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<str<strong>on</strong>g>Program</str<strong>on</strong>g> <strong>on</strong> <strong>Strategic</strong> <strong>Stability</strong> Evaluati<strong>on</strong> (POSSE)<br />
<br />
781 Marietta St. NW<br />
Atlanta, GA 30318<br />
web: www.posse.gatech.edu<br />
Ph<strong>on</strong>e:404-894-3199<br />
<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Sino</str<strong>on</strong>g>-U.S. <str<strong>on</strong>g>Inadvertent</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Escalati<strong>on</strong></str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Wu</str<strong>on</strong>g> Riqiang<br />
(Renmin University of China)<br />
Although the issues of nuclear weap<strong>on</strong>s and nuclear risk are not the focus of the<br />
interacti<strong>on</strong>s between China and the United States, a stable nuclear relati<strong>on</strong>ship is the<br />
foundati<strong>on</strong> of stable <str<strong>on</strong>g>Sino</str<strong>on</strong>g>-U.S. general relati<strong>on</strong>s. On <strong>on</strong>e hand, it is believed that<br />
current <str<strong>on</strong>g>Sino</str<strong>on</strong>g>-U.S. nuclear relati<strong>on</strong>s are stable,<br />
1<br />
and deliberate nuclear exchanges<br />
between China and the United States are unimaginable. On the other hand, China and<br />
the United States might engage in a c<strong>on</strong>venti<strong>on</strong>al c<strong>on</strong>flict because of the Taiwan issue,<br />
and the island disputes in the East China Sea and the South China Sea. Given both<br />
sides’ force structures and military strategies, the c<strong>on</strong>flict might escalate to nuclear<br />
level. This is not to say that nuclear escalati<strong>on</strong> between China and the United States<br />
is likely, but given the catastrophic c<strong>on</strong>sequences of nuclear war, any low possibilities<br />
of nuclear escalati<strong>on</strong> deserve careful examinati<strong>on</strong>.<br />
The problem of nuclear escalati<strong>on</strong> was studied intensively during the Cold War.<br />
Herman Kahn identified a 44-rung escalati<strong>on</strong> ladder.<br />
2<br />
Nuclear escalati<strong>on</strong> could result<br />
from several mechanisms. Paul Bracken examined the acti<strong>on</strong>-reacti<strong>on</strong> process of<br />
American and Soviet nuclear alerting, and argued that “operating nuclear forces at<br />
such high levels of alert ... could easily tip over into preemptive attacks and all-out<br />
war.”<br />
3<br />
Scott Sagan examined historical cases <strong>on</strong> U.S. nuclear alerting, and discussed<br />
the implicati<strong>on</strong>s for crisis management.<br />
4<br />
Barry Posen analyzed the risks of<br />
inadvertent escalati<strong>on</strong>, in which “intense c<strong>on</strong>venti<strong>on</strong>al operati<strong>on</strong>s may cause nuclear<br />
! 1 The PONI Working Group <strong>on</strong> U.S.-China Nuclear Dynamics, Nuclear Weap<strong>on</strong>s and U.S.-China Relati<strong>on</strong>s: A<br />
Way Forward (Washingt<strong>on</strong> D.C.: Center for <strong>Strategic</strong> and Internati<strong>on</strong>al Studies, March 2013), p. 9.<br />
! 2 Herman Kahn, On <str<strong>on</strong>g>Escalati<strong>on</strong></str<strong>on</strong>g>: Metaphors and Scenarios, (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965), p. 39.<br />
! 3 Paul Bracken, The Command and C<strong>on</strong>trol of Nuclear Forces (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983), pp.<br />
59-60, 64-65.<br />
! 4 Scott D. Sagan, “Nuclear Alerts and Crisis Management,” Internati<strong>on</strong>al Security, Vol. 9, No. 4 (Spring, 1985),<br />
pp. 99-139.<br />
! 1
escalati<strong>on</strong> by threatening or destroying strategic nuclear forces.”<br />
5<br />
Bruce Blair<br />
discussed the logic of accidental nuclear war caused by the vulnerability of nuclear<br />
command and c<strong>on</strong>trol systems.<br />
6<br />
From of an organizati<strong>on</strong> theory perspective, Scott<br />
Sagan analyzed nuclear safety and accidental nuclear war.<br />
7<br />
Richard Ned Lebow<br />
pointed out three mechanisms resulting in nuclear escalati<strong>on</strong>: pre-empti<strong>on</strong>, loss of<br />
c<strong>on</strong>trol of brinkmanship, and miscalculated escalati<strong>on</strong>.<br />
8<br />
Based <strong>on</strong> the analysis of<br />
nuclear escalati<strong>on</strong>, analysts had summarized the principles of Soviet-U.S. crisis<br />
management.<br />
9<br />
The risk of nuclear escalati<strong>on</strong> in current <str<strong>on</strong>g>Sino</str<strong>on</strong>g>-U.S. case is much higher than that<br />
of Soviet-U.S. case during the Cold War.<br />
10<br />
First, the Soviet Uni<strong>on</strong> maintained assured<br />
destructi<strong>on</strong> capability against the United States for much of the Cold War, but Chinese<br />
nuclear arsenal is small and vulnerable, and can <strong>on</strong>ly maintain uncertain retaliati<strong>on</strong><br />
against the United States.<br />
11<br />
Therefore, Chinese leaders will face higher “use-it-orlose-it”<br />
pressure. Sec<strong>on</strong>d, during the Cold War, Soviet and American leaders had<br />
clear understanding <strong>on</strong> the divide of Europe, avoiding direct clash of superpowers.<br />
But China has territorial disputes in the East and South China Sea with U.S. allies,<br />
and so China and the United States might involve into a direct c<strong>on</strong>venti<strong>on</strong>al c<strong>on</strong>flict.<br />
Third, the Soviet Uni<strong>on</strong> and the United States developed a set of basic tacit “rules of<br />
prudence” for crisis management, and worked out cooperative arrangements in many<br />
domains. China and the United States lack such experience.<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Sino</str<strong>on</strong>g>-U.S. nuclear escalati<strong>on</strong> is a hot topic in the debate regarding the security<br />
relati<strong>on</strong>ship between China and the United States, but there is no systematic work <strong>on</strong><br />
the mechanisms of <str<strong>on</strong>g>Sino</str<strong>on</strong>g>-U.S. inadvertent escalati<strong>on</strong>. Christopher Twomey argued that<br />
U.S. “escalati<strong>on</strong> dominance at every single step of an escalatory ladder in possible<br />
! 5 Barry R. Posen, “<str<strong>on</strong>g>Inadvertent</str<strong>on</strong>g> Nuclear War? <str<strong>on</strong>g>Escalati<strong>on</strong></str<strong>on</strong>g> and NATO's Northern Flank,” Internati<strong>on</strong>al Security, Vol.<br />
7, No. 2 (Autumn, 1982), pp. 28-54. See also Barry Posen, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Inadvertent</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Escalati<strong>on</strong></str<strong>on</strong>g>: C<strong>on</strong>venti<strong>on</strong>al War and<br />
Nuclear Risks (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991).<br />
! 6 Bruce G. Blair, The Logic of AccidentaL Nuclear War (Washingt<strong>on</strong>, D.C.: Brookings, 1993).<br />
! 7 Scott D. Sagan, The Limits of Safety: Organizati<strong>on</strong>s, Accidents, and Nuclear Weap<strong>on</strong>s (Princet<strong>on</strong>: Princet<strong>on</strong><br />
University Press, 1993).<br />
! 8 Richard Ned Lebow, Nuclear Crisis Management: A Dangerous Illusi<strong>on</strong> (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,<br />
1987), pp. 23-28.<br />
! 9 A. L. George, P. J. Farley, and A. Dallin, eds., U.S.-Soviet Security Cooperati<strong>on</strong>: Achievements, Failures, Less<strong>on</strong>s<br />
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1988). Graham T. Allis<strong>on</strong>, “Primitive Rules of Prudence: Foundati<strong>on</strong> of<br />
Peaceful Competiti<strong>on</strong>,” in G. T. Allis<strong>on</strong> and W. L. Ury with B. J. Allyn, eds., Windows of Opportunity: From Cold<br />
War to Peaceful Competiti<strong>on</strong> in U.S.-Soviet Relati<strong>on</strong>s, (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, 1989), pp. 9-27. John Lewis<br />
Gaddis, “The L<strong>on</strong>g Peace: Elements of <strong>Stability</strong> in the Postwar Internati<strong>on</strong>al System,” Internati<strong>on</strong>al Security, Vol.<br />
10, No. 4 (Spring, 1986), pp. 99-142. Alexander L. George, “Is Research <strong>on</strong> Crisis Management Needed?” in<br />
Alexander L. George ed., Avoiding War: Problems of Crisis Management (San Francisco: Westview Press, 1991),<br />
pp. 3-6. Scott D. Sagan, “Nuclear Alerts and Crisis Management,” Internati<strong>on</strong>al Security, Vol. 9, No. 4 (Spring<br />
1985), pp. 99-139.<br />
! 10 Actually, Posen did menti<strong>on</strong>, “the problems outlined herein will loom especially large for small and mediumsized<br />
nuclear powers.” See Barry Posen, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Inadvertent</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Escalati<strong>on</strong></str<strong>on</strong>g>: C<strong>on</strong>venti<strong>on</strong>al War and Nuclear Risks (Ithaca:<br />
Cornell University Press, 1991), p. 2.<br />
! <str<strong>on</strong>g>Wu</str<strong>on</strong>g> Riqiang, “Certainty of Uncertainty: Nuclear Strategy with Chinese Characteristics,” Journal of <strong>Strategic</strong><br />
11<br />
Studies, Vol. 36, No. 4 (July/August 2013), pp. 579-614.<br />
! 2
Taiwan scenarios, reducing the prospect of inadvertent escalati<strong>on</strong>,” and Chinese<br />
military modernizati<strong>on</strong> will cause dangerous uncertainty.<br />
12<br />
Thomas Christensen<br />
c<strong>on</strong>tended that because of the overlap of China’s c<strong>on</strong>venti<strong>on</strong>al and nuclear weap<strong>on</strong>s,<br />
U.S. c<strong>on</strong>venti<strong>on</strong>al attack could inadvertently “appear in Beijing as aimed at reducing,<br />
over time, China’s ability to launch a retaliatory nuclear strike.”<br />
13<br />
The escalatory risk<br />
of the Air-Sea Battle c<strong>on</strong>cept was also discussed, emphasizing its provocative indepth<br />
strike <strong>on</strong> China mainland.<br />
14 15<br />
This article will provide an analysis of the mechanisms of China-U.S.<br />
inadvertent nuclear escalati<strong>on</strong>, discuss specific hypothetical scenarios, and give<br />
recommendati<strong>on</strong>s <strong>on</strong> crisis management. Specifically, the research questi<strong>on</strong>s of this<br />
article are: how could <str<strong>on</strong>g>Sino</str<strong>on</strong>g>-U.S. inadvertent escalati<strong>on</strong>s happen? And how to avoid<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Sino</str<strong>on</strong>g>-U.S. inadvertent escalati<strong>on</strong>? It is assumed that China and the United States have<br />
already involved in a c<strong>on</strong>venti<strong>on</strong>al c<strong>on</strong>flict.<br />
This article defines nuclear escalati<strong>on</strong> as a situati<strong>on</strong> in which nuclear element is<br />
introduced into a c<strong>on</strong>venti<strong>on</strong>al c<strong>on</strong>flict, including using or threating to use nuclear<br />
weap<strong>on</strong>s. There are three types of nuclear escalati<strong>on</strong>: deliberate escalati<strong>on</strong>,<br />
inadvertent escalati<strong>on</strong>, and accidental/unauthorized escalati<strong>on</strong>. Accidental/<br />
unauthorized escalati<strong>on</strong> refers to nuclear escalati<strong>on</strong> that occurs as a result of acti<strong>on</strong>s<br />
not properly authorized by either side. On the c<strong>on</strong>trary, deliberate escalati<strong>on</strong> refers to<br />
nuclear escalati<strong>on</strong> that is authorized by both sides. In inadvertent escalati<strong>on</strong> scenario,<br />
<strong>on</strong>e side attacks the other side’s nuclear weap<strong>on</strong>s unintenti<strong>on</strong>ally, but the other side<br />
c<strong>on</strong>ceives the attack as disarming strike and decides to escalate. Table 1 shows all<br />
three types of escalati<strong>on</strong>.<br />
<br />
Table 1 Three types of escalati<strong>on</strong><br />
16<br />
! 12 Christopher Twomey, “Dangers and Prospects in <str<strong>on</strong>g>Sino</str<strong>on</strong>g>-American <strong>Strategic</strong> Nuclear Relati<strong>on</strong>s,” in Christopher<br />
Twomey ed., Perspectives <strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Sino</str<strong>on</strong>g>-American <strong>Strategic</strong> Nuclear Issues (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), pp.<br />
3-12.<br />
! 13 Thomas J. Christensen, “The Meaning of the Nuclear Evoluti<strong>on</strong>: China’s <strong>Strategic</strong> Modernizati<strong>on</strong> and <str<strong>on</strong>g>US</str<strong>on</strong>g>-<br />
China Security Relati<strong>on</strong>s,” The Journal of <strong>Strategic</strong> Studies, Vol. 35, No. 4, August 2012, pp. 447–487. A critic of<br />
this article, see <str<strong>on</strong>g>Wu</str<strong>on</strong>g> Riqiang, “Issues in <str<strong>on</strong>g>Sino</str<strong>on</strong>g>-<str<strong>on</strong>g>US</str<strong>on</strong>g> Nuclear Relati<strong>on</strong>s: Survivability, Coerci<strong>on</strong> and <str<strong>on</strong>g>Escalati<strong>on</strong></str<strong>on</strong>g>,” UK-<br />
China <strong>Strategic</strong> Communicati<strong>on</strong> Initiative, 21 June 2013, https://www.gov.uk/government/publicati<strong>on</strong>s/issues-insino-us-nuclear-relati<strong>on</strong>s-survivability-coerci<strong>on</strong>-and-escalati<strong>on</strong>.<br />
! 14 Eleni Ekmektsioglou, “AirSea Battle and <str<strong>on</strong>g>Escalati<strong>on</strong></str<strong>on</strong>g>,” The Diplomat, July 28, 2011, http://thediplomat.com/<br />
new-leaders-forum/2011/07/28/airsea-battle-and-escalati<strong>on</strong>/. T.X. Hammes, “Offshore C<strong>on</strong>trol: A Proposed<br />
Strategy for an Unlikely C<strong>on</strong>flict,” <strong>Strategic</strong> Forum, No. 278, June 2012. Raoul Heinrichs, “America’s Dangerous<br />
Battle Plan,” The Diplomat, August 17, 2011, http://thediplomat.com/2011/08/17/america’s-dangerous-battle-plan/.<br />
Jeffrey E. Kline and Wayne P. Hughes Jr., “Between Peace and the Air-Sea Battle: A War at Sea Strategy,” Naval<br />
War College Review, Vol. 65, No. 4 (Autumn 2012), pp. 35-40. Joshua Rovner, “AirSea Battle and <str<strong>on</strong>g>Escalati<strong>on</strong></str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
Risks,” Changing Military Dynamics in East Asia Policy Brief 12, Institute <strong>on</strong> Global C<strong>on</strong>flict and Cooperati<strong>on</strong>,<br />
University of California, January 2012.<br />
On the c<strong>on</strong>trary, Elbridge Colby argues, “An AirSea Battle-style approach in a war with China—if c<strong>on</strong>ducted with<br />
due c<strong>on</strong>cern for managing escalati<strong>on</strong>—would not be likely to lead to nuclear war.” Elbridge Colby, “D<strong>on</strong>'t Sweat<br />
AirSea Battle,” Nati<strong>on</strong>al Interest, July 31, 2013, http://nati<strong>on</strong>alinterest.org/commentary/d<strong>on</strong>t-sweat-airseabattle-8804.<br />
! 15 Avery Goldstein, “First Things First: The Pressing Danger of Crisis Instability in U.S.-China Relati<strong>on</strong>s,”<br />
Internati<strong>on</strong>al Security, Vol. 37, No. 4 (Spring 2013), pp. 49–89.<br />
! 16 The author thanks Robert Pape for pointing out this.<br />
! 3
Side B<br />
Intenti<strong>on</strong>al<br />
Unintenti<strong>on</strong>al<br />
Side A<br />
<br />
Intenti<strong>on</strong>al Deliberate escalati<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Inadvertent</str<strong>on</strong>g> escalati<strong>on</strong><br />
Unintenti<strong>on</strong>al<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Inadvertent</str<strong>on</strong>g> escalati<strong>on</strong><br />
Accidental/ unauthorized<br />
escalati<strong>on</strong><br />
We will not discuss accidental/unauthorized escalati<strong>on</strong> in this article, because an<br />
accidental/unauthorized launch Chinese nuclear weap<strong>on</strong>s is “highly unlikely.”<br />
17<br />
Both<br />
China and the United States might choose to escalate deliberately in order to coerce<br />
the other side or to compensate c<strong>on</strong>venti<strong>on</strong>al imbalance, but we will not discuss<br />
deliberate escalati<strong>on</strong> in this article either, and assume that neither China nor America<br />
would escalate deliberately. In <str<strong>on</strong>g>Sino</str<strong>on</strong>g>-U.S. case, inadvertent escalati<strong>on</strong> occurs <strong>on</strong>ly<br />
when the United States attacks China’s nuclear weap<strong>on</strong>s inadvertently. Since the<br />
numerically and technically inferior Chinese arsenal has by no means disarming<br />
capability against the U.S. <strong>on</strong>e, even if China attacks U.S. nuclear weap<strong>on</strong>s<br />
inadvertently, the United States would feel no use-it-or-lose-it pressure.<br />
It is worthwhile to discuss Chinese nuclear policy and its implicati<strong>on</strong> to<br />
inadvertent escalati<strong>on</strong>. China has maintained an unc<strong>on</strong>diti<strong>on</strong>al no first use (NFU)<br />
policy for several decades. It seems that given China’s NFU policy, there is no<br />
escalatory risk in a <str<strong>on</strong>g>Sino</str<strong>on</strong>g>-U.S. c<strong>on</strong>flict unless the United States escalates. The author<br />
believes that China’s NFU policy should be understood as a very high political<br />
threshold for first use, rather than an absolute and inaccessible wall. If China faces an<br />
extremely worst situati<strong>on</strong>, the very existence of the nati<strong>on</strong> threatened, China could use<br />
nuclear weap<strong>on</strong>s first.<br />
18<br />
Well, then people might argue that NFU declarati<strong>on</strong> is<br />
meaningless. From the author’s perspective, China’s NFU policy is of great<br />
significance because it means China aband<strong>on</strong>s the coercive utility of its nuclear<br />
weap<strong>on</strong>s. Nuclear coerci<strong>on</strong> requires to signal to the opposite the willingness to use<br />
nuclear weap<strong>on</strong>s. On the c<strong>on</strong>trary, if <strong>on</strong>e says that it would never use nuclear<br />
weap<strong>on</strong>s first, it cannot coerce anybody.<br />
This article is divided into four secti<strong>on</strong>s. The first secti<strong>on</strong> presents the<br />
mechanisms of <str<strong>on</strong>g>Sino</str<strong>on</strong>g>-U.S. inadvertent escalati<strong>on</strong>. As an important driving factor, the<br />
vulnerability of Chinese nuclear forces will be discussed in the sec<strong>on</strong>d secti<strong>on</strong>. The<br />
third secti<strong>on</strong> discusses three hypothetical escalatory scenarios in detail. The last<br />
secti<strong>on</strong> raises some policy recommendati<strong>on</strong>s <strong>on</strong> how to avoid escalati<strong>on</strong>.<br />
<br />
1 Mechanism of <str<strong>on</strong>g>Inadvertent</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Escalati<strong>on</strong></str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
! 17 Robert D. Walpole, Nati<strong>on</strong>al Intelligence Officer for <strong>Strategic</strong> and Nuclear <str<strong>on</strong>g>Program</str<strong>on</strong>g>s, Speech at Carnegie<br />
Endowment for Internati<strong>on</strong>al Peace, September 17, 1998, https://www.cia.gov/news-informati<strong>on</strong>/speechestestim<strong>on</strong>y/1998/walpole_speech_091798.html.<br />
! This is not to say that China’s NFU pledge is not sincere, <strong>on</strong> c<strong>on</strong>trary, it is. To judge whether or not China’s<br />
18<br />
NFU is sincere, we need to examine China’s nuclear posture, which is not designed for first use and is<br />
substantially c<strong>on</strong>strained by China’s NFU policy. Gregory Kulacki, “Chickens Talking With Ducks: The U.S.-<br />
Chinese Nuclear Dialogue,” Arms C<strong>on</strong>trol Today, October 2011.<br />
! 4
In this secti<strong>on</strong>, we will discuss the mechanisms of <str<strong>on</strong>g>Sino</str<strong>on</strong>g>-U.S. inadvertent<br />
escalati<strong>on</strong>. Barry Posen raised a model to explain the causes of Soviet-U.S.<br />
inadvertent escalati<strong>on</strong> during the Cold War, which can be derived from three bodies of<br />
theory: security dilemma, the nature of military organizati<strong>on</strong>s, and the fog of war. 19<br />
For China-U.S. inadvertent escalati<strong>on</strong>, there are four factors driving the mechanism:<br />
the “entanglement” of China’s c<strong>on</strong>venti<strong>on</strong>al and nuclear weap<strong>on</strong>s, the vulnerability of<br />
Chinese nuclear forces and the fog of war.<br />
20<br />
We will discuss these three factors in<br />
detail below.<br />
Chinese nuclear and c<strong>on</strong>venti<strong>on</strong>al weap<strong>on</strong>s overlap in three dimensi<strong>on</strong>s. First,<br />
China might operate a set of command and c<strong>on</strong>trol infrastructure for both nuclear and<br />
c<strong>on</strong>venti<strong>on</strong>al weap<strong>on</strong>s, so attacks <strong>on</strong> China’s c<strong>on</strong>venti<strong>on</strong>al command and c<strong>on</strong>trol<br />
system would reduce China’s c<strong>on</strong>fidence of launching a successful nuclear<br />
retaliati<strong>on</strong>.<br />
21<br />
Sec<strong>on</strong>d, China has both nuclear and c<strong>on</strong>venti<strong>on</strong>al land-based ballistic<br />
missiles, and the DF-21 missile even has both nuclear and c<strong>on</strong>venti<strong>on</strong>al versi<strong>on</strong>s. It’s<br />
difficult for the United States to discriminate between them. Third, China runs both<br />
attack submarines (SSNs) and ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs). U.S. SSNs<br />
might be unable to discriminate between China’s SSNs and SSBNs, especially in<br />
noisy shallow waters.<br />
Because of the vulnerability of Chinese nuclear forces, China’s nuclear posture is<br />
not minimum deterrence or assured retaliati<strong>on</strong>, as some western scholars argued.<br />
22<br />
A<br />
reas<strong>on</strong>able model for China’s nuclear posture is the c<strong>on</strong>cept of first-strike uncertainty,<br />
which relies <strong>on</strong> creating uncertainty “in the minds of the potential attacker’s leaders<br />
about whether it is possible to destroy all of the victim’s nuclear weap<strong>on</strong>s before it<br />
can retaliate.”<br />
23<br />
But this is not to say that any level of first-strike uncertainty can<br />
deter adversary’s nuclear attack and give Chinese leaders c<strong>on</strong>fidence. In order to<br />
deter, the uncertainty must be high enough. The threshold can be identified by<br />
studying China’s nuclear history. Beijing had no c<strong>on</strong>fidence of effective nuclear<br />
deterrence until China deployed land-based, mobile DF-3 intermediate-range ballistic<br />
missiles (IRBMs) and Chinese nuclear missile force (the Sec<strong>on</strong>d Artillery) acquired<br />
an independent launch capability (without technical support from the Chinese missile<br />
! 19 Barry Posen, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Inadvertent</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Escalati<strong>on</strong></str<strong>on</strong>g>: C<strong>on</strong>venti<strong>on</strong>al War and Nuclear Risks (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,<br />
1991), pp. 4-23.<br />
! 20 The author thanks Robert Pape for pointing out this.<br />
! 21 John Lewis and Xue Litai argued that China’s c<strong>on</strong>venti<strong>on</strong>al missiles use the same command and c<strong>on</strong>trol<br />
infrastructure as nuclear missiles. Although they did not have hard evidence supporting this argument, we have no<br />
evidence saying otherwise. In fact, even if China has two sets of separate command and c<strong>on</strong>trol infrastructure for<br />
nuclear and c<strong>on</strong>venti<strong>on</strong>al weap<strong>on</strong>s respectively, the United States could not identify with high c<strong>on</strong>fidence whether<br />
or not a specific facility is for nuclear or c<strong>on</strong>venti<strong>on</strong>al purposes. So in this article, we assume that Chinese nuclear<br />
and c<strong>on</strong>venti<strong>on</strong>al missiles share command and c<strong>on</strong>trol infrastructure. See John W. Lewis, Xue Litai, “Making<br />
China's nuclear war plan,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 68, No. 5 (2012), pp. 45-65.<br />
! 22<br />
Bates Gill, James C. Mulven<strong>on</strong>, Mark Stokes, “The Chinese Sec<strong>on</strong>d Artillery Corps: Transiti<strong>on</strong> to Credible<br />
Deterrence,” in James C. Mulven<strong>on</strong> and Andrew N. D. Yang, eds., The People’s Liberati<strong>on</strong> Army as Organizati<strong>on</strong><br />
(Santa M<strong>on</strong>ica, Calif.: RAND, 2002), pp. 510–586. M. Taylor Fravel and Evan S. Medeiros, “China’s Search for<br />
Assured Retaliati<strong>on</strong>: The Evoluti<strong>on</strong> of Chinese Nuclear Strategy and Force Structure,” Internati<strong>on</strong>al Security, Vol.<br />
35, No. 2 (Fall 2010), pp. 48–87.<br />
! Devin T. Hagerty, “Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia: The 1990 Indo-Pakistani Crisis,” Internati<strong>on</strong>al Security,<br />
23<br />
Vol. 20, No. 3 (Winter 1995–1996), pp. 79-114.<br />
! 5
!<br />
industry and Chinese missile-test bases) in the mid-1980s.<br />
24<br />
We will discuss the<br />
baseline vulnerability of Chinese nuclear forces in detail in the next secti<strong>on</strong>.<br />
The fog of war refers to the difficulty of collecting and interpreting informati<strong>on</strong><br />
of an <strong>on</strong>going war, and using it to c<strong>on</strong>trol the war. The impact of the fog of war <strong>on</strong><br />
the risk of inadvertent escalati<strong>on</strong> can be understood at two levels. First, it makes the<br />
U.S. military difficult to discriminate between China’s nuclear and c<strong>on</strong>venti<strong>on</strong>al<br />
systems, so the U.S. military might attack Chinese nuclear weap<strong>on</strong>s inadvertently.<br />
Sec<strong>on</strong>d, it makes the Chinese military difficult to know how many nuclear weap<strong>on</strong>s<br />
are survived, and the readiness of the surviving weap<strong>on</strong>s, creating high uncertainty in<br />
Chinese leaders’ c<strong>on</strong>fidence of nuclear retaliati<strong>on</strong>.<br />
Put together, because of the entanglement of Chinese c<strong>on</strong>venti<strong>on</strong>al and nuclear<br />
weap<strong>on</strong>s and the fog of war, the U.S. military might attack China’s nuclear weap<strong>on</strong>s<br />
accidentally in a c<strong>on</strong>venti<strong>on</strong>al war. From Chinese military’s worst-case perspective,<br />
the inadvertent attack is likely to be interpreted as a deliberate disarming strike, rather<br />
than an accident. Since Chinese nuclear forces are vulnerable, and Chinese leaders’<br />
c<strong>on</strong>fidence of nuclear retaliati<strong>on</strong> low, such accidental attacks would drive China’s<br />
c<strong>on</strong>fidence even lower. To make the situati<strong>on</strong> even worse, during wartime, a ragged<br />
Chinese command and c<strong>on</strong>trol system causes higher uncertainty in Chinese leaders’<br />
c<strong>on</strong>fidence of nuclear retaliati<strong>on</strong>. Finally, Chinese leaders might lose c<strong>on</strong>fidence,<br />
believe that U.S. attacks erode China’s nuclear retaliatory capability, and decide to<br />
escalate.<br />
uncertainty of<br />
c<strong>on</strong>fidence<br />
0 reduced<br />
baseline 100% c<strong>on</strong>fidence<br />
c<strong>on</strong>fidence<br />
threshold<br />
c<strong>on</strong>fidence c<strong>on</strong>fidence assured retaliati<strong>on</strong><br />
Figure 1 Chinese leaders’ c<strong>on</strong>fidence of nuclear retaliati<strong>on</strong><br />
<br />
Having discussed the mechanism of <str<strong>on</strong>g>Sino</str<strong>on</strong>g>-U.S. inadvertent escalati<strong>on</strong>, we will<br />
examine the baseline vulnerability of China’s nuclear forces in the next secti<strong>on</strong>.<br />
<br />
2 Baseline Vulnerability of China’s Nuclear Forces<br />
25<br />
3 Hypothetical Scenarios<br />
In this secti<strong>on</strong>, we will discuss three hypothetical scenarios: missile campaign,<br />
naval warfare, and integrated major war. China and the United States could be<br />
! 24 <str<strong>on</strong>g>Wu</str<strong>on</strong>g> Riqiang, “Certainty of Uncertainty: Nuclear Strategy with Chinese Characteristics,” Journal of <strong>Strategic</strong><br />
Studies, Vol. 36, No. 4 (July-August 2013), pp. 579-614.<br />
! China’s first-generati<strong>on</strong> SSBN (Type 092) is too noisy, and has never c<strong>on</strong>ducted a combat patrol. China is<br />
25<br />
developing its sec<strong>on</strong>d-generati<strong>on</strong> SSBN (Type 094). A declassified U.S. intelligence report shows that although<br />
the Type 094 is also noisy. <str<strong>on</strong>g>Wu</str<strong>on</strong>g> Riqiang, “Survivability of China’s Sea-based Nuclear Forces,” Science & Global<br />
Security, Vol. 19, No. 2, 2011, pp. 91-120.<br />
! 6
involved into a c<strong>on</strong>flict because of Taiwan issue or territorial disputes in the East and<br />
South China Sea. Our discussi<strong>on</strong> will focus <strong>on</strong> how forces are used, rather than<br />
specific dispute issues, and each of the three scenarios could apply to all dispute<br />
issues.<br />
<br />
3.1 Missile campaign<br />
Missile attack scenario can be divided into three sub-scenarios: 1995/1996-like<br />
scenario, limited missile campaign, and large-scale missile war. In 1995/1996-like<br />
scenario, China launches missiles to signal its resolve, and missiles are targeted at<br />
open sea. The United States also deploys military assets to west Pacific, but there is<br />
no direct “hot” c<strong>on</strong>flict between these two countries. Limited missile campaign<br />
involves limited Chinese missile attacks and U.S. seeking and hunting of Chinese<br />
mobile missiles. Military operati<strong>on</strong>s in limited missile campaign are more about<br />
signaling than war fighting. Large-scale missile war is all about war fighting, in<br />
which China launches a large number of missiles to destroy U.S. and its allies’<br />
military targets, and the United States tries to destroy Chinese missile war-supporting<br />
capabilities. We will discuss each of the three sub-scenarios in detail below.<br />
In order to understand the security c<strong>on</strong>sequences of missile campaigns, we need<br />
to discuss China’s deployed missiles and their deployment pattern first. China’s<br />
Sec<strong>on</strong>d Artillery operates land-based c<strong>on</strong>venti<strong>on</strong>al and nuclear ballistic and cruise<br />
missiles, as shown in Table 3. Chinese missiles have three-level operating sites: main<br />
sites, forward sites, and launch sites, as shown in Figure 3. During peacetime, most<br />
missiles stay in main sites. More missiles would move to forward sites under higher<br />
alert status. If a launch order were issued, missiles would move to launch sites and be<br />
fired. Missiles do not move randomly, in stead, they stay in main sites or forward<br />
sites, and move to launch sites if ordered.<br />
26<br />
All missile sites are c<strong>on</strong>cealed and<br />
camouflaged, and main sites and forward sites are probably underground facilities<br />
(UGFs).<br />
<br />
Table 3 China’s ballistic and cruise missiles<br />
Chinese name U.S. name Range (km) Type Basing<br />
DF-3 CSS-2 Nuclear, liquid Land-mobile<br />
DF-4 CSS-3 Nuclear, liquid Semi-mobile<br />
DF-5A CSS-4 13000 Nuclear, liquid Silo<br />
DF-21 CSS-5 Nuclear/<br />
C<strong>on</strong>venti<strong>on</strong>al,<br />
solid<br />
Land-mobile<br />
! Xie Tao, Wang Minle, Zh<strong>on</strong>g Jianqiang, Fang Qin, “Changgui daodan zhendi peizhi youhua yanjiu” [Research<br />
26<br />
<strong>on</strong> Optimal Deployment of C<strong>on</strong>venti<strong>on</strong>al Missile Positi<strong>on</strong>s], Xit<strong>on</strong>g fangzhen xuebao, Vol. 21 No. 6 (March,<br />
2009), pp. 1535-1537. Wang Minle, Gao Xiaoguang, “Zhanlue daodan jid<strong>on</strong>g zhendi bushu youhua yanjiu<br />
sheji” [Optimal design of deployment of strategic missile mobile positi<strong>on</strong>s], Xit<strong>on</strong>g g<strong>on</strong>gcheng lilun yu shijian,<br />
No. 10 (1999), pp. 94-98.<br />
! 7
!<br />
DF-31/DF-31A 7200/11200 Nuclear, solid Land-mobile<br />
DF-11<br />
DF-15<br />
DF-16?<br />
C<strong>on</strong>venti<strong>on</strong>al,<br />
solid<br />
C<strong>on</strong>venti<strong>on</strong>al,<br />
solid<br />
C<strong>on</strong>venti<strong>on</strong>al,<br />
solid<br />
Land-mobile<br />
Land-mobile<br />
Land-mobile<br />
DH-10<br />
Source:<br />
<br />
main site<br />
Cruise missile<br />
forward site<br />
forward site<br />
forward site<br />
launch<br />
site<br />
launch<br />
site<br />
launch<br />
site<br />
launch<br />
site<br />
launch<br />
site<br />
launch<br />
site<br />
launch<br />
site<br />
launch<br />
site<br />
launch<br />
site<br />
<br />
Figure 3 Chinese mobile missiles’ deployment pattern<br />
27<br />
The command and c<strong>on</strong>trol (C2) systems of Chinese missile units. At issue are<br />
two points: 1) overlap of c<strong>on</strong>venti<strong>on</strong>al and nuclear C2 infrastructure; 2)<br />
U.S. CPGS and precisi<strong>on</strong> guided muniti<strong>on</strong>s.<br />
1995/1996-like scenario carries no escalatory risk.<br />
In limited missile campaign, China’s strategic purpose is limited, so U.S.<br />
resp<strong>on</strong>se would probably also moderate. A tit-for-tat U.S. counterstrike strategy is to<br />
seek and hunt Chinese transporter-erector-launchers (TELs). Locating mobile<br />
missiles is a challenging job.<br />
28<br />
A frequently menti<strong>on</strong>ed case is that during the 1991<br />
Gulf War, while the allies c<strong>on</strong>ducted 1,460 strikes against Iraqi Scud missiles, there<br />
! 27 Xie Tao, Wang Minle, Zh<strong>on</strong>g Jianqiang, Fang Qin, “Changgui daodan zhendi peizhi youhua yanjiu” [Research<br />
<strong>on</strong> Optimal Deployment of C<strong>on</strong>venti<strong>on</strong>al Missile Positi<strong>on</strong>s], Xit<strong>on</strong>g fangzhen xuebao, Vol. 21 No. 6 (March,<br />
2009), pp. 1535-1537. Wang Minle, Gao Xiaoguang, “Zhanlue daodan jid<strong>on</strong>g zhendi bushu youhua yanjiu<br />
sheji” [Optimal design of deployment of strategic missile mobile positi<strong>on</strong>s], Xit<strong>on</strong>g g<strong>on</strong>gcheng lilun yu shijian,<br />
No. 10 (1999), pp. 94-98.<br />
! 28<br />
! 8
was no evidence dem<strong>on</strong>strating that any Scud TEL was destroyed.<br />
29<br />
But we cannot<br />
c<strong>on</strong>clude that the United States cannot find China’s mobile missiles. The U.S.<br />
intelligence system puts much more effort <strong>on</strong> China’s missiles than Iraq’s in<br />
peacetime, so in wartime the United States would have a much better performance<br />
against China. The Sec<strong>on</strong>d Artillery is trained to deploy c<strong>on</strong>cealment and camouflage<br />
measures to TELs, which could be good enough to be invisible to the naked eye.<br />
30<br />
So<br />
it is difficult for U.S. intelligence to find Chinese TELs, and must be more difficult to<br />
identify the located <strong>on</strong>e is c<strong>on</strong>venti<strong>on</strong>al or nuclear. So there is a possibility that the<br />
U.S. military attacks Chinese nuclear missiles inadvertently. Since both sides’<br />
purposes are limited, and the U.S. military is likely to select targets carefully in order<br />
to avoid attacking Chinese nuclear weap<strong>on</strong>s, the risk of inadvertent escalati<strong>on</strong> is low.<br />
If large-scale missile war occurs, the United States would try to neutralize<br />
China’s missile war capability, including missile TELs, missile sites, and command<br />
and c<strong>on</strong>trol systems. In order to neutralize a missile site, U.S. military need to first<br />
locate and then destroy or disable the site. A missile site could be ground or<br />
underground facility. For ground facilities, detectability depends <strong>on</strong> the performance<br />
of the c<strong>on</strong>cealment and camouflage measures they take. If detected, it would be<br />
destroyed. For UGFs, U.S. military need to not <strong>on</strong>ly locate the site, but also<br />
characterize it: physical layout, size, geology, depth, and hardness. To build an UGF<br />
is time-c<strong>on</strong>suming, making it relatively easy to detect.<br />
31<br />
A variety of methods for<br />
locating and characterizing UGFs were developed: gravity/magnetic field mapping,<br />
ground penetrating radar, seismic, electromagnetic, electrical c<strong>on</strong>ductivity, and<br />
radioactive.<br />
32<br />
Of significant practical importance are gravity field mapping (passive)<br />
and seismic (active) approaches. U.S. day-to-day surveillance <strong>on</strong> Chinese missile<br />
sites and military activities around helps to tell whether the specific facility is for<br />
nuclear or c<strong>on</strong>venti<strong>on</strong>al purposes. Two issues make the situati<strong>on</strong> more complicated.<br />
First, China’s DF-21 missile has both c<strong>on</strong>venti<strong>on</strong>al and nuclear versi<strong>on</strong>s, which are<br />
difficult to discriminate. Sec<strong>on</strong>d, China deploys c<strong>on</strong>cealment and camouflage<br />
measures <strong>on</strong> missile sites to cover their real purposes. The better the c<strong>on</strong>cealment and<br />
camouflage measures, the more difficult to identify a site’s purpose, and the higher<br />
inadvertent escalatory risk.<br />
Attacking command and c<strong>on</strong>trol systems.<br />
<br />
! 29 Mark E. Kipphut, Crossbow and Gulf War Counter-Scud Efforts: Less<strong>on</strong>s from History (Maxwell Air Force<br />
Base, ALA: Air Univ. 2003), pp. 17-18.<br />
! 30 Zhao Xianfeng, Bi Y<strong>on</strong>gjun and <str<strong>on</strong>g>Wu</str<strong>on</strong>g> Xud<strong>on</strong>g, “Rexue lijian ren: Gao Jin” [A hot- blooded swordsman: Gao Jin],<br />
Jiangfangjun bao, November 20, 2000, p. 1. Li Y<strong>on</strong>gfei, Wang Y<strong>on</strong>gxiao and Xia H<strong>on</strong>gqing, “Tiantian yu jiangjun<br />
t<strong>on</strong>gxing: di’er paobing moujidi guanbing xuexi jicheng yangyeg<strong>on</strong>g ‘sizh<strong>on</strong>g jingshen’ jishi” [Follow with the<br />
general everyday: real record of the study of Yang Yeg<strong>on</strong>g’s “four spirits” in a base of the Sec<strong>on</strong>d Artillery],<br />
Jiefangjun bao, August 17, 2006, p. 3.<br />
! 31 For example, a declassified U.S. intelligence report shows that in 1980 a big UGF in central China was<br />
detected. Probably this facility is an alternative nati<strong>on</strong>al military command center. U.S. Nati<strong>on</strong>al Photographic<br />
Interpretati<strong>on</strong> Center, “Possible Alternative Nati<strong>on</strong>al Military Command Center, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Wu</str<strong>on</strong>g>han Military Regi<strong>on</strong>, China,”<br />
November 1980.<br />
! Eric M. Sepp, “Deeply Buried Facilities: Implicati<strong>on</strong>s for Military Operati<strong>on</strong>s,” Occasi<strong>on</strong>al Paper No. 14,<br />
32<br />
Center for Strategy and Technology, Air War College, May 2000.<br />
! 9
!<br />
3.2 Naval warfare<br />
Naval warfare scenario can also be divided into three sub-scenarios: distant<br />
blockade, sea denial, and sea c<strong>on</strong>trol. In distant blockade scenario, the United States<br />
c<strong>on</strong>ducts a distant blockade in areas bey<strong>on</strong>d the range of most Chinese capabilities to<br />
cutoff Chinese trade and energy imports. In sea denial scenario, both China and the<br />
United States use missiles, aircrafts and submarines to deny the other’s ability to use<br />
the sea within the first island chain.<br />
33<br />
Sea c<strong>on</strong>trol scenario involves much higher U.S.<br />
objective: to ensure U.S. freedom of acti<strong>on</strong> in and deny China’s use of the sea within<br />
the first island chain. China has no sea c<strong>on</strong>trol capability against the United States.<br />
It is worthwhile to discuss China’s so-called “anti-access/area denial (A2/<br />
AD)”weap<strong>on</strong>s: anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM), and submarines, and their<br />
command and c<strong>on</strong>trol systems. China’s aircraft carrier is not c<strong>on</strong>sidered in this<br />
article, because it takes China several decades to achieve full operati<strong>on</strong>al capability.<br />
ASBM.<br />
34<br />
Targeting system of ASBM. intelligence, surveillance and<br />
rec<strong>on</strong>naissance (ISR)<br />
Submarines. In this article, it is assumed that Chinese Type 094s are in service<br />
and c<strong>on</strong>duct strategic patrol, and they are quiet enough to survive in shallow waters.<br />
<br />
Table 4 China’s submarines<br />
Chinese name U.S. name Type Number<br />
092 Xia SSBN<br />
094 Jin SSBN<br />
091 SSN<br />
093 SSN<br />
<br />
Land-based very low frequency (VLF) transmitter is China’s <strong>on</strong>ly way to<br />
communicate submerged submarines. There is some evidence indicating that China is<br />
working <strong>on</strong> airborne VLF communicati<strong>on</strong> system, but whether or not there is an<br />
actual developmental program is not clear.<br />
35<br />
China has two big VLF stati<strong>on</strong>s inland<br />
! 33 The first island chain means<br />
! 34 James Kraska, “How the United States Lost the Naval War of 2015,” Orbis, Winter 2010, pp. 35-45. Andrew S.<br />
Ericks<strong>on</strong> and David D. Yang, “On the Verge of a Game-Changer,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 135, No.<br />
5, May 2009, http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2009-05/verge-game-changer.<br />
! 35 Li Xiangping, Zhu Y<strong>on</strong>gxin, Zhang D<strong>on</strong>gxing, Li Rui, “Wei zhuangji zhuangtai xia dan tuoye VLF jizai<br />
tianxian dianci anquanxing fangzhen fenxi” [Simulati<strong>on</strong> Analysis of Electromagnetic Safety of Single-drag VLF<br />
Airborne Antenna Without Installed State], Jisuanji yu xiandaihua, No. 12, 2012, pp. 40-43. Zheng Xiaoh<strong>on</strong>g,<br />
Hou Zhiqiang, Han Wei, Li Jixin, “Shendipin tuoye tianxian de wentai d<strong>on</strong>glixue yanjiu” [Research <strong>on</strong> the steady<br />
dynamic of VLF trailing antenna <strong>on</strong> an aircraft], Jixie g<strong>on</strong>gcheng xuebao, Vol. 48, No. 11, June 2012, pp. 166-171.<br />
10
and several small VLF stati<strong>on</strong>s al<strong>on</strong>g the coast.<br />
36<br />
Since China’s Type 094 has yet to enter service, we do not know whether or not<br />
Chinese SSBNs have permissive acti<strong>on</strong> link (PAL)-like launch c<strong>on</strong>trol mechanisms. 37<br />
According to Peter Feaver, nuclear command and c<strong>on</strong>trol systems need to balance two<br />
risks: the potential for unwanted use, and the potential for decapitati<strong>on</strong>.<br />
38<br />
In U.S.<br />
experience, PALs were not incorporated into the nuclear weap<strong>on</strong>s carried by SSBNs<br />
until 1990s.<br />
39<br />
Given China’s weak capabilities to maintain communicati<strong>on</strong>s to<br />
submarines, it is likely that PALs will not be incorporated into the nuclear weap<strong>on</strong>s <strong>on</strong><br />
Chinese SSBNs. If so, under the c<strong>on</strong>diti<strong>on</strong> of communicati<strong>on</strong> with nati<strong>on</strong>al command<br />
authority interrupted, the captain of the SSBN would have full c<strong>on</strong>trol of the nuclear<br />
weap<strong>on</strong>s <strong>on</strong> board.<br />
Distant blockade.<br />
40<br />
Offshore C<strong>on</strong>trol strategy.<br />
41<br />
war-at-sea strategy (sea denial<br />
within the first island chain and distant blockade)<br />
42<br />
Maritime intercepti<strong>on</strong> operati<strong>on</strong>s,<br />
interdicti<strong>on</strong> operati<strong>on</strong>s.<br />
Sea denial scenario has higher intensity than distant blockade. China’s ASBM<br />
would expel U.S. aircraft carrier out of its range. U.S. anti-submarine warfare (ASW)<br />
operati<strong>on</strong>s against China’s submarines. Attack China’s VLF transmitters.<br />
Compared to sea denial scenario, sea c<strong>on</strong>trol scenario requires the United States<br />
to neutralize the ASBM threat, and sink Chinese submarines as so<strong>on</strong> as possible.<br />
There would be inadvertent escalatory risk in both sea denial and sea c<strong>on</strong>trol<br />
scenarios. China SSBN/SSN<br />
If all Chinese VLF transmitters, including the two inland <strong>on</strong>es, are destroyed,<br />
there is a possibility in both sea denial and sea c<strong>on</strong>trol scenarios that Chinese SSBNs,<br />
without communicati<strong>on</strong>s with the nati<strong>on</strong>al command authority, launch their SLBMs.<br />
<br />
3.3 Integrated major war<br />
Integrated major war represents the highest level of <str<strong>on</strong>g>Sino</str<strong>on</strong>g>-U.S. c<strong>on</strong>venti<strong>on</strong>al war,<br />
! 36<br />
! 37 D<strong>on</strong>ald R. Cotter, “Peacetime Operati<strong>on</strong>s: Safety and Security,” in Asht<strong>on</strong> B. Carter, John D. Steinbruner, and<br />
Charles A. Zraket eds., Managing Nuclear Operati<strong>on</strong>s (Washingt<strong>on</strong> D.C.: The Brookings Instituti<strong>on</strong>, 1987), pp.<br />
17-74.<br />
! 38 Peter D. Feaver, “Command and C<strong>on</strong>trol in Emerging Nuclear Nati<strong>on</strong>s,” Internati<strong>on</strong>al Security, Vol. 17, No. 3<br />
(Winter, 1992-1993), pp. 160-187.<br />
! 39 G. E. Miller, "Who Needs PALs?" Proceedings of the U.S. Naval Institute, July 1988, pp. 50-56. Nathan<br />
Edward Busch, “Assessing the Optimism-Pessimism Debate: Nuclear Proliferati<strong>on</strong>, Nuclear Risks, and Theories<br />
of State Acti<strong>on</strong>,” Ph.D. Dissertati<strong>on</strong>, University of Tor<strong>on</strong>to, 2001, pp. 47-48.<br />
! 40 Sean Mirski, “Stranglehold: The C<strong>on</strong>text, C<strong>on</strong>duct and C<strong>on</strong>sequences of an American Naval Blockade of<br />
China,” Journal of <strong>Strategic</strong> Studies, Vol. 36, No. 3 (2013), pp. 385–421.<br />
Evan Braden M<strong>on</strong>tgomery, “Rec<strong>on</strong>sidering a Naval Blockade of China: A Resp<strong>on</strong>se to Mirski,” Journal of<br />
<strong>Strategic</strong> Studies, Vol. 36, No. 4 (2013), pp.<br />
! 41 T.X. Hammes, “Offshore C<strong>on</strong>trol: A Proposed Strategy for an Unlikely C<strong>on</strong>flict,” <strong>Strategic</strong> Forum, No. 278,<br />
June 2012.<br />
! Jeffrey E. Kline and Wayne P. Hughes Jr., “Between Peace and the Air-Sea Battle: A War at Sea Strategy,”<br />
42<br />
Naval War College Review, Vol. 65, No. 4 (Autumn 2012), pp. 35-40.<br />
! 11
in which both sides use all kinds of forces except nuclear weap<strong>on</strong>s and fight in all<br />
domains (land, sea, air, space, cyberspace). China will take full advantage of its A2/<br />
AD capabilities (in Chinese shashoujian, Assassin’s Mace), against the United States,<br />
and the United States will also full advantage of its ASB c<strong>on</strong>cept against China. We<br />
will discuss the ASB c<strong>on</strong>cept first.<br />
The ASB c<strong>on</strong>cept is designed to counter the A2/AD threats from peer (China) or<br />
near-peer (Iran) competitors.<br />
43<br />
The central idea of ASB is “to develop networked,<br />
integrated forces capable of attack-in-depth to disrupt, destroy and defeat adversary<br />
forces.”<br />
44<br />
The details of this c<strong>on</strong>cept have yet to be released, but the Center for<br />
<strong>Strategic</strong> and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA), the think tank that plays an important<br />
role in developing the ASB c<strong>on</strong>cept, provides some insights into this c<strong>on</strong>cept. The<br />
CSBA-versi<strong>on</strong> ASB campaign calls for blinding campaign, missile suppressi<strong>on</strong><br />
campaign, and ASW campaign. The blinding campaign includes: attacking Chinese<br />
ISR systems used to target naval mobile assets; attacking space situati<strong>on</strong>al awareness<br />
and counter-space capabilities; severing communicati<strong>on</strong> links and precisi<strong>on</strong> nodal<br />
attack; and disrupting airborne ISR sensors. The missile suppressi<strong>on</strong> campaign<br />
includes seeking and hunting mobile missile launchers and striking missile producti<strong>on</strong><br />
and storage targets. The ASW campaign includes c<strong>on</strong>tinued ASW operati<strong>on</strong>s inside<br />
and maintaining ASW barrier al<strong>on</strong>g the first island chain.<br />
45<br />
Some elements of the<br />
ASB c<strong>on</strong>cept have already been discussed in the missile campaign and naval warfare<br />
secti<strong>on</strong>s.<br />
Obviously, the integrated major war scenario carries all escalatory risks that<br />
associated with the missile campaign/large-scale missile war and naval warfare/sea<br />
c<strong>on</strong>trol scenarios.<br />
In discussing missile campaign, it is assumed that some sort of communicati<strong>on</strong><br />
links be maintained between the Sec<strong>on</strong>d Artillery units and the nati<strong>on</strong>al command<br />
authority, which is not good enough for organizing optimal c<strong>on</strong>venti<strong>on</strong>al salvos, but is<br />
good enough for sending the final order of nuclear retaliati<strong>on</strong>, so-called “emergency<br />
acti<strong>on</strong> message” in American literature. In the scenario of integrated major war, this<br />
assumpti<strong>on</strong> is challenged. Given the high intensity of the c<strong>on</strong>flict and possible U.S.<br />
operati<strong>on</strong>s presented in last paragraph, there is a possibility that China’s nuclear<br />
missile units lost communicati<strong>on</strong> links with political leaders. If so, this situati<strong>on</strong><br />
carries high escalatory risks. In order to understand that, we need to discuss China’s<br />
strategic communicati<strong>on</strong> network and the Sec<strong>on</strong>d Artillery’s command and c<strong>on</strong>trol<br />
system.<br />
China’s strategic communicati<strong>on</strong> network. Underground communicati<strong>on</strong> system.<br />
! 43 Kyle D. Christensen, “<strong>Strategic</strong> Developments In The Western Pacific: Anti-Access/Area Denial And The<br />
Airsea Battle C<strong>on</strong>cept,” Journal of Military and <strong>Strategic</strong> Studies, Vol. 14, No. 3, 2013, pp. 1-24. Greg Jaffe,<br />
“U.S. model for a future war fans tensi<strong>on</strong>s with China and inside Pentag<strong>on</strong>,” Washingt<strong>on</strong> Post, August 1, 2012,<br />
http://articles.washingt<strong>on</strong>post.com/2012-08-01/world/35492126_1_china-tensi<strong>on</strong>s-china-threat-pentag<strong>on</strong>.<br />
! 44 U.S. Air-Sea Battle Office, Air-Sea Battle: Service Collaborati<strong>on</strong> to Address Anti-Access & Area Denial<br />
Challenges, May 2013, p. 4.<br />
! 45 Jan van Tol, Mark Gunzinger, Andrew Krepinevich, Jim Thomas, “AirSea Battle,” Center for <strong>Strategic</strong> and<br />
Budgetary Assessments, May 18, 2010. Jan van Tol, Mark Gunzinger, Andrew Krepinevich, and Jim Thomas,<br />
AirSea Battle: A Point-of-Departure Operati<strong>on</strong>al C<strong>on</strong>cept (Washingt<strong>on</strong> D.C.: Center for <strong>Strategic</strong> and Budgetary<br />
Assessments, 2010).<br />
! 12
China reportedly lacked PALs in 1987.<br />
46<br />
In this secti<strong>on</strong>, we discussed the escalatory risk of three scenarios (seven subscenarios).<br />
Table 1 presents a summary of the result. It can be seen that <strong>on</strong>ly two<br />
scenarios have no escalatory risk: 1995/1996-like scenario and distant blockade. All<br />
other scenarios carry risk of inadvertent escalati<strong>on</strong>. Questi<strong>on</strong> naturally arises: how to<br />
avoid <str<strong>on</strong>g>Sino</str<strong>on</strong>g>-U.S. escalati<strong>on</strong>? We will try to answer this questi<strong>on</strong> in the nest secti<strong>on</strong>.<br />
Table 1 Escalatory risk of different scenarios<br />
Scenarios Descripti<strong>on</strong> Escalatory risk<br />
Missile campaign 1995/1996-like scenario No<br />
Limited missile campaign<br />
Large-scale missile war<br />
Yes<br />
Yes<br />
Naval warfare Distant blockade No<br />
Sea denial<br />
Sea c<strong>on</strong>trol<br />
Yes<br />
Yes<br />
Major war<br />
<br />
4 How to avoid <str<strong>on</strong>g>Sino</str<strong>on</strong>g>-U.S. nuclear escalati<strong>on</strong>?<br />
After analyzing the mechanisms of <str<strong>on</strong>g>Sino</str<strong>on</strong>g>-U.S. nuclear escalati<strong>on</strong> and discussing<br />
the escalatory risk of several scenarios, in this secti<strong>on</strong>, we will present some policy<br />
recommendati<strong>on</strong>s for avoiding <str<strong>on</strong>g>Sino</str<strong>on</strong>g>-U.S. nuclear escalati<strong>on</strong>.<br />
<br />
4.1 C<strong>on</strong>fidence-Building Measures (CBMs)<br />
To decrease <str<strong>on</strong>g>Sino</str<strong>on</strong>g>-U.S. inadvertent escalati<strong>on</strong> risk requires reducing the overlap<br />
of China’s c<strong>on</strong>venti<strong>on</strong>al and nuclear weap<strong>on</strong>s.<br />
missiles: identifying characters.<br />
Demolishing medium-range nuclear ballistic missiles (nuclear DF-21s).<br />
Sea: ASW-free z<strong>on</strong>e. Maybe Yellow Sea?<br />
the United States needs to limit its CPGS programs.<br />
small arsenal of CPGS, and transparency. <strong>Strategic</strong> dialogue.<br />
<br />
4.2 Accept mutual vulnerability with China<br />
A key questi<strong>on</strong> of <str<strong>on</strong>g>Sino</str<strong>on</strong>g>-U.S. strategic stability is: will or should the United States<br />
accept mutual but unequal vulnerability with China? To this questi<strong>on</strong>, there are two<br />
Yes<br />
! 46 Dan Caldwell, “Permissive Acti<strong>on</strong> Links: A Descripti<strong>on</strong> and Proposal,” Survival, Vol. 29, No. 3 (May/June<br />
1987), p. 231. Steve Coll and David Ottaway, “Will the United States, Russia and China be Nuclear Partners or<br />
Rivals in the 21st Century?” Washingt<strong>on</strong> Post, April 11, 1995, p. A01. Steve Coll, “The Man Inside China’s Bomb<br />
Labs: U.S. Blocks Memoir of Scientist Who Gathered Trove of Informati<strong>on</strong>,” Washingt<strong>on</strong> Post, May 16, 2001, p.<br />
A01.<br />
! 13
points of view am<strong>on</strong>g U.S. experts.<br />
47<br />
The first is that mutual vulnerability with China<br />
is unacceptable and avoidable, and the United States can and should exploit its<br />
commanding technical lead over China to neutralize China’s nuclear deterrent<br />
capability.<br />
48<br />
“Washingt<strong>on</strong> should also make clear that it will not accept a mutual<br />
vulnerability relati<strong>on</strong>ship with China.”<br />
49<br />
The sec<strong>on</strong>d is that “mutual vulnerability is a<br />
fact, not a choice,”<br />
50<br />
and the United States should “acknowledge mutual vulnerability<br />
as a fact of life.”<br />
51<br />
U.S. 2010 Nuclear Posture Review stated that the United States<br />
would maintain strategic stability with China.<br />
52<br />
But Obama administrati<strong>on</strong> can <strong>on</strong>ly<br />
accept an ambiguous “strategic stability,” rather than a clear “mutual vulnerability”<br />
with China.<br />
53<br />
It is important to give China c<strong>on</strong>fidence <strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Sino</str<strong>on</strong>g>-U.S. strategic stability because<br />
the higher China’s c<strong>on</strong>fidence, the lower Chinese leaders’ use-it-or-lose-it pressure,<br />
and the lower inadvertent escalati<strong>on</strong> risk. China and the United States should reach a<br />
comm<strong>on</strong> understanding <strong>on</strong> strategic offensive and defensive weap<strong>on</strong>s. A possible<br />
soluti<strong>on</strong> is that the United States limits its missile defense, which could counter<br />
simple North Korean interc<strong>on</strong>tinental ballistic missiles, if any, without threatening<br />
China’s advanced strategic missiles, in return for China’s promise to not expand its<br />
nuclear arsenal.<br />
54<br />
<br />
4.3 Pursuing modest strategic objectives<br />
It can be seen from our analysis that the higher both sides’ strategic objectives,<br />
the higher escalatory risk. So it is very important for both sides, especially the United<br />
States, to pursue modest purposes. In 1995/1996 Taiwan crisis, the United States sent<br />
two aircraft carriers to west Pacific, and China had no means to counter that threat.<br />
After that, China began to develop so-called A2/AD weap<strong>on</strong>s. Current reality is that<br />
neither China nor the United States can achieve sea c<strong>on</strong>trol within the first island<br />
chain, and at the same time, both sides have the capability to denial the other side’s<br />
! 47 Brad Roberts, “China-U.S. Nuclear Relati<strong>on</strong>s: What Relati<strong>on</strong>ship Best Serves U.S. Interests?” IDA Document<br />
P-3640, Institute for Defense Analyses, August 2001, p. 2.<br />
! 48 L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., “China-U.S. <strong>Strategic</strong> <strong>Stability</strong>,” presentati<strong>on</strong> prepared for the Carnegie Endowment for<br />
Internati<strong>on</strong>al Peace c<strong>on</strong>ference, April 2009.<br />
! 49 Internati<strong>on</strong>al Security Advisory Board to Secretary of State, “China's <strong>Strategic</strong> Modernizati<strong>on</strong>: Report from the<br />
ISAB Task Force,” 2008, http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/china/2008/china-081001-isab01.htm.<br />
! 50 James M. Act<strong>on</strong>, “Managing Vulnerability,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 89, No. 2 (2010), pp. 145-153.<br />
! 51 Lint<strong>on</strong> Brooks, “The <str<strong>on</strong>g>Sino</str<strong>on</strong>g>-American Nuclear Balance: Its future and implicati<strong>on</strong>s,” in Abraham Denmark and<br />
Nirav Patel eds., China’s Arrival: A <strong>Strategic</strong> Framework for a Global Relati<strong>on</strong>ship (Washingt<strong>on</strong>, DC: Center for a<br />
New American Security, 2009), pp. 60-76.<br />
! 52 U.S. Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review Report, April 2010, pp. 28-29.<br />
! 53 Jeffrey Lewis, “Challenges for U.S.-China <strong>Strategic</strong> <strong>Stability</strong> in the Obama Administrati<strong>on</strong>,” in Catherine<br />
McArdle Kelleher, Judith Reppy eds., Getting to Zero: The Path to Nuclear Disarmament (Stanford University<br />
Press, 2011), pp. 149-163.<br />
! 54 <str<strong>on</strong>g>Wu</str<strong>on</strong>g> Riqiang, “Why should China be c<strong>on</strong>cerned with U.S. missile defense? And how to address it?” Survival,<br />
forthcoming.<br />
! 14
use of sea within the first island chain. The United States has to face and accept the<br />
reality. It could do otherwise, but it would be very difficult, expensive, and<br />
dangerous.<br />
Pursuing modest strategic objective is a natural result of accepting mutual<br />
vulnerability with China.<br />
U.S. military argues that Air-Sea Battle (ASB) is not a strategy, not a war plan, is<br />
just an operati<strong>on</strong>al c<strong>on</strong>cept designed to improve Navy and Air Force interoperability.<br />
But critics argue that ASB has become a “strategy of tactics.”<br />
55<br />
“The ASB C<strong>on</strong>cept<br />
seeks to ensure freedom of acti<strong>on</strong> in the global comm<strong>on</strong>s.”<br />
56<br />
seeking a decisive<br />
victory against China.<br />
Alternative: maritime denial<br />
57<br />
Offshore c<strong>on</strong>trol<br />
58<br />
War-at-sea strategy<br />
59<br />
The same logic applies to China.<br />
<br />
4.4 Declaratory policy<br />
NFU helps.<br />
China c<strong>on</strong>siders c<strong>on</strong>venti<strong>on</strong>al attacks <strong>on</strong> nuclear weap<strong>on</strong>s or nuclear facilities as<br />
nuclear attacks.<br />
<br />
4.5 Avoid <str<strong>on</strong>g>Sino</str<strong>on</strong>g>-U.S. c<strong>on</strong>flict<br />
Undoubtedly, the best way to avoid <str<strong>on</strong>g>Sino</str<strong>on</strong>g>-U.S. nuclear escalati<strong>on</strong> is to avoid<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Sino</str<strong>on</strong>g>-U.S. c<strong>on</strong>venti<strong>on</strong>al c<strong>on</strong>flict. 60<br />
China is rising as a regi<strong>on</strong>al, rather than global, power. 61<br />
U.S. c<strong>on</strong>strains its allies’ provocative acti<strong>on</strong>s. Hujiahuwei (the fox assuming the<br />
majesty of the tiger)<br />
China’s assertiveness.<br />
62<br />
! 55 J. Noel Williams, “Air-Sea Battle: An operati<strong>on</strong>al c<strong>on</strong>cept looking for a strategy,” Armed Forces Journal,<br />
September 2011, http://armedforcesjournal.com/2011/09/7558138/.<br />
! 56 U.S. Air-Sea Battle Office, Air-Sea Battle: Service Collaborati<strong>on</strong> to Address Anti-Access & Area Denial<br />
Challenges, May 2013, p. 4.<br />
! 57 Raoul Heinrichs, “America’s Dangerous Battle Plan,” The Diplomat, August 17, 2011, http://thediplomat.com/<br />
2011/08/17/america’s-dangerous-battle-plan/.<br />
! 58 T.X. Hammes, “Offshore C<strong>on</strong>trol: A Proposed Strategy for an Unlikely C<strong>on</strong>flict,” <strong>Strategic</strong> Forum, No. 278,<br />
June 2012.<br />
! 59 Jeffrey E. Kline and Wayne P. Hughes Jr., “Between Peace and the Air-Sea Battle: A War at Sea Strategy,”<br />
Naval War College Review, Vol. 65, No. 4 (Autumn 2012), pp. 35-40.<br />
! 60 B<strong>on</strong>nie S. Glaser, “Armed Clash in the South China Sea,” C<strong>on</strong>tingency Planning Memorandum No. 14, Council<br />
<strong>on</strong> Foreign Relati<strong>on</strong>s, April 2012.<br />
! 61 Amitai Etzi<strong>on</strong>i, “Who Authorized Preparati<strong>on</strong>s for War with China?” Yale Journal of Internati<strong>on</strong>al Affairs,<br />
(Summer 2013), pp. 37-51. Amitai Etzi<strong>on</strong>i, “Accommodating China,” Survival, Vol. 55, No. 2, (April/May 2013),<br />
pp. 45-60.<br />
! 62 Alastair Iain Johnst<strong>on</strong>, “How New and Assertive Is China’s New Assertiveness?” Internati<strong>on</strong>al Security, Vol.<br />
37, No. 4 (Spring 2013), pp. 7-48.<br />
! 15