A Users' Guide to Measuring Local Governance
A Users' Guide to Measuring Local Governance
A Users' Guide to Measuring Local Governance
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findings of the assessment in ways that emphasise<br />
local ownership of the reform agenda.<br />
1.12 Using assessment results <strong>to</strong> strengthen<br />
downward and upward accountability<br />
There are several broad areas in which the <strong>to</strong>ols for<br />
comparative performance measurement of local<br />
governance can be ‘operationalised’ by using the<br />
results <strong>to</strong> impact on public policy formulation and<br />
implementation. What they have in common is<br />
that they all seek, in different ways, <strong>to</strong> activate<br />
and/or strengthen the various accountability<br />
mechanisms that are implicit in a devolved system<br />
of local government – downward accountability <strong>to</strong><br />
citizens and upward accountability <strong>to</strong> central<br />
government.<br />
Strengthening the downwards accountability of<br />
local government <strong>to</strong> its citizens<br />
The assembly and dissemination of comparative<br />
local governance performance data can be used <strong>to</strong><br />
strengthen the downwards accountability of local<br />
government <strong>to</strong> its citizens by seeking <strong>to</strong> influence<br />
the very basis on which citizens make their voting<br />
decisions.<br />
In the Philippines there is a longstanding ‘nonprogrammatic’<br />
political culture rooted in populism<br />
and clientelism through which politicians are<br />
re-elected despite poor governance performance.<br />
Here the national statistical office (NSO) computed<br />
a province-level Good <strong>Governance</strong> Index (GGI),<br />
comprising a range of indica<strong>to</strong>rs grouped under<br />
administrative and economic themes. The GGI – at<br />
the start (2000) and end (2003) of the term of office<br />
of provincial governors – were then compared and<br />
used <strong>to</strong> rank all 81 provinces from “best” <strong>to</strong> “worst”<br />
and also “best performing” <strong>to</strong> “worst performing”.<br />
Best provinces were classed as those with the<br />
highest GGIs and Best Performing Provinces were<br />
those with the highest differences between the<br />
2003 GGI and the 2000 GGI. The NSO then widely<br />
disseminated a list of the “best – or worst –<br />
performing provinces”indicating for each province<br />
the variation (positive or negative) in performance<br />
from start <strong>to</strong> end of term. A study of the 2004<br />
provincial elections showed that although most of<br />
the governors of the “best” and “best performing”<br />
provinces were re-elected, this was also true of the<br />
governors of the “worst” and “worst performing”<br />
provinces. In order <strong>to</strong> raise voter awareness of this<br />
‘contradiction’ the NSO then constructed a “Voters’<br />
Index” that aimed <strong>to</strong> measure the “wisdom” of<br />
voters in selecting candidates (<strong>to</strong> assess whether<br />
or not governors of poor performing provinces<br />
were indeed being ‘kicked out’, and vice versa.) The<br />
2004 voters’ index revealed that voters were not in<br />
fact making “informed” decisions and that they<br />
were re-electing poorly performing governors.<br />
Recognizing its importance in strengthening good<br />
local governance, the NSO began <strong>to</strong> disseminate<br />
the GGI scores & underlying data in close<br />
partnership with the media. As citizens start <strong>to</strong><br />
recognise that their voting patterns did not match<br />
the change in the provincial GGI scores, it is<br />
forecast that there will be a greater emphasis on<br />
‘programmatic’ considerations in future voting<br />
patterns. By strengthening the accountability of<br />
elected officials <strong>to</strong> the elec<strong>to</strong>rate, this will enhance<br />
local governance (Virolaz, 2006).<br />
Strengthening the upwards accountability of<br />
local government <strong>to</strong> central government<br />
The assembly and dissemination of comparative<br />
local governance performance data can also be<br />
used <strong>to</strong> strengthen the upwards accountability of<br />
local government <strong>to</strong> central government by<br />
influencing the allocation of the fiscal transfers<br />
from central <strong>to</strong> local government. Ideally, the<br />
allocation of central government transfers<br />
between municipalities is based on a formula that<br />
seeks <strong>to</strong> calculate relative need, by the use of<br />
demographic and poverty-related indica<strong>to</strong>rs. In<br />
some countries these formulas also incorporate<br />
indica<strong>to</strong>rs that seek <strong>to</strong> reward efforts in local ownrevenue<br />
generation. However, local governance<br />
performance in general, rather than simply local<br />
revenue generation performance, may also be<br />
used as criteria for allocating central government<br />
fiscal transfers <strong>to</strong> local government. The<br />
justification for linking fiscal transfers <strong>to</strong> this wider<br />
local governance performance is simple – the<br />
better is the local governance performance in<br />
general, the greater is the probability that the<br />
transferred funds will be used effectively,<br />
irrespective of whether they are ear-marked or not.<br />
At the most basic level, local governance indica<strong>to</strong>rs<br />
could be used for calculating a minimum set of<br />
preconditions for access <strong>to</strong> such fiscal transfers<br />
from central government. In several countries<br />
scoring on governance indica<strong>to</strong>rs is used <strong>to</strong><br />
calculate Minimum Conditions of Access (MCA) as<br />
a precondition for local government <strong>to</strong> be able <strong>to</strong><br />
receive funding from central government. Such is<br />
the case in Bangladesh, where the MCA developed<br />
20 UNDP Oslo <strong>Governance</strong> Centre