The Archaeology of Britain: An introduction from ... - waughfamily.ca

Roman Britain: military dimension
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factors make it difficult to dismiss the current orthodoxy: the general distribution of the forts
along the coast that faced the brunt of Saxon raiding (Figure 8.11); the way in which the forts
seem to dominate access to important harbours or river mouths, a feature that is even more
apparent against the background of the contemporary coastline where this is known (e.g. Maxfield
1989, 13–15); and the specific literary reference to defence against such attacks being the reason
for the appointment of Carausius, under whose auspices most of the forts seem to have been
built, to a command that spanned both sides of the Channel. Nonetheless, the absence of direct
evidence for naval detachments at most of the forts remains a problem if their primary function
was as defended strongholds for the fleet.
ROMAN BRITAIN IN ITS WIDER SETTING
Two distinctive approaches to the study of Roman Britain are apparent. The first emphasizes
the distinctive nature of the island and the importance of local conditions in determining the
extent, nature and course of that occupation. The second stresses Britain’s position in the
wider Empire, of which it was only a small part, and the impact of broader policy decisions
and actions elsewhere on events in the Province. This latter approach has become the orthodoxy
in recent years, but has recently been subject to question (e.g. Freeman 1996). In fact, there is
validity in both approaches, for although, on the one hand, the physical and political geography
will have varied from frontier to frontier, on the other hand, all the provinces were constituent
parts of a wider imperial system, administered by personnel who frequently moved between
provinces (Hanson 1994). Thus, though local circumstances must have influenced decisions
taken about the strategy and tactics involved in the occupation, the personnel making those
decisions will inevitably have been informed by their experiences in other parts of the Empire.
Moreover, comparative frontier studies do reveal various consistent approaches to the exercising
of control in frontier zones, such as the use of client or friendly monarchs or the levying of
customs duties, as well as highlighting local differences, such as the absence of gateways along
the German frontier palisade or the more restricted depth of military dispositions behind the
frontiers along the Rhine and Danube.
The influence of the wider stage of imperial politics on events in Britain has already been
hinted at above, when the resumption of advance in the Flavian period after the halt on the
Forth-Clyde isthmus seems to coincide with the accession of a new emperor. There are, however,
several more specific examples of this process. It is now widely accepted that the major stimulus
for the invasion in AD 43 was the need of the new emperor, Claudius, for the prestige of a
successful military conquest, while the same principle seems to underlie the reconquest of Scotland
under Antoninus Pius. Similarly, attention has been drawn to the effect of circumstances in other
parts of the Empire on determining the limits of Roman control in the north of Britain. In the
late first century AD, the transfer of troops to the Danube resulted in the withdrawal from
northern Scotland; and in the early second century, Trajan’s concentration on wars of expansion
in Dacia may have resulted in further retrenchment on the northern frontier.
Key texts
Breeze, D.J., 1982. The northern frontiers of Roman Britain. London: Batsford.
Breeze, D.J. and Dobson, B., 1987. Hadrian’s Wall. London: Penguin.
Hanson, W.S., 1991. Agricola and the conquest of the north. London: Batsford. 2 edn.
Hanson, W.S. and Maxwell, G.S., 1986. Rome’s north-west frontier: the Antonine Wall. Edinburgh: Edinburgh
University Press. 2 edn.
Jones, G.D.B. and Mattingly, D.J., 1991. An atlas of Roman Britain. Oxford: Blackwell.