Sharon-Weinberger-In.. - American Antigravity

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Sharon Weinberger on the Pentagon's Imaginary Weapons 

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Sharon Weinberger on the Pentagon's Imaginary Weapons 

By Tim Ventura and Sharon Weinberger, June 19th, 2006 

It's called a “hafnium bomb”, and it uses a new type of stimulated nuclear isomer technology so deadly 

that the Pentagon doesn't want you to even know that it exists -- and according to Sharon Weinberger, 

it doesn't. We join the intrepid editor of Aviation Week's Defense Technology International as she takes 

us on a journey through the Pentagon's scientific underworld... 

AAG: Let's start out with a bit of background information: you're an experienced defenseindustry 

reporter and editor with lots of experience covering the latest trends in military 

technology. However, it appears that your new book, "Imaginary Weapons", goes in a radically 

new direction with a focus on overhyped vaporware defense technologies. I'm wondering if you 

could start us out with a bit about your personal background, and what really inspired you to 

begin writing this book? 

Weinberger: I have some background in 

national security studies, but I really stumbled into 

defense reporting when I moved to Washington 

after graduate school. I was looking, like all 

newcomers to DC, to find work that didn’t involve 

toting someone else’s briefcase. I eventually ended 

up working for a small Beltway company doing 

research and analysis for the Pentagon. I worked 

with some incredibly intelligent and thoughtful 

people, and went from there into defense 

journalism. 

One of the things I learned from that experience is 

that the defense industry is itself an “underworld” 

in many ways, and I try to give readers a feel for 

this is my book. I remember sitting in the office of 

the head of the defense company I was working 

at—the CEO started talking about the fallout 

shelter in his backyard, and lecturing me on how 

much dirt you need over your fallout shelter to 

protect against radiation, and what wind patterns 

mean for radioactive fallout. I suddenly realized 

how absolutely weird the conversation was, and yet 

not so weird for those in the defense industry. We 

were discussing fallout shelters the way other 

people discuss barbeques. When you reside in an 

“underworld,” it seems so normal, but if you step 

back and look at it as an outsider, then you’re 

struck by how perverse it all is. 

Imaginary Weapons: A journey through 

the Pentagon’s scientific underworld. 


It’s not the vaporware per se that makes this an underworld, but the very odd culture of 

technology and national security. I don’t draw a line between the perverse and the normal 

cultures of defense technology—the two are intertwined because we are all so insulated from the 

outside world. I was inspired to try to describe this underworld—and my experience being in it— 

to others. 

AAG: My understanding is that while you examine several technologies in "Imaginary 

Weapons", the core story really involves something called hafnium-bomb, which you first heard 

about in a defense-briefing on Capitol Hill in 1998. Can you give us a bit of detail about the 

scope of technologies that you focus on in the book, and what it was about the hafnium bomb in 

particular that made it so central to this story? 

Weinberger: The book talks about some of 

the more controversial areas of science that have 

attracted military interest, including remote 

viewing (psychics), cold fusion and antimatter 

weapons. I do not list these areas with the idea of 

lumping them together as bad science, but rather, 

to point out how each of these subjects tends to 

attract support from the underworld. 

At one point, I considered writing this book as a 

collection of stories about the scientific 

underworld, but the feedback I got was: “You need 

a narrative to carry the reader long.” In that sense, 

the hafnium bomb is a trope for a larger story I was 

trying to tell about technology and national 

security. 

AAG: Speaking of the hafnium-bomb, I thought 

the idea sounded reasonable until I saw your 

website, which featured a "hafnium grenade" 

claimed to deliver a 2-kiloton yield. Now from a 

layman's perspective, my first thought is that a 

nuclear hand-grenade has some immediately 

obvious drawbacks to deployment, so how’d this 

one make it that far up the chain of command? 

Hafnium Grenade: A hand-grenade 

claiming to deliver a 2-kiloton nuclear blast? 

Weinberger: Lots of ideas sound reasonable until you look at the practical implications. 

To be fair, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), in its official briefings to 

Congress about hafnium, described the power of a 2,000 pound bomb in the package of a 50 

pound bomb. But even that is impractical, and, according to the experts, simply not feasible. 

AAG: Now to turn the question around a bit, I've heard rumors that Los Alamos has been 

playing with laser-triggered nuclear isomers for years: at least in the context of a quasi-stable 

fuel-pellet for use in nuclear space propulsion. Is it possible that this particular idea made it past 

the screeners because of simple name-recognition and maybe just a lack of close-scrutiny on the 

proposed implementation, or is the entire nuclear-isomer thing just a fish-story? 

Weinberger: Yes, Los Alamos has been a “hot bed” for nuclear isomer enthusiasts, 

although some of them may have retired by now. But it’s important to differentiate between 


interest in nuclear isomers, and the specific 1998 results that sparked the debate over the 

“hafnium bomb.” What is primarily at issue in my book is an experiment conducted in 1998 that 

led a scientist in Texas to claim he had “triggered” the hafnium isomer (hafnium-178m2) using 

photons from a dental X-ray machine. Those results could not be reproduced by independent 

researchers, and the initial claims violated some laws of physics. However, this does not cover 

the entire range of isomer physics, just the specific idea of a nuclear hand grenade based on the 

hafnium isomer. 

AAG: In "The Social Life of Information", Brown & Duguid made an excellent point that 

technology stories like the hafnium-bomb or even the Philadelphia Experiment are part of an 

oral-tradition that's an ingrained part of the engineering & defense culture. They believe that 

stories like this stick around because they contain inherent information value, but that like any 

metaphorical tale, the information is often seriously diluted & misinterpreted over time. Any 

thoughts on how this might affect these "cutting-edge" technologies as they filter up from the 

engineering to the administrative levels in industry & government? 

Weinberger: I love that idea, truly. Oral 

traditions are a wonderful thing, and you may well 

be right about how those work. In a sense, the 

isomer bomb has been one of those stories: every 

few years nuclear weapons scientists would say, 

“Hey, wouldn’t isomers make for a great bomb?” 

Then the scientists would discuss it, realize the 

limitations, and (usually) move on. 

But the hafnium bomb should not be equated with 

all isomer research. That would be unfortunate. 

The idea is not to discourage truly forward thinking 

ideas, but to ensure that the ideas we do fund are 

grounded in reality (and science). I do hope the 

hafnium bomb becomes a reminder of why you 

don’t want to go off the deep end. 

Carl Collins: The hafnium researcher in his 

laboratory at the University of Texas. 

AAG: I'd like to broaden our scope just a bit from the book itself to some examples 

throughout the defense-industry. First, I'd like to touch on what I call "me too" technologies, 

which I guess would include Darpa's massive push towards Information Technology solutions 

for any and every problem they come up against. They invented the internet, and IT certainly 

offers flashy solutions, but do you think that they're over-investing in IT simply because it gets 

them publicity to push initiatives in this area? 

Weinberger: Every DARPA director wants a legacy. I’ve heard, very second-hand, that 

the current director wants it to be cognitive computing, and DARPA has put a lot of investment 

into that area. At the same time, the New York Times ran an article some time back on DARPA’s 

cutbacks on university funding for IT. I can’t say which areas are over or under-invested in---I 

simply haven’t looked at the budget in that sort of detail. Though I’m sometimes critical of 

DARPA, I think its portfolio is likely balanced to reflect the current exigencies of war, and that 

may be quite reasonable. 

AAG: Speaking of which, the mother of all over-hyped "me too" technologies these days is 

nanotechnology. I probably don't even need to list examples (MIT's nanotech armor), but I 

should point out that the fundamental basis for Drexlerian nanotechnology - the nanoassembler 

- is still decades away from being a reality. Is nanotech a defense-industry example 


where they're pushing a dream towards reality, or is this a case where the people following this 

craze are driving everybody else over the edge of a cliff with unrealistic expectations? 

Weinberger: I want to be careful here, because again I haven’t examined the 

nanotechnology issue much, particularly as it pertains to defense. If I were to learn that it’s 

being overhyped in defense, that wouldn’t surprise me, because there’s a tendency to do that. 

Certainly defense companies still regard nanotech as very basic research---something to be left 

to the universities, and I don’t know how much 

Defense Department funding is going to 

nanotechnology at the moment. 

In a somewhat related area, I recently saw that 

some researchers in meta-materials (negative index 

of refraction) are touting the research as a possible 

application to stealth. Metamaterials started off a 

few years ago as a somewhat controversial area, but 

seem now to have moved solidly into advancing 

science with possible applications. But I can’t help 

but wonder if it seems to be a tad reaching (toward 

the arms of funding agencies) to claim applications 

in stealth. But, who knows? 

AAG: One area that I'd like to ask about is the 

difference between broad cross-organizational 

initiatives, such as the pressing need to eliminate 

IED's in Iraq, and the many "pet projects" that 

seem to fly under the radar. Can you comment at 

all on pet-projects in general, and whether they're 

more susceptible to going completely off-track into 

areas like the hafnium technology -- maybe as a 

result of insular development cultures or a lack of 

proper oversight? 

Defense Tech International: Sept/Oct 

2005 issue, edited by Sharon Weinberger. 

Weinberger: I think the insular culture (or what I refer to as an underworld) can be a 

part of the problem with things going off track with some of the more wild ideas, but it’s not the 

only issue to consider. If you get a defense official who is dead set on an idea—to the exclusion of 

outside review, you can do some serious damage. I think that’s what happened with the hafnium 

bomb to a large degree. Is this a universal problem? I think the issue of “vested interests” of 

program officers in defense projects is a problem, but one that extends far beyond “fringe 

science” and into the mainstream defense establishment. There’s also a larger issue here: the 

general scientific decline that many are observing within our defense establishment. 

The IED issue is very different. There, we are trying to tap science and technology to find 

immediate solutions to a problem that may defy any technical panacea. It’s a tragedy—the most 

technologically advanced military in the world is being done incredible harm by the most 

rudimentary of weapons. 

AAG: Now organizationally, what role does the Bush (or any) administration play in these 

technologies - or are they below the level of the administration's awareness? 


Weinberger: I think most of them are below the administration’s radar screen, and that 

perhaps is part of the problem. Top officials are focused on Iraq. So, it’s more a problem of 

neglect. 

AAG: What role does general fear, uncertainty, and doubt (FUD) about enemy capabilities 

play in pushing through otherwise untenable technologies? I mean, it seems like some of these 

initiatives are really sold on the idea that "somebody might beat us to it", which seems to play 

into a culture of generalized anxiety in the defense industry. Any thoughts on this? 

Weinberger: That’s a huge, huge driving 

factor in a lot of what the Pentagon does. Just 

about every defense technology official you’ll meet 

will say, “My job is to prevent technological 

surprise.” And then they’ll talk about Sputnik, 

Japanese torpedoes, Soviet subs, etc. All those 

things that “surprised us” in one way or another. 

But when you look at the things that surprised us, 

you have to think about why they surprised us. It 

wasn’t typically things that we thought violated the 

laws of physics, but rather technological advances 

that competitors had made and where our 

intelligence wasn’t very good. So, when we speak 

about the hafnium bomb and competitors, we have 

to ask: is this an intelligence problem or a physics 

problem? 

AAG: Speaking of FUD, I've heard rumblings 

about China being the next "Soviet Union", and I'm 

wondering if you have any thoughts on this aspect 

of military programs driving foreign policy? Could 

there be a "trickle-up" effect from the defenseindustry 

to the administration pushing this anxiety 

into the foreign policy area? 

DTI 2006: A focus on radar coverage in 

Jan/Feb 2006, a bimonthly AvWeek feature. 

Weinberger: Organizations operate like human beings—they want to grow, become 

richer, and live forever. The China threat might indeed be real, but certainly I see a tendency to 

hype their capabilities in specific areas as a convenient way to garner support for favored U.S. 

defense projects. But is the tail wagging the dog, as your question suggests? That I’m not so sure. 

Rather, I think those with interests in these technologies are simply happy to play upon an 

existing belief within the current administration. 

Just for the record, I think the notion of a “military-industry complex” is misunderstood. This 

idea presumes much more power than these industries have. The influence is less at the 

strategic level and more at what I call the tactical level (i.e. the revolving door of defense officials 

who move into private employment and vice versa). 

AAG: Do you think that our military intentionally inflates their claims about enemy 

capabilities to sustain their budgets? I think that the difference between the cold-war picture of 

the Soviet Union and the reality of their defense-capabilities was shocking to most people, and 

I'm wondering if this might have been intentional, or just a runaway side-effect of selfreinforcing 

perceptions about the unknown? 


Weinberger: I’m not sure intentional is the right word. It’s very easy to make yourself 

believe in something you want to believe in. It’s certainly advantageous for some military 

officials to promote and hype particular foreign threats in the hopes of furthering their own pet 

projects. Yes, there were certainly some egregious examples of this during the Cold War, like the 

so-called missile gap, and the imaginary Soviet nuclear bomber. We must be vigilant and 

cautious of such claims. 

AAG: Now you've said that the hafnium-bomb wasn't supported by scientific evidence, and 

I'd like to use that to touch on the idea of subjectivism & politics in scientific review. In a 

political environment, when funding is at stake, how should the military involve scientific review 

for various ideas -- especially when the supposedly impartial scientific review panels seem to be 

so politically driven themselves? 

Weinberger: There is no perfect model, and peer review doesn’t work for everything. 

Jimmy Wales, the founder of Wikipedia, gave a really eloquent interview some time back 

describing how he first tried a model for Wikipedia 

using peer review by experts, and it failed dismally. 

Now look at the success of Wikipedia, with no 

experts and no peer review, but rather, a 

community of users who constantly improve upon 

the entries. I think it would be beautiful if somehow 

science evolved to this sort of “community of users” 

model, I just don’t know how it would be done. 

High-level physics is just not accessible to the 

masses (let alone the experimental equipment 

needed for, let’s say, high energy physics). [Just 

after writing this answer, I also note a New York 

Times article on how Wikipedia will start 

restricting edits of some entries—so that model 

isn’t perfect either.] 

Certainly the Internet is helping us move to an 

open model for science in some areas, by allowing 

scientists in frontier (or “fringe”) science to publish 

on the web without the need for peer review. In 

another arena, such as mass media, anyone now 

can create a blog, or a news site. The access to entry 

is low, and so it opens up the field. Some people in 

the media view this as a threat, but I think it’s just 

wonderful. 

Cutting Edge: DTI explores military robotics 

in its March/April 2006 special edition. 

Now, when it comes to funding of science, that’s another story. I just don’t know if there is a 

better model than peer review. It’s possible that peer review can promote group think, or that 

good ideas are quashed because they are competitive with those of the reviewers. There are 

elements of truth in these claims, I’m sure. But what’s the alternative? 

I think there could be a better model for government funding of truly far-reaching science. One 

method may be the old Advanced Energy Projects division of the Department of Energy. That 

office funded a lot of high-risk research using peer review at particular points to determine if a 

project could go forward, but it allowed some discretion by the director. That office is now gone, 

but I think reestablishing something along those lines makes a lot of sense, particularly with the 


current concerns about energy. And, of course, wouldn’t we all love to have the old industrial 

labs, like GE? But that, I’m afraid, is a thing of the past. 

AAG: Another issue is the pervasive problem of "quick-fix" thinking: pushing marginally 

useful or generally inelegant solutions as short-term solutions that fail to address long-term 

problems? Maybe this comes out of corporate America's narrow-focus on quarterly-profits, but 

I'm wondering if the problem of fixing the symptoms rather than the cause isn't a real issue in 

terms of the defense industry as well? 

Weinberger: I don’t want to over-generalize, but I think we see this problem in how the 

Pentagon is addressing the threat of improvised explosive devices. Understandably, they want 

quick fixes, because it’s an immediate problem. But they also need to be funding basic science 

and technology in the hopes that we can come across breakthrough technologies that would help 

with this problem. 

AAG: Is there a point where our technological 

edge in a specific area becomes apparent enough 

that we should stop investing money in an already 

mature technology? For instance, if we can hit a 

thumbtack with a guided missile launched from an 

aircraft 5 miles away, is it worth spending millions 

a year to continue enhancing the technology? 

Weinberger: If money were free, I’d say, 

heck, let’s invest in all of it. Personally, I’d like to 

study why salt shakers can stand on their edge in a 

pile of salt—pondering this oddity has kept me 

awake through many a corporate dinner. Seriously, 

though, in a world of choices we must prioritize. 

However, in the case of maturing technology, I 

actually do believe in upgrades. After all, part of 

“technological surprise” can be when our 

competitors make advances in existing technology 

that we didn’t expect. So, it depends on the 

circumstance. I am more critical of the massive 

expenditures in something like, say, a new fighter 

aircraft, if we see that the superiority, relative to the 

financial costs, may not be warranted. 

DTI Goes To Sea: A focus on emerging 

naval stealth in the Nov/Dec 2005 issue. 

AAG: In a case like that, wouldn't it be better to push an initiative to reduce the cost of these 

mature technologies rather than enhance their effectiveness to the point of absurdity? 

Weinberger: I might actually disagree here slightly with this premise. Effectiveness is 

important---if you’re going to spend billions of dollars to deploy a missile defense system, then I 

would much rather that it is 95 percent effective than 75 percent effective. The question is 

whether we really need the capability in the first place, relative to the base investment. As I said 

in the question above, we need to be critical about the initial investments in expensive 

technology. 

AAG: Would vaporware weapons-projects have any tertiary value in terms of psychological 

warfare? Personally, I've always wondered if maybe some of the government non-answers about 


UFO's might not be an intentional way of keeping the enemy guessing about exactly what kinds 

of uber-weapons we have hidden away in our arsenal. 

Weinberger: Never assume conspiracy when incompetence will suffice as an 

explanation. I think the government simply never figured out quite how to deal with all the UFO 

memos in its archives. Some people were worried about embarrassment, perhaps, and maybe 

some people were really worried about UFOs (possibly). People assume the government 

operates with one voice---it doesn’t. As for psychological warfare, I’m not sure government is 

that savvy. 

Let’s take another example. New Scientist recently reviewed my book, and although the review 

was really quite positive and thoughtful, the author ended by asserting that perhaps the hafnium 

bomb was an intentional effort to dupe our enemies into thinking we had a fantastic new 

weapon. Wow, what a marvelous thought. But I have to ask: On what does the reviewer base this 

assertion? As a journalist, I have looked at the documentation and evidence, and there is 

absolutely nothing that would lead me to support such a contention, so why should I write it? If 

indeed the purpose of investment in the hafnium bomb were to fool others into thinking we 

were on our way to a new fantastic arms race, then only Popular Mechanics and a handful of 

other publications were duped. The Russians, on the other hand, were making fun of the 

hafnium bomb almost from the start. 

Journalism, particularly as it pertains to national 

security, has a moral obligation to be responsible, 

and not to perpetuate fantasy, or a political agenda. 

I truly believe this. 

AAG: What happens to these programs after 

they disappear? Does the technology get 

reabsorbed into other projects, or do they literally 

crate up the research and stick in next to the Ark of 

the Covenant in that big warehouse at the end of 

Indiana Jones? 

Weinberger: I like the Ark of the Covenant 

idea. I like to say that no bad idea ever dies at the 

Pentagon, it just ends up in another agency. These 

proposals lie dormant, and then are rediscovered 

and repackaged. I guess this is inevitable to some 

degree. I have no doubt that hafnium will rise like a 

phoenix from the ashes at some point—but when it 

does, I hope people say, “Remember the dental X- 

ray and the nuclear hand grenade?” 

Oil Crunch: DTI tackes military fuel supply 

logistics in it’s latest May/June 2006 issue. 

AAG: Do you think that the current SBIR 

process actually limits the development of new technologies? The reason I ask is that I've met 

many inventors with projects they'd love to get DoD financing for, but most of the time they end 

up getting pushed into trying to match their unique invention with an arcane list of "SBIR 

projects" (like stealth belt-buckles)? 

Weinberger: That’s funny—I love the idea of “stealth belt buckles.” You know, I think a 

study of the Small Business Innovative Research (SBIR) process would be an excellent area for 

journalists to look into. Does it work? Could it work better? On one hand, you have an entire 


usiness sector that wouldn’t exist were it not for the SBIR process. On the other hand, as you 

point out, you have the stealth belt buckle issue. 

But you have to understand why that exists. If you’re not solving a problem the military needs, 

what good are you doing, and who will buy your fabulous technology? On the other hand, I 

suppose if you want true innovation, you don’t want to overly limit proposals. Maybe the 

solution is to strike a balance between the two: practical problems and far-reaching ideas. 

AAG: What about over-engineering: the best example is NASA designing the space-pen with 

a pressure-loaded cartridge to write upside down without running dry, while the Russians 

effectively solved the same issue by issuing their cosmonauts pencils. Does the incentive to drive 

large, financially-profitable defense-contracts lead us towards these Rube Goldberg style 

approaches to solve everyday challenges, and has this been addressed at all in the defenseindustry? 

Weinberger: That’s a good question, but I would reply with, “it depends.” When you’re 

dealing with multibillion dollar weapon systems, you sometimes can’t afford for little things to 

go wrong. On the other hand, you don’t want to create a billion dollar solution to something a 

stick of gum can fix. 

“We should never dismiss any idea out of hand as being fringe... 

We should challenge orthodoxy and encourage free thinking.” 

AAG: I'd like to focus on aerospace for just a second, because I've talked to Nick Cook over at 

Janes a few times about industry trends, and he's very concerned that aerospace is going 

through a period of profound decline right now. For instance, the average age of most aerospace 

engineers is 55 years old, because the industry only produces refinements on mature 

technologies, which means that young innovators go for the high-paychecks & creative 

fulfillment of the IT industry rather than aerospace. Can you give us your thoughts on this 

industry, and whether it's really in decline or not? 

Weinberger: Cook is very correct. My brother for example, studied aerospace 

engineering at Stanford about 10 years ago, and like most of his colleagues, went into computer 

programming. That’s where the excitement was—aerospace wasn’t a fun or creative field to be 

in. There’s going to be a big crisis as the current generation of aerospace engineers retires; I 

don’t think anyone knows what to do about it. There needs to be a lot more funding for basic 

research and development—that will help attract younger workers. But I don’t know if that’s 

politically feasible right now. Where will the money come from? 

How to fix it? I’m just not sure. Maybe we need simply to accept that IT, and not aerospace, is 

the growth field. My guess is that for the aerospace industry to be reinvigorated, we’ll need the 

next breakthrough in propulsion—that technology that really will effectively get us to Mars and 

beyond. So, there needs to a big push into R&D, but I don’t see that money coming down the 

pike. 

AAG: Well as a professional who works across a variety of defense-related industries, which 

ones would you say are really on the upswing right now? Can you give us an idea of what the 

players & technologies are that are going to really be making an impact in 21st century defense? 


Weinberger: I hate to make predictions; they are always wrong. I would say that 

directed energy is the “next big thing,” but then again, that’s been the next big thing for the past 

20 years. Who would have guessed that homemade bombs would be the big threat in the current 

war? Not me. I’m good with evidence, but bad with predictions. The future is unknown. 

AAG: Let's close on a personal note: can you tell us a bit about the projects that you're 

currently pursuing, and are you planning more books or perhaps public speaking engagements 

related to this one in the future? 

Weinberger: I’ll be doing a Q&A 

at Politics & Prose Bookstore on July 8, 

and another reading at the Strand in New 

York on July 10. Details of the events are 

available on the bookstores’ websites, and 

I welcome everyone to attend. Some of the 

subjects I deal with are controversial, and 

I know not everyone will agree with my 

views, so I invite debate. 

Right now, I’m in the middle of 

investigating another “fringe science” area 

the Pentagon has been involved in. I’d 

prefer not to discuss it too much right 

now, but it has important societal 

implications (particularly if it works). 

Pentagon City: What other breakthroughs can be 

found inside America’s most secure military facility? 

And that, by the way, is my final note: we should never, ever dismiss any idea out of hand as 

being fringe. Rather, we should investigate and study these ideas. We should challenge 

orthodoxy and encourage free thinking. But when all is said and done, we must make our 

judgments based on the evidence we have in hand, and we should expect the agencies 

responsible for national security to do the same. For me, that is the lesson of Iraq and WMD’s, 

as well as of the hafnium bomb… 

Sharon Weinberger is the editor-in-chief of Defense Technology International, a bimonthly 

editorial supplement to Aviation Week & Space Technology. Her writing on science and 

technology has also appeared in Slate, and the Washington Post Magazine. For additional 

information on her latest projects, visit Sharon’s site online at Imaginary Weapons.com

Sharon-Weinberger-In.. - American Antigravity

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