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Computability and Logic

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22<br />

Second-Order <strong>Logic</strong><br />

Suppose that, in addition to allowing quantifications over the elements of a domain,<br />

as in ordinary first-order logic, we allow also quantification over relations <strong>and</strong> functions<br />

on the domain. The result is called second-order logic. Almost all the major theorems<br />

we have established for first-order logic fail spectacularly for second-order logic, as<br />

is shown in the present short chapter. This chapter <strong>and</strong> those to follow generally<br />

presuppose the material in section 17.1. (They are also generally independent of each<br />

other, <strong>and</strong> the results of the present chapter will not be presupposed by later ones.)<br />

Let us begin by recalling some of the major results we have established for first-order<br />

logic.<br />

The compactness theorem: If every finite subset of a set of sentences has a model,<br />

the whole set has a model.<br />

The (downward) Löwenheim–Skolem theorem: If a set of sentences has a model,<br />

it has an enumerable model.<br />

The upward Löwenheim–Skolem theorem: If a set of sentences has an infinite<br />

model, it has a nonenumerable model.<br />

The (abstract) Gödel completeness theorem: The set of valid sentences is semirecursive.<br />

All of these results fail for second-order logic, which involves an extended notion<br />

of sentence, with a corresponding extension of the notion of truth of a sentence in<br />

an interpretation. In introducing these extended notions, we stress at the outset that<br />

we change neither the definition of language nor the definition of interpretation:<br />

a language is still an enumerable set of nonlogical symbols, <strong>and</strong> an interpretation<br />

of a language is still a domain together with an assignment of a denotation to each<br />

nonlogical symbol in the language. The only changes will be that we add some new<br />

clauses to the definition of what it is to be a sentence of a language, <strong>and</strong> correspondingly<br />

some new clauses to the definition of what it is for a sentence of a language to<br />

be true in an interpretation.<br />

What is a second-order sentence? Let us refer to what we have been calling ‘variables’<br />

as individual variables. We now introduce some new kinds of variable: relation<br />

variables <strong>and</strong> function variables. Just as we have one-, two-, three-, <strong>and</strong> more-place<br />

predicates or relation symbols <strong>and</strong> function symbols, we have one-, two-, three-, <strong>and</strong><br />

more-place relation variables <strong>and</strong> function variables. (Since one-place relations are<br />

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