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Ξ : Ramsey , , : , , , , , , , : Ramsey , , ( 100029) ; , 1 1960 1980 2000 GDP , , , , , ? , Acemoglu , , , , , , 94 Ξ , , , , Daron Acemoglu , I nt roduction to Modern Economic Grow th , Princeton NJ : Princeton University Press , 2008 , p . 155. © 1994-2010 China Academic Journal Electronic Publishing House. All rights reserved. http://www.cnki.net

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: Ramsey ,

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: Ramsey

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1 1960 1980 2000

GDP ,

, ,

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, ,

,

94

Ξ ,

, ,

,

Daron Acemoglu , I nt roduction to Modern Economic Grow th , Princeton NJ : Princeton University Press ,

2008 , p . 155.

1 GDP

: ( Kernet Estimation)

: Daron Acemoglu , I nt roduction to Modern Economic Growth , p . 4 ; A. Heston , Robert Summers and Bettina

Aten , Penn W orl d Tables V ersion 611 , Center for International Comparisons , University of Pennsylvania , 2004.

Acemoglu , ,

Acemoglu ,

Acemoglu , ,

, ,

,

, ,

,

, ,

Daron Acemoglu , I nt roduction to Modern Economic Grow th , p . 157.

Daron Acemoglu , Simon Johnson and James Robinson , The Colonial Origins of Comparative

Development : An Empirical Investigation ," A merican Economic Review , vol. 91 , no. 5 , 2001 , pp. 13692

1401 ; Daron Acemoglu , Simon Johnson and James Robinson , Reversal of Fortune : Geography and

Institutions in the Making of the Modern World Income Distribution ," Quarterl y J ournal of Economics ,

vol. 117 , no. 4 , 2002 , pp. 123121294 ; Daron Acemoglu , Simon Johnson and James Robinson ,

Institutions as a Fundamental Cause of Long2run Growth ," in P. Aghion and S. Durlauf , eds. ,

H andbook of Economic Grow th , Amsterdam : North Holland , 2005 , pp . 3842473.

:: , : , 1994 , 28

29 ; J ustin Yifu Lin , Development Strategy , Viability , and Economic Convergence ,"

95

Economic

Development and Cultural Change , vol. 51 , no. 2 , 2003 , pp . 2772308 ; J ustin Yifu Lin , Development

and Transition : Idea , Strategy and Viability ," Working Paper Series , No. E 2007007 , China Center for

Economic Research , Peking University , 2007 , pp. 18225.

2010 3

Ramsey ,

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:: ,2008 4 ;

M. Daniel Westbrook and James Tybout , Estimating Returns to Scale with Large Imperfect Panels : An

96

: , 2008 8 ; Robert Baldwin , The Case against Infant2

industry Tariff Protection ," J ournal of Political Economy , vol. 77 , no. 3 , 1969 , pp. 2952305 ; Barbara

Spencer and James Brander , International R &D Rivalry and Industrial Strategy ," Review of Economic

S tudies , vol. 50 , no. 4 , 1983 , pp. 7072722 ; James Brander and Barbara Spencer , Export Subsidies and

International Market Share Rivalry ," J ournal of I nternational Economics , vol. 18 , 1985 , pp . 832100.

Application to Chilean Manufacturing Industries ," The W orl d B ank Economic Review , vol. 7 , no. 1 ,

1993 , pp. 852112 ; Richard Beason and David Weistein , Growth , Economies of Scale , and Targeting in

Japan (195521990) ," Review of Economics and S tatistics , vol. 78 , no. 2 , 1996 , pp . 2862295.

,

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: , Ramsey ,

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()

,

, ;

, :

yi

= Ai k i

i l 1 - i

i (i = 1 ,2) (1)

, , 1 < 2

, ,

y1 , y2

, ( TFP) ,

, (1) li i , ki i

, :

l1 + l2 = 1 (2)

k1 + k2 = k (3)

, k

, ,

:

Kenneth J udd , Redistributive Taxation in a Simple Perfect Foresight Model ," J ournal of Public

Economics , vol. 28 , 1985 , pp . 59283 ; Christophe Chamley , Optimal Taxation of Capital Income in

General Equilibrium with Infinite Lives ," Economet rica , vol. 54 , no. 3 , 1986 , pp. 6072622 ; Isabel

Correia , Should Capital Income Be Taxed in the Steady State ?" J ournal of Public Economics , vol. 60 ,

1996 , pp. 1472151.

Daron Acemoglu , Michael Golosov and Aleh Tsyvinski , Dynamic Mirrlees Taxation under Political

Economy Constraints ," Review of Economic S tudies , forthcoming ; Daron Acemoglu , Michael Golosov

and Aleh Tsyvinski , Political Econom y of Ramsey Tax ation , mimeo , 2009.

97

2010 3

y = y

1 y 1 -

2 (4)

:

c 1 -

0 1 - e

- t dt (5)

: c ; > 0 , ; 0 < 1 ,

:

c + gk = w + rk + (6)

(6) , w rk ;

, c gk , 0 ,

,

y = w + rk +, , c + gk = y

, , :

gc c

= 1 (r -

) (7)

U [ u (c) ,v (y2 ) ] , u (c) , v (y2 )

y2 ,

,

, ,

, U (u ,v) , U (u ,v) ,

; , :

U 1 > 0 ,U 2 > 0 ,U 12 = U 21 0 ,v> 0 (8)

U 1 > 0 ,

; U 2 > 0 v> 0

, ; U 12 = U 21 0

, ,

, :

1

u (c)

- v (y2 ) e - t dt (9)

0

,> 0 , , 0 1 ,

, ,

, , ,

, ,

, ,

, , , ,

98

, ,

,

; ,

, 1 , ,

; , 0 , ,

()

, ,

, ,

,

, : ,

, ,

(1 - ) 1p1 A1 k 1

1 - 1

l 1 - 1

1 (1 + ) 2p 2 A2 k 2 - 1

, , :

(1 - ) 1p 1 A1 k 1 - 1

1 = (1 + )

1 l 1 - 1

: pi i

2p2 A2 k 2

2 - 1

l 1 - 2

2 l 1 - 2

2 (10)

2 ,

, ,

, :

:

1p1 A1 k 1

1 =

1 l 1 - 1

2p2 A2 k 2

2 l 1 - 2

2 (11)

y 1 , (4) ,

p 1

= y

y1

p2

=

(1 - ) y

y2

(10) (11) (12) k = k1 + k2 ,

:

k1

= 1 - 2 (1 - )

k k2

(12)

= 2 (1 - ) (1 + )

k (13)

, = 1 + 2 (1 - ) , , 0

2010 3

:

y = Bf ( ) k (15)

, 0

Ramsey Ljungqvist Sargent ,

Ramsey

1 : (k ,c) (p 1 ,

p2 ,r ,w) (, ) ,

, (p 1 ,p2 ,r ,w) (, ) , ,

(k ,c)

, (k ,c) (p1 ,p 2 ,r ,w) , (, )

(11)

2 : k0 , Ramsey , (9)

(p1 ,p2 ,r ,w) (12) (18) ,

(k ,c) , (10) (11)

, Ramsey ,

,

Ramsey

, (9) ,

:

U (u ,v) =

u (c)

1 - y

2 (19)

, u (c) y2 (19) , :

max

Ac

0

(1 - ) (1 -

, A , :

A = A 2 2 (1 - )

2

(1 - ) 1 -

)

(1 + ) 2 k 2 e - t dt (20)

2 l (1 - 2 )

2

, ,

:

H = Ac

:

(1 - ) (1 -

5 H

5 = 2Ac

:

g= +

g= + Bk - 2

) (1 + ) 2 k 2 + c Bf (

) k- 1 - +Bf ( ) k - c (21)

(1 - ) (1 -

) (1 + ) 2 - 1 k 2 + ( c +k) Bf

( ) k- 1 = 0 (22)

(1 - ) (1 - ) (1 + ) ( c +k) Bf

2 c ( ) k- 1 - gc c

( c

+k)

+ (23)

(1 + ) f ( ) - f ( ) + c

f ( ) (24)

(22) k c , (k ,c , )

(6) (7) (23) (24) 2

2 : k , c , :

w ,

101

2010 3

k 3 = Bf (3 )

3 =

1/ (1 - )

, c 3 = (

)

/ (1 -

) Bf ( 3 )

1 (1 - )

(1 - ) 2 (1 - ) +(1 - ) (1 - ) (1 - )

1/ (1 - )

,

: , :

Bf ( ) k - 1 | 3 =

(23) (24) , :

g= (1

+

- ) (1 - ) (1 + ) f ( )

(1 - ) (1 - ) (1 +

+1 + ) f ( )

2 f ( )

g= (1 + ) f ( )

(1

+ 1 - +

+ )

f (

f ( )

)

f ( )

, gg0 , (26) (27) , :

(1 +

) f ( ) = -

f ( )

(17) , :

2 (1 - )

(1 - ) 2 + (1 - ) (1 - )

(1 +

) f ( ) 2 (1 - )

= -

f ( )

1 - 2 (1 - )

, , 3 ,

2 ,

1 : , 3 , :

lim ()

= 0 lim ()

1 (1 - )

0

1

=

2 (1 - ) (1 - )

2 : , 3

(25) ,

2 1 2

,

, 2 1 2 , , ,

() ,

,

2 (25) , ,

,

; , , ;

,

(25)

(26)

(27)

(28)

(29)

Ramsey

, , ,

, ,

102

,

, , ,

, , ,

Ramsey ,

, Ramsey

, (19)

, :

c ,k 2

,l 2

A

2

0

max

(1 - ) 1 - c

(1 - ) (1 - ) k 2

2 l 2

2 k 2 e - t dt (30)

(20) , ,

,

, ,

, (2) (3) (6) ,

:

H =

+ ;

A

2

(1 - ) 1 - c

(1 - ) (1 - ) k 2

2 l (1 - 2 )

2 k 2

A

1 A 1 2 - (1 - k2 ) 1 (1 - l2 ) (1 - 1 ) k 2

, ; , 1 + 2 (1 - )

(31) :

5 H

5 c

5 H

5 k2

5 H

5 l2

:

;

(1 - ) (1 - ) A 2

=

(1 - ) 1 - c

= 2A

2

(1 - ) 1 - c

= 2A

2

(1 - ) 1 - c

(1 -

2 )

l (1 - 2

(1 - ) (1 - ) - 1 k 2

2 l (1 - 2 )

(1 - ) (1 - ) k 2

2 - 1

l (1 - 2 )

(1 - ) (1 - ) k 2 (1 -

2 l

2 )- 1

2 k 2 - ; y

= - A

1 A 1 2 - (1 - k2 ) 1 (1 - l2 ) (1 - 1 ) k 2

, ,

) (1 -

2 )

k - c (31)

2 k 2 - ; (32)

(1 -

2 )

l (1 - 2

1

- 1 (1 - )

1 - k2 k2

(1 - 1 )

-

1 - l2

(1 - 2 ) (1 - )

l2

(33)

(34)

) (1 -

2 )

k - 1 (35)

(32) (35) ,

,

(32) (33) (34) , 0 , :

2

(1 - ) (1 - ) c y

(1 - 2 )

(1 - ) (1 - ) c y

k2 - 2 (1 - )

=

1 - k2

(1 - ) l2 - (1 - 2 ) (1 - )

=

1 - l2

(36)

(37)

103

2010 3

, 0 , , c

y, :

k 2

3 = 2 / (1 - ) (1 - ) + 2 (1 - )

(38)

2 / (1 - ) (1 - ) +

l 2 3

= 2 / (1 - ) (1 - ) + (1 - 2 ) (1 - )

(39)

2 / (1 - ) (1 - ) + 1 -

, 3

3 : , Ramsey ;

, Ramsey ,

, , ,

Ramsey , , , Ramsey

: Ramsey ,

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,

, 3 , ,

Ramsey , ,

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3 ,

3 : Ramsey , ,

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, , Ramsey ,

, ,

4 : = 0 , Ramsey Ramsey

: = 0 , (25) = 0 ,

k c , = 0 , k c

Ramsey

= 0 = 0 (13) (14) (38) (39) , ,

Ramsey ,

, = 0 , Ramsey Ramsey

4 , Ramsey ,

Ramsey

, 3

104

, Ramsey ,

, = , =

, ,

:

, z , z =

c/+k gz k c

gz = c

( g

+ gc c

) +k (

g

+ gk k ) (40)

k c (40) , :

gz z

= + Af ( ) (1 k- 1 - ) (1 - ) + 2 (1 +

) f ( ) + 1 - + c

2

f ( )

z ( - 1)

, =, z c k z , k c

c k z ,

(41)

1 (= )

c 3 k 3 y 3 2 3

0 11 3735 715540 11 2208 0

01 05 11 3545 715049 11 3278 011454

01 25 11 2722 619973 11 5036 014875

01 50 11 1631 613972 11 5416 016907

01 75 11 0804 519416 11 5317 018021

01 95 11 0286 516574 11 5146 018606

1 11 0172 515943 11 5099 018725

=,

4 : =, , ,

3

5 : =, c , k z , c 3 k 3 z 3

c 3 k 3 z 3

, ,

1 = 0135 , 2 = 0165 , = 017 , = 0144 ; = 0108 , =

,

, ,

, 1 ,

,

105

2010 3

: , ,

, 1 2

2 (= )

3 (= )

, ,

Runge2Kutta , 010005 ,

(reverse shooting) , (c 3 ,k 3 ,z 3 )

, (c ,k ,z) (22)

, , ,

(0199999c 3 ,k 3 ,z 3 ) ,

2 3 =c ,

= 0125 = 0175 2 , c

, , , ,

3 , , 4

106

Kenneth J udd , N umerical Methods in Economics , Cambridge , Mass. : MIT Press , 1998 ; Mario Miranda

and Paul Fackler , A p plied Com putational Economics and Finance , Cambridge , Mass. : MIT Press ,

2002.

, ,

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, FDI

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The World Bank ,

The Grow th Report : S t rategies f or S ustained Grow th and I ncl usive Development , Washington DC ,

2008 , p . 48.

Dani Rodrik , Industrial Policies for the Twenty2First Century ," KSG Working Paper , No. RWP042047 ,

2004 ; The World Bank , The Grow th Report : S t rategies f or S ustained Grow th and I ncl usive

Development , p. 49.

, , :

, , 2004 21 ; :

,2004 12 27

107

2010 3

, , ,

,

, ,

,

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, ,

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, , Ramsey

, ,

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:

: , () 2 2 , 2003 ;

J ustin Yifu Lin , Development and Transition : Idea , Strategy and Viability ," pp . 61265.

: , ()

108

9 2 , 2010

2010 3

monopoly industries into justified and unjustified portions. The empirical analysis shows t hat

more t han 50 % of t he salary difference between employees in monopoly and competitive

industries cannot be explained and is mainly t he result of administrative monopoly. Due to t he

absence of the data on employee benefit s and subsidies , t he above estimate is based solely on an

analysis of base salaries , which would underestimate t he unexplained portion of the high income

of monopoly industry employees.

(7) Development Strategy and Economic Growth X u Zhaoy ang and J usti n Yi f u L i n 94

Based on t he model of endogenous industry structure , this paper construct s a Ramsey

problem model to examine t he impact of the governmentπs develop ment strategy on industry

struct ural upgrading and economic performance. Our research shows t hat industry struct ure is

endogenous to factor endowment structure and that it s upgrading proceeds in tandem wit h t he

latter. The fact t hat t he government is deviating from factor endowment struct ure and giving

priority to the develop ment of heavy industry will lead to resource misallocation and less efficient

economic develop ment . Therefore what is crucial to economic develop ment lies not in t he

upgrading of industrial struct ure , but that of factor endowment struct ure. Advisable industrial

policies , which should be agnostic about particular industries , may promote t he upgrading of

industrial structure , but their effectiveness remains subject to t he struct ure of factor

endowment s.

(8) Cyber Crime and Viable Solutions for Chinese Criminal La w Yu Zhi gan g 109

Internet2related variations of traditional crimes involve changes in their constit uent element s ,

harmf ulness to society and patterns of crime. Such crimes have multiple causes , but t heir direct

cause is t he intergenerational technological evolution of cyberspace. Expanded judicial

interpretation is t he first preference in dealing wit h cyber crime , but it has obvious limitations. In

t he face of t hese altered crimes , upgrading some act s of preparation and rendering t hem

independent as act s of perpetration along wit h treating some accomplices as principals are two

inevitable options for f uture criminal legislation.

(9) Deterrence Supplementation and Lenient Sentencing upon Compensation"

D ai X i n 127

Utilizing t he analytical f ramework provided by law and economicsπ theory of deterrence , and

in particular t he thought s on two basic justifications for t he necessity of criminal p unishment s (i.

e. the insolvency" problem and the inadequate deterrent " problem) , t his article discusses ,

f rom t he angle of systematic efficiency , t he feasibility , advantages as well as potential problems

of lenient sentencing upon compensation. " The aut hor argues t hat criminal p unishment and civil

liability for tort , despite the commonly emp hasized sectorial differences and boundaries between

p ublic law and private law , do share certain underlying rationale of efficiency. Recognition of

222

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