of comparative
local governance performance data can be used to
strengthen the downwards accountability of local
government to its citizens by seeking to influence
the very basis on which citizens make their voting
decisions.
In the Philippines there is a longstanding ‘nonprogrammatic’
political culture rooted in populism
and clientelism through which politicians are
re-elected despite poor governance performance.
Here the national statistical office (NSO) computed
a province-level Good Governance Index (GGI),
comprising a range of indicators grouped under
administrative and economic themes. The GGI – at
the start (2000) and end (2003) of the term of office
of provincial governors – were then compared and
used to rank all 81 provinces from “best” to “worst”
and also “best performing” to “worst performing”.
Best provinces were classed as those with the
highest GGIs and Best Performing Provinces were
those with the highest differences between the
2003 GGI and the 2000 GGI. The NSO then widely
disseminated a list of the “best – or worst –
performing provinces”indicating for each province
the variation (positive or negative) in performance
from start to end of term. A study of the 2004
provincial elections showed that although most of
the governors of the “best” and “best performing”
provinces were re-elected, this was also true of the
governors of the “worst” and “worst performing”
provinces. In order to raise voter awareness of this
‘contradiction’ the NSO then constructed a “Voters’
Index” that aimed to measure the “wisdom” of
voters in selecting candidates (to assess whether
or not governors of poor performing provinces
were indeed being ‘kicked out’, and vice versa.) The
2004 voters’ index revealed that voters were not in
fact making “informed” decisions and that they
were re-electing poorly performing governors.
Recognizing its importance in strengthening good
local governance, the NSO began to disseminate
the GGI scores & underlying data in close
partnership with the media. As citizens start to
recognise that their voting patterns did not match
the change in the provincial GGI scores, it is
forecast that there will be a greater emphasis on
‘programmatic’ considerations in future voting
patterns. By strengthening the accountability of
elected officials to the electorate, this will enhance
local governance (Virolaz, 2006).
Strengthening the upwards accountability of
local government to central government
The assembly and dissemination of comparative
local governance performance data can also be
used to strengthen the upwards accountability of
local government to central government by
influencing the allocation of the fiscal transfers
from central to local government. Ideally, the
allocation of central government transfers
between municipalities is based on a formula that
seeks to calculate relative need, by the use of
demographic and poverty-related indicators. In
some countries these formulas also incorporate
indicators that seek to reward efforts in local ownrevenue
generation. However, local governance
performance in general, rather than simply local
revenue generation performance, may also be
used as criteria for allocating central government
fiscal transfers to local government. The
justification for linking fiscal transfers to this wider
local governance performance is simple – the
better is the local governance performance in
general, the greater is the probability that the
transferred funds will be used effectively,
irrespective of whether they are ear-marked or not.
At the most basic level, local governance indicators
could be used for calculating a minimum set of
preconditions for access to such fiscal transfers
from central government. In several countries
scoring on governance indicators is used to
calculate Minimum Conditions of Access (MCA) as
a precondition for local government to be able to
receive funding from central government. Such is
the case in Bangladesh, where the MCA developed
20 UNDP Oslo Governance Centre