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THE NATION TUESDAY, APRIL 28, 2015 3<br />
frustrated forensic report on missing $20b, by PwC<br />
* NNPC Towers, Abuja.<br />
mittance/under-remittance can only be<br />
arrived at if all revenues and all costs<br />
of the Corporation and all its subsidiaries<br />
are accounted for in a consolidated<br />
position. A detailed review of this<br />
was beyond the scope of our mandate.<br />
We therefore recommend that<br />
NNPC be required to disclose the consolidated<br />
position of the Group and its<br />
subsidiaries, and expected remittances<br />
to the Federation accounts be determined<br />
from the available consolidated<br />
net revenues. Furthermore, the nature<br />
of costs that are allowable should be<br />
pre-determined by all relevant parties.<br />
We also recommend that the NNPC<br />
act be reviewed as the content contradicts<br />
the requirement for NNPC to be<br />
run as a commercially viable entity. It<br />
appears the act has given the Corporation<br />
a “Blank” cheque to spend money<br />
without limit or control. This is untenable<br />
and unsustainable and must be addressed<br />
immediately. The Corporation<br />
should be required to create value, and<br />
meet its expenses entirely from the value<br />
created. Proceeds from the FGN’s<br />
crude oil sales should be remitted entirely<br />
to the Federation accounts. Commisions<br />
for the Corporation services<br />
can then be paid based on agreed terms.<br />
Comments<br />
(I). We did not obtain any information<br />
directly from NPDC, but in accordance<br />
with NPDC former Managing<br />
Director’s (Mr Briggs Victor) submission<br />
to the Senate Committee hearing<br />
on the subject matter, for the period,<br />
NPDC generated $5.11billion (net of<br />
royalties and petroleum profits tax<br />
paid).<br />
We have relied on the legal opinion<br />
provided to the Senate Committee by<br />
the Attorney-General (AG) on the subject<br />
of the transfers of various NNPC<br />
(55%) portion of Oil Leases (OMLs) involved<br />
in the Shell (SPDC) Divestments<br />
which impact crude oil flows in the<br />
period. The AG’s opinion indicated that<br />
these transfers were within the authority<br />
of the Minister to make. Thus, these<br />
assets were validly transferred to<br />
NPDC. The same AG’s legal opinion<br />
also indicated that NPDC was to make<br />
payments for Net Revenue (dividend)<br />
to NNPC, which should ultimately be<br />
remitted to the Federation Account. A<br />
sale will mean the following should be<br />
due to be remitted to the Federation accounts<br />
1. Petroleum Profit Taxes (PPT)<br />
2. Royalties<br />
3. Signature bonus payment<br />
4. Dividend from profit for the period<br />
(according to dividend declared in<br />
line with NPDC’s dividend policy)<br />
We have not obtained any information<br />
that suggests that NPDC has been<br />
assessed for PPT and Royalty for the<br />
review period. However, as disclosed<br />
by the former MD of NPDC at the senate<br />
hearing, NPDC had done a self assessment<br />
of PPT and Royalty and had<br />
unpaid self assessed PPT and Royalty<br />
to the tune of $0.47 billion related to the<br />
review period.<br />
In January 2015 (subsequent to our<br />
initial reported conclusions), we were<br />
availed with copies of Deeds of Assignment<br />
for OML’s 26,30,40,42.We were<br />
not provided with copies of Deeds of<br />
Assignment for OML’s 4,38,41,34.We<br />
were also provided with information<br />
which indicated that the various NNPC<br />
(55%) portion of Oil leases (OMLs) involved<br />
in the Shell Divestments related<br />
to the eight (8) OML’s aforestated,<br />
were transferred to NPDC for an aggregate<br />
Sum of US$1.85billion. So far,<br />
only the amount of US$100m had been<br />
remitted in relation to these assets. This<br />
means that the amount of<br />
US$1.75billion is yet to be remitted in<br />
relation to this transfer. In addition, by<br />
a comparison of the aggregate amount<br />
of US$1.85billion determined by DPR<br />
as the transfer value , and the (arm’s<br />
length) commercial value paid for by<br />
3rd parties for between 30% to 45% divested<br />
by Shell, we arrive at an estimated<br />
Alternative Commercial Valuation<br />
of US$3.4 billion for the NNPC 55%.<br />
The point here is that while we appreciate<br />
that this is a government entity to<br />
government entity transaction, we had<br />
expected a transfer basis higher than<br />
the US$1.85 billion commercial value<br />
determined by DPR. We have not performed<br />
a professional valuation and<br />
therefore recommend that the valuation<br />
done by DPR be re-assessed.<br />
NNPC explained that these OML<br />
transfers were in the bid to encourage<br />
local participation in the Nigerian upstream<br />
Oil and Gas Industry.<br />
We also expect that NPDC should<br />
remit dividends to NNPC and ultimately<br />
the Federation Accounts, based on<br />
NPDC’s dividend policy and declaration<br />
of dividend for the review period.<br />
We did not have access to NPDC’s full<br />
accounts and records and we have not<br />
ascertained the amount of costs and<br />
expenses which should be applied to<br />
the US$5.11 billion crude oil revenue<br />
(net of royalties and PPT paid) per the<br />
NPDC submission to the Senate Committee<br />
hearing in order to arrive at the<br />
Net Revenue (in line with the AG’s<br />
opinion), which should be subjected to<br />
dividend remittance.We are also not<br />
aware that NPDC declared dividend<br />
for the review period.<br />
These matters need to be followed<br />
up for final resolution in terms of the<br />
NPDC Net Revenue (dividend) for<br />
crude oil relating to the transfers, PPT<br />
and royalty unremitted, and the transfer<br />
price valuation and remittance.<br />
(II). We determined from information<br />
obtained from PPPRA that $3.38<br />
billion relating to DPK subsidy cost was<br />
incurred by the NNPC for the review<br />
period.We obtained a letter, dated 19<br />
October 2009 written by the Principal<br />
Secretary to the President, to the National<br />
Security Adviser (The following<br />
were in copy: Honourable Minister for<br />
Petroleum Resources, Honourable<br />
Minister of State for Petroleum Resources,<br />
Group Managing Director<br />
NNPC, and the Executive Secretary<br />
PPPRA), confirming a Presidential directive<br />
of 15 June 2009 instructing that<br />
subsidy on DPK be stopped (Exhibit<br />
D7).We also obtained a letter dated 16<br />
December 2010 from the Executive Secretary<br />
PPPRA to the CBN Governor<br />
clarifying that PPPRA had ceased<br />
granting subsidy on Kerosene since the<br />
Presidential directive of 15 June 2009<br />
(Exhibit D8).<br />
Furthermore, Kerosene subsidy was<br />
not appropriated for in the 2012 and<br />
2013 FGN budget.<br />
However, the Presidential directive<br />
was not gazetted and there has been<br />
no other legal instrument cancelling the<br />
subsidy on DPK.<br />
In a Presidential media chat on 24<br />
February 2014, the President and Commander-in-Chief<br />
of the Armed Forces<br />
of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, President<br />
Goodluck Ebele Jonathan, asserted<br />
that kerosene subsidies have not<br />
been disallowed.<br />
We therefore recommend that an official<br />
directive be written to support the<br />
legality of the kerosene subsidy costs.<br />
This should also be followed by adequate<br />
budgeting and appropriation for<br />
the costs.<br />
Other Findings<br />
• For the period reviewed, we identified<br />
possible errors in the computation<br />
of crude oil prices at the NNPC that<br />
resulted in a $3.6 million shortfall in<br />
incomes to the Federation account. The<br />
major beneficiaries were Fujairah Refinery<br />
- $805,545, NNPC (KRPC/<br />
WRPC) – $697,995 and NNPC (COMD)<br />
- $2,107,275. Subsequent to our identification<br />
of this issue, NNPC has amended<br />
the errors, and have reflected the<br />
amendments in the remittances to<br />
FAAC in October 2014.<br />
• Our review of the DPK sales process<br />
revealed that NNPC sells DPK to<br />
bulk DPK marketers in Nigeria at<br />
N40.90 per litre at a location on the<br />
coastal waterways (off shore Lagos).<br />
The expected/official regulated retail<br />
price of DPK in Nigeria is N50 per litre.<br />
This retail price of N50 comprises<br />
the Ex-depot price of N34.51 and aMargin<br />
of N15.49. NNPC should be required<br />
to explain the reason for selling<br />
DPK at N40.90, rather than the regulated<br />
ex-depot price of N34.51. The<br />
Corporation should also be required to<br />
explain the reason for selling DPK to<br />
bulk DPK marketers at a location on<br />
the coastal waterways (off shore Lagos)<br />
rather than at the in-country depots.<br />
•The accounting and reconciliation<br />
system for crude oil revenues used by<br />
government agencies appear to be inaccurate<br />
and weak.We noted significant<br />
discrepancies in data from different<br />
sources. The lack of independent<br />
audit and reconciliation led to over reliance<br />
on data produced from NNPC.<br />
This matter is further compounded by<br />
the lack of independence within NNPC<br />
as the business has conflicting interests<br />
of being a stand-alone self-funding entity<br />
and also the main source of revenue<br />
to the Federation account.<br />
(2.2). Our approach to this mandate<br />
• It is important to note that although<br />
PwC has reviewed documents submitted<br />
by the key stakeholders involved,<br />
our work was conducted independently,<br />
and our findings are based on the<br />
review of documentation, analytical<br />
reviews of data, and interviews conducted.<br />
• Due to this approach, our findings<br />
and the way we presented them in this<br />
report may not necessarily reflect the<br />
formats of the various submissions<br />
made by the different stakeholders.<br />
• In certain instances where we were<br />
not provided with information or access<br />
to key stakeholders (Section 6.3.2 )<br />
we leveraged on external and available<br />
sources of information to reach our<br />
conclusions. These external and available<br />
sources of information are clearly<br />
highlighted in the relevant sections of<br />
this report.<br />
• Any information and/or documentation<br />
which may come to our attention<br />
subsequent to the date of this<br />
report may alter our findings.<br />
• We have also listed some of the limitations<br />
to our scope in Section 3.2.<br />
•The procedures performed and specific<br />
limitations to scope are also discussed<br />
under thevarious work stream<br />
sections.<br />
•Based on specific instructions from<br />
the Auditor General for the Federation,<br />
we returned to do additional work, after<br />
NNPC had represented that our initial<br />
process did not provide an opportunity<br />
for formal discussions of our<br />
findings with top management, in the<br />
form of an exit interview.<br />
• With the exception of the Deputy<br />
Group Managing Director/Group Executive<br />
Director Finance and Accounts<br />
of NNPC, the Auditor-General for the<br />
Federation, and the Honourable Minister<br />
of Petroleum Resources, we have<br />
not discussed the findings of this report<br />
with any stakeholder.<br />
•Our work was split into two work<br />
streams as follows;<br />
(1). We estimated how much revenue<br />
is due to the FGN from crude oil<br />
liftings; and (2). We reconciled the revenues<br />
due to the FGN against the actual<br />
cash received by the federation.<br />
• Our findings and conclusions considered<br />
the impact of some matters<br />
which require legal opinion to be<br />
sought by the FGN.<br />
PwC estimated revenue from crude<br />
oil lifting ($69.34 billion) This is the total<br />
amount of revenue from crude oil<br />
liftings during the review period, after<br />
increasing A by the adjustments in B.<br />
(D) Direct Costs ($2.65 billion)<br />
This represents the total expenses<br />
incurred and/deducted directly by<br />
NNPC (from crude oil revenues) where<br />
supporting documents were provided<br />
to PwC.<br />
Source: PPMC’s Schedule of Costs,<br />
Reconciliations signed off by traders<br />
and NNPC, PwC Analysis<br />
These costs relate to amounts incurred<br />
by NNPC (and its subsidiaries)<br />
in executing its mandate. We observed<br />
that there were documents supporting<br />
these expenses.<br />
For the purpose of this report, PwC<br />
has included these expenses as verified,<br />
andtreated them as legitimately incurred<br />
in the process of the Corporation<br />
executing its mandate.<br />
(E) This represents the revenues due<br />
to NPDC from crude oil sale for the<br />
period from January 2012 to July 2013.<br />
The balances used in this analysis were<br />
obtained from the submissions made<br />
by the former MD of NPDC Mr Victor<br />
Briggs, during the Senate Committee<br />
hearings.We could not find proof or<br />
evidence that these revenues were remitted<br />
by NPDC/NNPC into the Federation<br />
Accounts Verified costs (NPDC<br />
yet to complete payment for assigned<br />
assets).<br />
It is important to note that the relationship<br />
between NNPC and NPDC as<br />
itrelates to OMLs 30, 34, 40, 26, 4, 38,<br />
41, 42 controlled by NPDC, is a key limitation<br />
to our scope.We had no access<br />
to NPDC management; our work relied<br />
on discussions with NNPC management<br />
(Section 6.3.2) and review of<br />
submissions to the senate (Exhibit A1).<br />
From our reviews of the NNPC Act<br />
(section 6(1 c & d)), we noted that the<br />
Corporation is empowered:<br />
(c) to enter into contracts or partnerships<br />
with any company, firm or person<br />
which in the opinion of the Corporation<br />
will facilitate the discharge of the said duties<br />
under this Act;<br />
(d) to establish and maintain subsidiaries<br />
for the discharge of such functions as the<br />
Corporation may determine;<br />
Sections 6(1c & d) are critical to establishing<br />
the nature of sale of these OMLs.<br />
We have analysed these as follows:<br />
Factors supporting a sale<br />
(1). NPDC paid taxes and royalties<br />
with a total of $1.7 billion.We have not<br />
been able to establish the assets on<br />
which these taxes and royalties were<br />
paid. However, the practice of payment<br />
of these statutory deductions suggests<br />
that the revenues from the related assets<br />
belong to the company. According<br />
to NPDC’s submission at the senate<br />
hearing, NPDC has not been assessed<br />
for royalty and PPT for the review period<br />
by DPR and FIRS respectively. The<br />
Company made part payments based<br />
on estimates.<br />
(2). Existence of a Deed of Assignment:<br />
As part of our work, we were informed<br />
of a document (Deed of Assignment)<br />
that transferred the assets from<br />
NNPC to NPDC.We were availed with<br />
copies of Deeds of Assignment for<br />
OML’s 26,30,40,42.We were not provided<br />
with copies of Deeds of Assignment<br />
for OML’s 4,38,41,34.<br />
(3). An outright sale to NPDC means<br />
that NPDC would be expected to make<br />
a payment to the Federation accounts<br />
for procuring the asset.<br />
DPR assigned a total value of $1.85<br />
billion dollars as reasonable amounts<br />
•Continued on page 7