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<strong>Sino</strong>-U.S. <strong>Inadvertent</strong> <strong>Escalation</strong>
<strong>Wu</strong> Riqiang
(Renmin University of China)
Although the issues of nuclear weapons and nuclear risk are not the focus of the
interactions between China and the United States, a stable nuclear relationship is the
foundation of stable <strong>Sino</strong>-U.S. general relations. On one hand, it is believed that
current <strong>Sino</strong>-U.S. nuclear relations are stable,
1
and deliberate nuclear exchanges
between China and the United States are unimaginable. On the other hand, China and
the United States might engage in a conventional conflict because of the Taiwan issue,
and the island disputes in the East China Sea and the South China Sea. Given both
sides’ force structures and military strategies, the conflict might escalate to nuclear
level. This is not to say that nuclear escalation between China and the United States
is likely, but given the catastrophic consequences of nuclear war, any low possibilities
of nuclear escalation deserve careful examination.
The problem of nuclear escalation was studied intensively during the Cold War.
Herman Kahn identified a 44-rung escalation ladder.
2
Nuclear escalation could result
from several mechanisms. Paul Bracken examined the action-reaction process of
American and Soviet nuclear alerting, and argued that “operating nuclear forces at
such high levels of alert ... could easily tip over into preemptive attacks and all-out
war.”
3
Scott Sagan examined historical cases on U.S. nuclear alerting, and discussed
the implications for crisis management.
4
Barry Posen analyzed the risks of
inadvertent escalation, in which “intense conventional operations may cause nuclear
! 1 The PONI Working Group on U.S.-China Nuclear Dynamics, Nuclear Weapons and U.S.-China Relations: A
Way Forward (Washington D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, March 2013), p. 9.
! 2 Herman Kahn, On <strong>Escalation</strong>: Metaphors and Scenarios, (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965), p. 39.
! 3 Paul Bracken, The Command and Control of Nuclear Forces (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983), pp.
59-60, 64-65.
! 4 Scott D. Sagan, “Nuclear Alerts and Crisis Management,” International Security, Vol. 9, No. 4 (Spring, 1985),
pp. 99-139.
! 1

escalation by threatening or destroying strategic nuclear forces.”
5
Bruce Blair
discussed the logic of accidental nuclear war caused by the vulnerability of nuclear
command and control systems.
6
From of an organization theory perspective, Scott
Sagan analyzed nuclear safety and accidental nuclear war.
7
Richard Ned Lebow
pointed out three mechanisms resulting in nuclear escalation: pre-emption, loss of
control of brinkmanship, and miscalculated escalation.
8
Based on the analysis of
nuclear escalation, analysts had summarized the principles of Soviet-U.S. crisis
management.
9
The risk of nuclear escalation in current <strong>Sino</strong>-U.S. case is much higher than that
of Soviet-U.S. case during the Cold War.
10
First, the Soviet Union maintained assured
destruction capability against the United States for much of the Cold War, but Chinese
nuclear arsenal is small and vulnerable, and can only maintain uncertain retaliation
against the United States.
11
Therefore, Chinese leaders will face higher “use-it-orlose-it”
pressure. Second, during the Cold War, Soviet and American leaders had
clear understanding on the divide of Europe, avoiding direct clash of superpowers.
But China has territorial disputes in the East and South China Sea with U.S. allies,
and so China and the United States might involve into a direct conventional conflict.
Third, the Soviet Union and the United States developed a set of basic tacit “rules of
prudence” for crisis management, and worked out cooperative arrangements in many
domains. China and the United States lack such experience.
<strong>Sino</strong>-U.S. nuclear escalation is a hot topic in the debate regarding the security
relationship between China and the United States, but there is no systematic work on
the mechanisms of <strong>Sino</strong>-U.S. inadvertent escalation. Christopher Twomey argued that
U.S. “escalation dominance at every single step of an escalatory ladder in possible
! 5 Barry R. Posen, “<strong>Inadvertent</strong> Nuclear War? <strong>Escalation</strong> and NATO's Northern Flank,” International Security, Vol.
7, No. 2 (Autumn, 1982), pp. 28-54. See also Barry Posen, <strong>Inadvertent</strong> <strong>Escalation</strong>: Conventional War and
Nuclear Risks (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991).
! 6 Bruce G. Blair, The Logic of AccidentaL Nuclear War (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1993).
! 7 Scott D. Sagan, The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1993).
! 8 Richard Ned Lebow, Nuclear Crisis Management: A Dangerous Illusion (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
1987), pp. 23-28.
! 9 A. L. George, P. J. Farley, and A. Dallin, eds., U.S.-Soviet Security Cooperation: Achievements, Failures, Lessons
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1988). Graham T. Allison, “Primitive Rules of Prudence: Foundation of
Peaceful Competition,” in G. T. Allison and W. L. Ury with B. J. Allyn, eds., Windows of Opportunity: From Cold
War to Peaceful Competition in U.S.-Soviet Relations, (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, 1989), pp. 9-27. John Lewis
Gaddis, “The Long Peace: Elements of Stability in the Postwar International System,” International Security, Vol.
10, No. 4 (Spring, 1986), pp. 99-142. Alexander L. George, “Is Research on Crisis Management Needed?” in
Alexander L. George ed., Avoiding War: Problems of Crisis Management (San Francisco: Westview Press, 1991),
pp. 3-6. Scott D. Sagan, “Nuclear Alerts and Crisis Management,” International Security, Vol. 9, No. 4 (Spring
1985), pp. 99-139.
! 10 Actually, Posen did mention, “the problems outlined herein will loom especially large for small and mediumsized
nuclear powers.” See Barry Posen, <strong>Inadvertent</strong> <strong>Escalation</strong>: Conventional War and Nuclear Risks (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1991), p. 2.
! <strong>Wu</strong> Riqiang, “Certainty of Uncertainty: Nuclear Strategy with Chinese Characteristics,” Journal of Strategic
11
Studies, Vol. 36, No. 4 (July/August 2013), pp. 579-614.
! 2

Taiwan scenarios, reducing the prospect of inadvertent escalation,” and Chinese
military modernization will cause dangerous uncertainty.
12
Thomas Christensen
contended that because of the overlap of China’s conventional and nuclear weapons,
U.S. conventional attack could inadvertently “appear in Beijing as aimed at reducing,
over time, China’s ability to launch a retaliatory nuclear strike.”
13
The escalatory risk
of the Air-Sea Battle concept was also discussed, emphasizing its provocative indepth
strike on China mainland.
14 15
This article will provide an analysis of the mechanisms of China-U.S.
inadvertent nuclear escalation, discuss specific hypothetical scenarios, and give
recommendations on crisis management. Specifically, the research questions of this
article are: how could <strong>Sino</strong>-U.S. inadvertent escalations happen? And how to avoid
<strong>Sino</strong>-U.S. inadvertent escalation? It is assumed that China and the United States have
already involved in a conventional conflict.
This article defines nuclear escalation as a situation in which nuclear element is
introduced into a conventional conflict, including using or threating to use nuclear
weapons. There are three types of nuclear escalation: deliberate escalation,
inadvertent escalation, and accidental/unauthorized escalation. Accidental/
unauthorized escalation refers to nuclear escalation that occurs as a result of actions
not properly authorized by either side. On the contrary, deliberate escalation refers to
nuclear escalation that is authorized by both sides. In inadvertent escalation scenario,
one side attacks the other side’s nuclear weapons unintentionally, but the other side
conceives the attack as disarming strike and decides to escalate. Table 1 shows all
three types of escalation.
Table 1 Three types of escalation
16
! 12 Christopher Twomey, “Dangers and Prospects in <strong>Sino</strong>-American Strategic Nuclear Relations,” in Christopher
Twomey ed., Perspectives on <strong>Sino</strong>-American Strategic Nuclear Issues (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), pp.
3-12.
! 13 Thomas J. Christensen, “The Meaning of the Nuclear Evolution: China’s Strategic Modernization and <strong>US</strong>-
China Security Relations,” The Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 35, No. 4, August 2012, pp. 447–487. A critic of
this article, see <strong>Wu</strong> Riqiang, “Issues in <strong>Sino</strong>-<strong>US</strong> Nuclear Relations: Survivability, Coercion and <strong>Escalation</strong>,” UK-
China Strategic Communication Initiative, 21 June 2013, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/issues-insino-us-nuclear-relations-survivability-coercion-and-escalation.
! 14 Eleni Ekmektsioglou, “AirSea Battle and <strong>Escalation</strong>,” The Diplomat, July 28, 2011, http://thediplomat.com/
new-leaders-forum/2011/07/28/airsea-battle-and-escalation/. T.X. Hammes, “Offshore Control: A Proposed
Strategy for an Unlikely Conflict,” Strategic Forum, No. 278, June 2012. Raoul Heinrichs, “America’s Dangerous
Battle Plan,” The Diplomat, August 17, 2011, http://thediplomat.com/2011/08/17/america’s-dangerous-battle-plan/.
Jeffrey E. Kline and Wayne P. Hughes Jr., “Between Peace and the Air-Sea Battle: A War at Sea Strategy,” Naval
War College Review, Vol. 65, No. 4 (Autumn 2012), pp. 35-40. Joshua Rovner, “AirSea Battle and <strong>Escalation</strong>
Risks,” Changing Military Dynamics in East Asia Policy Brief 12, Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation,
University of California, January 2012.
On the contrary, Elbridge Colby argues, “An AirSea Battle-style approach in a war with China—if conducted with
due concern for managing escalation—would not be likely to lead to nuclear war.” Elbridge Colby, “Don't Sweat
AirSea Battle,” National Interest, July 31, 2013, http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/dont-sweat-airseabattle-8804.
! 15 Avery Goldstein, “First Things First: The Pressing Danger of Crisis Instability in U.S.-China Relations,”
International Security, Vol. 37, No. 4 (Spring 2013), pp. 49–89.
! 16 The author thanks Robert Pape for pointing out this.
! 3

Side B
Intentional
Unintentional
Side A
Intentional Deliberate escalation <strong>Inadvertent</strong> escalation
Unintentional
<strong>Inadvertent</strong> escalation
Accidental/ unauthorized
escalation
We will not discuss accidental/unauthorized escalation in this article, because an
accidental/unauthorized launch Chinese nuclear weapons is “highly unlikely.”
17
Both
China and the United States might choose to escalate deliberately in order to coerce
the other side or to compensate conventional imbalance, but we will not discuss
deliberate escalation in this article either, and assume that neither China nor America
would escalate deliberately. In <strong>Sino</strong>-U.S. case, inadvertent escalation occurs only
when the United States attacks China’s nuclear weapons inadvertently. Since the
numerically and technically inferior Chinese arsenal has by no means disarming
capability against the U.S. one, even if China attacks U.S. nuclear weapons
inadvertently, the United States would feel no use-it-or-lose-it pressure.
It is worthwhile to discuss Chinese nuclear policy and its implication to
inadvertent escalation. China has maintained an unconditional no first use (NFU)
policy for several decades. It seems that given China’s NFU policy, there is no
escalatory risk in a <strong>Sino</strong>-U.S. conflict unless the United States escalates. The author
believes that China’s NFU policy should be understood as a very high political
threshold for first use, rather than an absolute and inaccessible wall. If China faces an
extremely worst situation, the very existence of the nation threatened, China could use
nuclear weapons first.
18
Well, then people might argue that NFU declaration is
meaningless. From the author’s perspective, China’s NFU policy is of great
significance because it means China abandons the coercive utility of its nuclear
weapons. Nuclear coercion requires to signal to the opposite the willingness to use
nuclear weapons. On the contrary, if one says that it would never use nuclear
weapons first, it cannot coerce anybody.
This article is divided into four sections. The first section presents the
mechanisms of <strong>Sino</strong>-U.S. inadvertent escalation. As an important driving factor, the
vulnerability of Chinese nuclear forces will be discussed in the second section. The
third section discusses three hypothetical escalatory scenarios in detail. The last
section raises some policy recommendations on how to avoid escalation.
1 Mechanism of <strong>Inadvertent</strong> <strong>Escalation</strong>
! 17 Robert D. Walpole, National Intelligence Officer for Strategic and Nuclear <strong>Program</strong>s, Speech at Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, September 17, 1998, https://www.cia.gov/news-information/speechestestimony/1998/walpole_speech_091798.html.
! This is not to say that China’s NFU pledge is not sincere, on contrary, it is. To judge whether or not China’s
18
NFU is sincere, we need to examine China’s nuclear posture, which is not designed for first use and is
substantially constrained by China’s NFU policy. Gregory Kulacki, “Chickens Talking With Ducks: The U.S.-
Chinese Nuclear Dialogue,” Arms Control Today, October 2011.
! 4

In this section, we will discuss the mechanisms of <strong>Sino</strong>-U.S. inadvertent
escalation. Barry Posen raised a model to explain the causes of Soviet-U.S.
inadvertent escalation during the Cold War, which can be derived from three bodies of
theory: security dilemma, the nature of military organizations, and the fog of war. 19
For China-U.S. inadvertent escalation, there are four factors driving the mechanism:
the “entanglement” of China’s conventional and nuclear weapons, the vulnerability of
Chinese nuclear forces and the fog of war.
20
We will discuss these three factors in
detail below.
Chinese nuclear and conventional weapons overlap in three dimensions. First,
China might operate a set of command and control infrastructure for both nuclear and
conventional weapons, so attacks on China’s conventional command and control
system would reduce China’s confidence of launching a successful nuclear
retaliation.
21
Second, China has both nuclear and conventional land-based ballistic
missiles, and the DF-21 missile even has both nuclear and conventional versions. It’s
difficult for the United States to discriminate between them. Third, China runs both
attack submarines (SSNs) and ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs). U.S. SSNs
might be unable to discriminate between China’s SSNs and SSBNs, especially in
noisy shallow waters.
Because of the vulnerability of Chinese nuclear forces, China’s nuclear posture is
not minimum deterrence or assured retaliation, as some western scholars argued.
22
A
reasonable model for China’s nuclear posture is the concept of first-strike uncertainty,
which relies on creating uncertainty “in the minds of the potential attacker’s leaders
about whether it is possible to destroy all of the victim’s nuclear weapons before it
can retaliate.”
23
But this is not to say that any level of first-strike uncertainty can
deter adversary’s nuclear attack and give Chinese leaders confidence. In order to
deter, the uncertainty must be high enough. The threshold can be identified by
studying China’s nuclear history. Beijing had no confidence of effective nuclear
deterrence until China deployed land-based, mobile DF-3 intermediate-range ballistic
missiles (IRBMs) and Chinese nuclear missile force (the Second Artillery) acquired
an independent launch capability (without technical support from the Chinese missile
! 19 Barry Posen, <strong>Inadvertent</strong> <strong>Escalation</strong>: Conventional War and Nuclear Risks (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
1991), pp. 4-23.
! 20 The author thanks Robert Pape for pointing out this.
! 21 John Lewis and Xue Litai argued that China’s conventional missiles use the same command and control
infrastructure as nuclear missiles. Although they did not have hard evidence supporting this argument, we have no
evidence saying otherwise. In fact, even if China has two sets of separate command and control infrastructure for
nuclear and conventional weapons respectively, the United States could not identify with high confidence whether
or not a specific facility is for nuclear or conventional purposes. So in this article, we assume that Chinese nuclear
and conventional missiles share command and control infrastructure. See John W. Lewis, Xue Litai, “Making
China's nuclear war plan,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 68, No. 5 (2012), pp. 45-65.
! 22
Bates Gill, James C. Mulvenon, Mark Stokes, “The Chinese Second Artillery Corps: Transition to Credible
Deterrence,” in James C. Mulvenon and Andrew N. D. Yang, eds., The People’s Liberation Army as Organization
(Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 2002), pp. 510–586. M. Taylor Fravel and Evan S. Medeiros, “China’s Search for
Assured Retaliation: The Evolution of Chinese Nuclear Strategy and Force Structure,” International Security, Vol.
35, No. 2 (Fall 2010), pp. 48–87.
! Devin T. Hagerty, “Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia: The 1990 Indo-Pakistani Crisis,” International Security,
23
Vol. 20, No. 3 (Winter 1995–1996), pp. 79-114.
! 5

!
industry and Chinese missile-test bases) in the mid-1980s.
24
We will discuss the
baseline vulnerability of Chinese nuclear forces in detail in the next section.
The fog of war refers to the difficulty of collecting and interpreting information
of an ongoing war, and using it to control the war. The impact of the fog of war on
the risk of inadvertent escalation can be understood at two levels. First, it makes the
U.S. military difficult to discriminate between China’s nuclear and conventional
systems, so the U.S. military might attack Chinese nuclear weapons inadvertently.
Second, it makes the Chinese military difficult to know how many nuclear weapons
are survived, and the readiness of the surviving weapons, creating high uncertainty in
Chinese leaders’ confidence of nuclear retaliation.
Put together, because of the entanglement of Chinese conventional and nuclear
weapons and the fog of war, the U.S. military might attack China’s nuclear weapons
accidentally in a conventional war. From Chinese military’s worst-case perspective,
the inadvertent attack is likely to be interpreted as a deliberate disarming strike, rather
than an accident. Since Chinese nuclear forces are vulnerable, and Chinese leaders’
confidence of nuclear retaliation low, such accidental attacks would drive China’s
confidence even lower. To make the situation even worse, during wartime, a ragged
Chinese command and control system causes higher uncertainty in Chinese leaders’
confidence of nuclear retaliation. Finally, Chinese leaders might lose confidence,
believe that U.S. attacks erode China’s nuclear retaliatory capability, and decide to
escalate.
uncertainty of
confidence
0 reduced
baseline 100% confidence
confidence
threshold
confidence confidence assured retaliation
Figure 1 Chinese leaders’ confidence of nuclear retaliation
Having discussed the mechanism of <strong>Sino</strong>-U.S. inadvertent escalation, we will
examine the baseline vulnerability of China’s nuclear forces in the next section.
2 Baseline Vulnerability of China’s Nuclear Forces
25
3 Hypothetical Scenarios
In this section, we will discuss three hypothetical scenarios: missile campaign,
naval warfare, and integrated major war. China and the United States could be
! 24 <strong>Wu</strong> Riqiang, “Certainty of Uncertainty: Nuclear Strategy with Chinese Characteristics,” Journal of Strategic
Studies, Vol. 36, No. 4 (July-August 2013), pp. 579-614.
! China’s first-generation SSBN (Type 092) is too noisy, and has never conducted a combat patrol. China is
25
developing its second-generation SSBN (Type 094). A declassified U.S. intelligence report shows that although
the Type 094 is also noisy. <strong>Wu</strong> Riqiang, “Survivability of China’s Sea-based Nuclear Forces,” Science & Global
Security, Vol. 19, No. 2, 2011, pp. 91-120.
! 6

involved into a conflict because of Taiwan issue or territorial disputes in the East and
South China Sea. Our discussion will focus on how forces are used, rather than
specific dispute issues, and each of the three scenarios could apply to all dispute
issues.
3.1 Missile campaign
Missile attack scenario can be divided into three sub-scenarios: 1995/1996-like
scenario, limited missile campaign, and large-scale missile war. In 1995/1996-like
scenario, China launches missiles to signal its resolve, and missiles are targeted at
open sea. The United States also deploys military assets to west Pacific, but there is
no direct “hot” conflict between these two countries. Limited missile campaign
involves limited Chinese missile attacks and U.S. seeking and hunting of Chinese
mobile missiles. Military operations in limited missile campaign are more about
signaling than war fighting. Large-scale missile war is all about war fighting, in
which China launches a large number of missiles to destroy U.S. and its allies’
military targets, and the United States tries to destroy Chinese missile war-supporting
capabilities. We will discuss each of the three sub-scenarios in detail below.
In order to understand the security consequences of missile campaigns, we need
to discuss China’s deployed missiles and their deployment pattern first. China’s
Second Artillery operates land-based conventional and nuclear ballistic and cruise
missiles, as shown in Table 3. Chinese missiles have three-level operating sites: main
sites, forward sites, and launch sites, as shown in Figure 3. During peacetime, most
missiles stay in main sites. More missiles would move to forward sites under higher
alert status. If a launch order were issued, missiles would move to launch sites and be
fired. Missiles do not move randomly, in stead, they stay in main sites or forward
sites, and move to launch sites if ordered.
26
All missile sites are concealed and
camouflaged, and main sites and forward sites are probably underground facilities
(UGFs).
Table 3 China’s ballistic and cruise missiles
Chinese name U.S. name Range (km) Type Basing
DF-3 CSS-2 Nuclear, liquid Land-mobile
DF-4 CSS-3 Nuclear, liquid Semi-mobile
DF-5A CSS-4 13000 Nuclear, liquid Silo
DF-21 CSS-5 Nuclear/
Conventional,
solid
Land-mobile
! Xie Tao, Wang Minle, Zhong Jianqiang, Fang Qin, “Changgui daodan zhendi peizhi youhua yanjiu” [Research
26
on Optimal Deployment of Conventional Missile Positions], Xitong fangzhen xuebao, Vol. 21 No. 6 (March,
2009), pp. 1535-1537. Wang Minle, Gao Xiaoguang, “Zhanlue daodan jidong zhendi bushu youhua yanjiu
sheji” [Optimal design of deployment of strategic missile mobile positions], Xitong gongcheng lilun yu shijian,
No. 10 (1999), pp. 94-98.
! 7

!
DF-31/DF-31A 7200/11200 Nuclear, solid Land-mobile
DF-11
DF-15
DF-16?
Conventional,
solid
Conventional,
solid
Conventional,
solid
Land-mobile
Land-mobile
Land-mobile
DH-10
Source:
main site
Cruise missile
forward site
forward site
forward site
launch
site
launch
site
launch
site
launch
site
launch
site
launch
site
launch
site
launch
site
launch
site
Figure 3 Chinese mobile missiles’ deployment pattern
27
The command and control (C2) systems of Chinese missile units. At issue are
two points: 1) overlap of conventional and nuclear C2 infrastructure; 2)
U.S. CPGS and precision guided munitions.
1995/1996-like scenario carries no escalatory risk.
In limited missile campaign, China’s strategic purpose is limited, so U.S.
response would probably also moderate. A tit-for-tat U.S. counterstrike strategy is to
seek and hunt Chinese transporter-erector-launchers (TELs). Locating mobile
missiles is a challenging job.
28
A frequently mentioned case is that during the 1991
Gulf War, while the allies conducted 1,460 strikes against Iraqi Scud missiles, there
! 27 Xie Tao, Wang Minle, Zhong Jianqiang, Fang Qin, “Changgui daodan zhendi peizhi youhua yanjiu” [Research
on Optimal Deployment of Conventional Missile Positions], Xitong fangzhen xuebao, Vol. 21 No. 6 (March,
2009), pp. 1535-1537. Wang Minle, Gao Xiaoguang, “Zhanlue daodan jidong zhendi bushu youhua yanjiu
sheji” [Optimal design of deployment of strategic missile mobile positions], Xitong gongcheng lilun yu shijian,
No. 10 (1999), pp. 94-98.
! 28
! 8

was no evidence demonstrating that any Scud TEL was destroyed.
29
But we cannot
conclude that the United States cannot find China’s mobile missiles. The U.S.
intelligence system puts much more effort on China’s missiles than Iraq’s in
peacetime, so in wartime the United States would have a much better performance
against China. The Second Artillery is trained to deploy concealment and camouflage
measures to TELs, which could be good enough to be invisible to the naked eye.
30
So
it is difficult for U.S. intelligence to find Chinese TELs, and must be more difficult to
identify the located one is conventional or nuclear. So there is a possibility that the
U.S. military attacks Chinese nuclear missiles inadvertently. Since both sides’
purposes are limited, and the U.S. military is likely to select targets carefully in order
to avoid attacking Chinese nuclear weapons, the risk of inadvertent escalation is low.
If large-scale missile war occurs, the United States would try to neutralize
China’s missile war capability, including missile TELs, missile sites, and command
and control systems. In order to neutralize a missile site, U.S. military need to first
locate and then destroy or disable the site. A missile site could be ground or
underground facility. For ground facilities, detectability depends on the performance
of the concealment and camouflage measures they take. If detected, it would be
destroyed. For UGFs, U.S. military need to not only locate the site, but also
characterize it: physical layout, size, geology, depth, and hardness. To build an UGF
is time-consuming, making it relatively easy to detect.
31
A variety of methods for
locating and characterizing UGFs were developed: gravity/magnetic field mapping,
ground penetrating radar, seismic, electromagnetic, electrical conductivity, and
radioactive.
32
Of significant practical importance are gravity field mapping (passive)
and seismic (active) approaches. U.S. day-to-day surveillance on Chinese missile
sites and military activities around helps to tell whether the specific facility is for
nuclear or conventional purposes. Two issues make the situation more complicated.
First, China’s DF-21 missile has both conventional and nuclear versions, which are
difficult to discriminate. Second, China deploys concealment and camouflage
measures on missile sites to cover their real purposes. The better the concealment and
camouflage measures, the more difficult to identify a site’s purpose, and the higher
inadvertent escalatory risk.
Attacking command and control systems.
! 29 Mark E. Kipphut, Crossbow and Gulf War Counter-Scud Efforts: Lessons from History (Maxwell Air Force
Base, ALA: Air Univ. 2003), pp. 17-18.
! 30 Zhao Xianfeng, Bi Yongjun and <strong>Wu</strong> Xudong, “Rexue lijian ren: Gao Jin” [A hot- blooded swordsman: Gao Jin],
Jiangfangjun bao, November 20, 2000, p. 1. Li Yongfei, Wang Yongxiao and Xia Hongqing, “Tiantian yu jiangjun
tongxing: di’er paobing moujidi guanbing xuexi jicheng yangyegong ‘sizhong jingshen’ jishi” [Follow with the
general everyday: real record of the study of Yang Yegong’s “four spirits” in a base of the Second Artillery],
Jiefangjun bao, August 17, 2006, p. 3.
! 31 For example, a declassified U.S. intelligence report shows that in 1980 a big UGF in central China was
detected. Probably this facility is an alternative national military command center. U.S. National Photographic
Interpretation Center, “Possible Alternative National Military Command Center, <strong>Wu</strong>han Military Region, China,”
November 1980.
! Eric M. Sepp, “Deeply Buried Facilities: Implications for Military Operations,” Occasional Paper No. 14,
32
Center for Strategy and Technology, Air War College, May 2000.
! 9

!
3.2 Naval warfare
Naval warfare scenario can also be divided into three sub-scenarios: distant
blockade, sea denial, and sea control. In distant blockade scenario, the United States
conducts a distant blockade in areas beyond the range of most Chinese capabilities to
cutoff Chinese trade and energy imports. In sea denial scenario, both China and the
United States use missiles, aircrafts and submarines to deny the other’s ability to use
the sea within the first island chain.
33
Sea control scenario involves much higher U.S.
objective: to ensure U.S. freedom of action in and deny China’s use of the sea within
the first island chain. China has no sea control capability against the United States.
It is worthwhile to discuss China’s so-called “anti-access/area denial (A2/
AD)”weapons: anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM), and submarines, and their
command and control systems. China’s aircraft carrier is not considered in this
article, because it takes China several decades to achieve full operational capability.
ASBM.
34
Targeting system of ASBM. intelligence, surveillance and
reconnaissance (ISR)
Submarines. In this article, it is assumed that Chinese Type 094s are in service
and conduct strategic patrol, and they are quiet enough to survive in shallow waters.
Table 4 China’s submarines
Chinese name U.S. name Type Number
092 Xia SSBN
094 Jin SSBN
091 SSN
093 SSN
Land-based very low frequency (VLF) transmitter is China’s only way to
communicate submerged submarines. There is some evidence indicating that China is
working on airborne VLF communication system, but whether or not there is an
actual developmental program is not clear.
35
China has two big VLF stations inland
! 33 The first island chain means
! 34 James Kraska, “How the United States Lost the Naval War of 2015,” Orbis, Winter 2010, pp. 35-45. Andrew S.
Erickson and David D. Yang, “On the Verge of a Game-Changer,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 135, No.
5, May 2009, http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2009-05/verge-game-changer.
! 35 Li Xiangping, Zhu Yongxin, Zhang Dongxing, Li Rui, “Wei zhuangji zhuangtai xia dan tuoye VLF jizai
tianxian dianci anquanxing fangzhen fenxi” [Simulation Analysis of Electromagnetic Safety of Single-drag VLF
Airborne Antenna Without Installed State], Jisuanji yu xiandaihua, No. 12, 2012, pp. 40-43. Zheng Xiaohong,
Hou Zhiqiang, Han Wei, Li Jixin, “Shendipin tuoye tianxian de wentai donglixue yanjiu” [Research on the steady
dynamic of VLF trailing antenna on an aircraft], Jixie gongcheng xuebao, Vol. 48, No. 11, June 2012, pp. 166-171.
10

and several small VLF stations along the coast.
36
Since China’s Type 094 has yet to enter service, we do not know whether or not
Chinese SSBNs have permissive action link (PAL)-like launch control mechanisms. 37
According to Peter Feaver, nuclear command and control systems need to balance two
risks: the potential for unwanted use, and the potential for decapitation.
38
In U.S.
experience, PALs were not incorporated into the nuclear weapons carried by SSBNs
until 1990s.
39
Given China’s weak capabilities to maintain communications to
submarines, it is likely that PALs will not be incorporated into the nuclear weapons on
Chinese SSBNs. If so, under the condition of communication with national command
authority interrupted, the captain of the SSBN would have full control of the nuclear
weapons on board.
Distant blockade.
40
Offshore Control strategy.
41
war-at-sea strategy (sea denial
within the first island chain and distant blockade)
42
Maritime interception operations,
interdiction operations.
Sea denial scenario has higher intensity than distant blockade. China’s ASBM
would expel U.S. aircraft carrier out of its range. U.S. anti-submarine warfare (ASW)
operations against China’s submarines. Attack China’s VLF transmitters.
Compared to sea denial scenario, sea control scenario requires the United States
to neutralize the ASBM threat, and sink Chinese submarines as soon as possible.
There would be inadvertent escalatory risk in both sea denial and sea control
scenarios. China SSBN/SSN
If all Chinese VLF transmitters, including the two inland ones, are destroyed,
there is a possibility in both sea denial and sea control scenarios that Chinese SSBNs,
without communications with the national command authority, launch their SLBMs.
3.3 Integrated major war
Integrated major war represents the highest level of <strong>Sino</strong>-U.S. conventional war,
! 36
! 37 Donald R. Cotter, “Peacetime Operations: Safety and Security,” in Ashton B. Carter, John D. Steinbruner, and
Charles A. Zraket eds., Managing Nuclear Operations (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1987), pp.
17-74.
! 38 Peter D. Feaver, “Command and Control in Emerging Nuclear Nations,” International Security, Vol. 17, No. 3
(Winter, 1992-1993), pp. 160-187.
! 39 G. E. Miller, "Who Needs PALs?" Proceedings of the U.S. Naval Institute, July 1988, pp. 50-56. Nathan
Edward Busch, “Assessing the Optimism-Pessimism Debate: Nuclear Proliferation, Nuclear Risks, and Theories
of State Action,” Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Toronto, 2001, pp. 47-48.
! 40 Sean Mirski, “Stranglehold: The Context, Conduct and Consequences of an American Naval Blockade of
China,” Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 36, No. 3 (2013), pp. 385–421.
Evan Braden Montgomery, “Reconsidering a Naval Blockade of China: A Response to Mirski,” Journal of
Strategic Studies, Vol. 36, No. 4 (2013), pp.
! 41 T.X. Hammes, “Offshore Control: A Proposed Strategy for an Unlikely Conflict,” Strategic Forum, No. 278,
June 2012.
! Jeffrey E. Kline and Wayne P. Hughes Jr., “Between Peace and the Air-Sea Battle: A War at Sea Strategy,”
42
Naval War College Review, Vol. 65, No. 4 (Autumn 2012), pp. 35-40.
! 11

in which both sides use all kinds of forces except nuclear weapons and fight in all
domains (land, sea, air, space, cyberspace). China will take full advantage of its A2/
AD capabilities (in Chinese shashoujian, Assassin’s Mace), against the United States,
and the United States will also full advantage of its ASB concept against China. We
will discuss the ASB concept first.
The ASB concept is designed to counter the A2/AD threats from peer (China) or
near-peer (Iran) competitors.
43
The central idea of ASB is “to develop networked,
integrated forces capable of attack-in-depth to disrupt, destroy and defeat adversary
forces.”
44
The details of this concept have yet to be released, but the Center for
Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA), the think tank that plays an important
role in developing the ASB concept, provides some insights into this concept. The
CSBA-version ASB campaign calls for blinding campaign, missile suppression
campaign, and ASW campaign. The blinding campaign includes: attacking Chinese
ISR systems used to target naval mobile assets; attacking space situational awareness
and counter-space capabilities; severing communication links and precision nodal
attack; and disrupting airborne ISR sensors. The missile suppression campaign
includes seeking and hunting mobile missile launchers and striking missile production
and storage targets. The ASW campaign includes continued ASW operations inside
and maintaining ASW barrier along the first island chain.
45
Some elements of the
ASB concept have already been discussed in the missile campaign and naval warfare
sections.
Obviously, the integrated major war scenario carries all escalatory risks that
associated with the missile campaign/large-scale missile war and naval warfare/sea
control scenarios.
In discussing missile campaign, it is assumed that some sort of communication
links be maintained between the Second Artillery units and the national command
authority, which is not good enough for organizing optimal conventional salvos, but is
good enough for sending the final order of nuclear retaliation, so-called “emergency
action message” in American literature. In the scenario of integrated major war, this
assumption is challenged. Given the high intensity of the conflict and possible U.S.
operations presented in last paragraph, there is a possibility that China’s nuclear
missile units lost communication links with political leaders. If so, this situation
carries high escalatory risks. In order to understand that, we need to discuss China’s
strategic communication network and the Second Artillery’s command and control
system.
China’s strategic communication network. Underground communication system.
! 43 Kyle D. Christensen, “Strategic Developments In The Western Pacific: Anti-Access/Area Denial And The
Airsea Battle Concept,” Journal of Military and Strategic Studies, Vol. 14, No. 3, 2013, pp. 1-24. Greg Jaffe,
“U.S. model for a future war fans tensions with China and inside Pentagon,” Washington Post, August 1, 2012,
http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-08-01/world/35492126_1_china-tensions-china-threat-pentagon.
! 44 U.S. Air-Sea Battle Office, Air-Sea Battle: Service Collaboration to Address Anti-Access & Area Denial
Challenges, May 2013, p. 4.
! 45 Jan van Tol, Mark Gunzinger, Andrew Krepinevich, Jim Thomas, “AirSea Battle,” Center for Strategic and
Budgetary Assessments, May 18, 2010. Jan van Tol, Mark Gunzinger, Andrew Krepinevich, and Jim Thomas,
AirSea Battle: A Point-of-Departure Operational Concept (Washington D.C.: Center for Strategic and Budgetary
Assessments, 2010).
! 12

China reportedly lacked PALs in 1987.
46
In this section, we discussed the escalatory risk of three scenarios (seven subscenarios).
Table 1 presents a summary of the result. It can be seen that only two
scenarios have no escalatory risk: 1995/1996-like scenario and distant blockade. All
other scenarios carry risk of inadvertent escalation. Question naturally arises: how to
avoid <strong>Sino</strong>-U.S. escalation? We will try to answer this question in the nest section.
Table 1 Escalatory risk of different scenarios
Scenarios Description Escalatory risk
Missile campaign 1995/1996-like scenario No
Limited missile campaign
Large-scale missile war
Yes
Yes
Naval warfare Distant blockade No
Sea denial
Sea control
Yes
Yes
Major war
4 How to avoid <strong>Sino</strong>-U.S. nuclear escalation?
After analyzing the mechanisms of <strong>Sino</strong>-U.S. nuclear escalation and discussing
the escalatory risk of several scenarios, in this section, we will present some policy
recommendations for avoiding <strong>Sino</strong>-U.S. nuclear escalation.
4.1 Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs)
To decrease <strong>Sino</strong>-U.S. inadvertent escalation risk requires reducing the overlap
of China’s conventional and nuclear weapons.
missiles: identifying characters.
Demolishing medium-range nuclear ballistic missiles (nuclear DF-21s).
Sea: ASW-free zone. Maybe Yellow Sea?
the United States needs to limit its CPGS programs.
small arsenal of CPGS, and transparency. Strategic dialogue.
4.2 Accept mutual vulnerability with China
A key question of <strong>Sino</strong>-U.S. strategic stability is: will or should the United States
accept mutual but unequal vulnerability with China? To this question, there are two
Yes
! 46 Dan Caldwell, “Permissive Action Links: A Description and Proposal,” Survival, Vol. 29, No. 3 (May/June
1987), p. 231. Steve Coll and David Ottaway, “Will the United States, Russia and China be Nuclear Partners or
Rivals in the 21st Century?” Washington Post, April 11, 1995, p. A01. Steve Coll, “The Man Inside China’s Bomb
Labs: U.S. Blocks Memoir of Scientist Who Gathered Trove of Information,” Washington Post, May 16, 2001, p.
A01.
! 13

points of view among U.S. experts.
47
The first is that mutual vulnerability with China
is unacceptable and avoidable, and the United States can and should exploit its
commanding technical lead over China to neutralize China’s nuclear deterrent
capability.
48
“Washington should also make clear that it will not accept a mutual
vulnerability relationship with China.”
49
The second is that “mutual vulnerability is a
fact, not a choice,”
50
and the United States should “acknowledge mutual vulnerability
as a fact of life.”
51
U.S. 2010 Nuclear Posture Review stated that the United States
would maintain strategic stability with China.
52
But Obama administration can only
accept an ambiguous “strategic stability,” rather than a clear “mutual vulnerability”
with China.
53
It is important to give China confidence on <strong>Sino</strong>-U.S. strategic stability because
the higher China’s confidence, the lower Chinese leaders’ use-it-or-lose-it pressure,
and the lower inadvertent escalation risk. China and the United States should reach a
common understanding on strategic offensive and defensive weapons. A possible
solution is that the United States limits its missile defense, which could counter
simple North Korean intercontinental ballistic missiles, if any, without threatening
China’s advanced strategic missiles, in return for China’s promise to not expand its
nuclear arsenal.
54
4.3 Pursuing modest strategic objectives
It can be seen from our analysis that the higher both sides’ strategic objectives,
the higher escalatory risk. So it is very important for both sides, especially the United
States, to pursue modest purposes. In 1995/1996 Taiwan crisis, the United States sent
two aircraft carriers to west Pacific, and China had no means to counter that threat.
After that, China began to develop so-called A2/AD weapons. Current reality is that
neither China nor the United States can achieve sea control within the first island
chain, and at the same time, both sides have the capability to denial the other side’s
! 47 Brad Roberts, “China-U.S. Nuclear Relations: What Relationship Best Serves U.S. Interests?” IDA Document
P-3640, Institute for Defense Analyses, August 2001, p. 2.
! 48 L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., “China-U.S. Strategic Stability,” presentation prepared for the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace conference, April 2009.
! 49 International Security Advisory Board to Secretary of State, “China's Strategic Modernization: Report from the
ISAB Task Force,” 2008, http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/china/2008/china-081001-isab01.htm.
! 50 James M. Acton, “Managing Vulnerability,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 89, No. 2 (2010), pp. 145-153.
! 51 Linton Brooks, “The <strong>Sino</strong>-American Nuclear Balance: Its future and implications,” in Abraham Denmark and
Nirav Patel eds., China’s Arrival: A Strategic Framework for a Global Relationship (Washington, DC: Center for a
New American Security, 2009), pp. 60-76.
! 52 U.S. Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review Report, April 2010, pp. 28-29.
! 53 Jeffrey Lewis, “Challenges for U.S.-China Strategic Stability in the Obama Administration,” in Catherine
McArdle Kelleher, Judith Reppy eds., Getting to Zero: The Path to Nuclear Disarmament (Stanford University
Press, 2011), pp. 149-163.
! 54 <strong>Wu</strong> Riqiang, “Why should China be concerned with U.S. missile defense? And how to address it?” Survival,
forthcoming.
! 14

use of sea within the first island chain. The United States has to face and accept the
reality. It could do otherwise, but it would be very difficult, expensive, and
dangerous.
Pursuing modest strategic objective is a natural result of accepting mutual
vulnerability with China.
U.S. military argues that Air-Sea Battle (ASB) is not a strategy, not a war plan, is
just an operational concept designed to improve Navy and Air Force interoperability.
But critics argue that ASB has become a “strategy of tactics.”
55
“The ASB Concept
seeks to ensure freedom of action in the global commons.”
56
seeking a decisive
victory against China.
Alternative: maritime denial
57
Offshore control
58
War-at-sea strategy
59
The same logic applies to China.
4.4 Declaratory policy
NFU helps.
China considers conventional attacks on nuclear weapons or nuclear facilities as
nuclear attacks.
4.5 Avoid <strong>Sino</strong>-U.S. conflict
Undoubtedly, the best way to avoid <strong>Sino</strong>-U.S. nuclear escalation is to avoid
<strong>Sino</strong>-U.S. conventional conflict. 60
China is rising as a regional, rather than global, power. 61
U.S. constrains its allies’ provocative actions. Hujiahuwei (the fox assuming the
majesty of the tiger)
China’s assertiveness.
62
! 55 J. Noel Williams, “Air-Sea Battle: An operational concept looking for a strategy,” Armed Forces Journal,
September 2011, http://armedforcesjournal.com/2011/09/7558138/.
! 56 U.S. Air-Sea Battle Office, Air-Sea Battle: Service Collaboration to Address Anti-Access & Area Denial
Challenges, May 2013, p. 4.
! 57 Raoul Heinrichs, “America’s Dangerous Battle Plan,” The Diplomat, August 17, 2011, http://thediplomat.com/
2011/08/17/america’s-dangerous-battle-plan/.
! 58 T.X. Hammes, “Offshore Control: A Proposed Strategy for an Unlikely Conflict,” Strategic Forum, No. 278,
June 2012.
! 59 Jeffrey E. Kline and Wayne P. Hughes Jr., “Between Peace and the Air-Sea Battle: A War at Sea Strategy,”
Naval War College Review, Vol. 65, No. 4 (Autumn 2012), pp. 35-40.
! 60 Bonnie S. Glaser, “Armed Clash in the South China Sea,” Contingency Planning Memorandum No. 14, Council
on Foreign Relations, April 2012.
! 61 Amitai Etzioni, “Who Authorized Preparations for War with China?” Yale Journal of International Affairs,
(Summer 2013), pp. 37-51. Amitai Etzioni, “Accommodating China,” Survival, Vol. 55, No. 2, (April/May 2013),
pp. 45-60.
! 62 Alastair Iain Johnston, “How New and Assertive Is China’s New Assertiveness?” International Security, Vol.
37, No. 4 (Spring 2013), pp. 7-48.
! 15