7 Feb - British Parachute Association

British Parachute Association
5 Wharf Way Tel: 0116 278 5271
Glen Parva Fax: 0116 247 7662
Leicester LE2 9TF e-mail: skydive@bpa.org.uk
www.bpa.org.uk
Safety & Training Committee
Minutes of the meeting held on
Thursday 7 February 2013 at 1900
at the BPA Office, 5 Wharf Way, Glen Parva, Leicester LE2 9TF
Present: John Hitchen - Chair STC
Phil Collett - 22 Tng Gp RAF
Paul Floyd - LSC
Pete Sizer - Skydive Headcorn
Noel Purcell - Target Skysports
Stuart Meacock - Hinton Skydiving
Mike Bolton - LPS
Paul Yeoman - Black Knights
Dave Wood - Cornish PC
Chris McCann - UK Parachuting (Sibson)
Brucie Johnson - Skydive London
Ian Rosenvinge - Peterlee
Jay Webster - JSPC(N)/APA
Gary Stevens - Skydive UK Ltd
Alex Busby-Hicks - Tilstock
Jeff Montgomery - Silver Stars
Richard Wheatley - BPS, Langar
Mike Rust - NLSC
Kieran Brady - Skydive Strathallan
Paul Applegate - Chair Riggers Committee
Apologies:
Dennis Buchanan, Bryn Chaffe, Andy Clark, Mal Richardson,
George McGuinness.
In Attendance: Tony Butler - Technical Officer
John Page - Vice Chair STC/Council
Trudy Kemp - Assistant to NCSO/TO
Observers:
Martin Harris, Paul Stockwell, Jay Hart, John Reid, Dave Major,
Anthony Fernyhough, Mark Bayada.
ITEM
MINUTE
1. MINUTES OF THE STC MEETING OF THE 22 NOVEMBER 2012
It was proposed by Mike Rust and seconded by Alex Busby-Hicks that the Minutes of the STC
Meeting of the 22 November 2012 be accepted as a true record.
Carried Unanimously
2. MATTERS ARISING FROM THE STC MEETING OF THE 22 NOVEMBER 2012
Page 3, Item 5, Incident Reports – resume. The Chair reported that the Panel of Inquiry
investigating the incident involving a student who jumped the incorrect equipment was a main
agenda item.
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Page 4, Item 5, Incident Reports – resume. The Chair reported that the incident where a
hook came undone from a Tandem Student harness had been deferred until this meeting
because it could not be established at the time the identity of the harness. He stated that this
was now known and the video of the jump had been received, though it was not possible to
tell from viewing the video footage exactly when the butterfly snap hook became detached
from the main harness. The harness concerned was available for inspection at the meeting.
As a result of this incident Mike Bolton had proposed that all Tandem Student harnesses be
equipped with securing pins as a mandatory requirement to prevent possibly a repeat incident
occurring in future. This proposal had also been deferred until this meeting.
Some discussion ensued. Most CCIs present felt that Mike’s proposal should not be a
mandatory requirement, but should be a decision for individual CCIs. They felt that if Tandem
Instructors carried out all the necessary checks prior to exit they saw no reason why anyone
should find themselves in freefall with a hook undone.
Although the Association did have an accepted modification for locking pins, some concern
had been expressed by the Riggers Committee with regard to drilling of holes into equipment
and the implications involved. They see this as more of an engineering task that needs to be
carried our properly and supervised by an Advanced Rigger.
Following further discussion, Mike Bolton’s proposal failed to find a seconder.
The Chair wished to remind all Tandem Instructors of their responsibility of conducting the
final checks of their equipment prior to exit, as per requirements accepted previously by STC.
Paul Applegate reported that Paratec have stated that they have no objection against the use
of the BPA accepted modification for locking pins on their equipment as an optional feature.
Page 5, Item 6, Proposed change to BPA Operations Manual. The Chair stated that STC
had decided that a Working Group be formed to look at the type of instructor that may be left
in charge of the parachuting operation when the CCI was not present, and also to look at the
various qualifications to attend instructor courses. The Chair reported that this WG had not yet
been formed, but would be in the near future.
Page 6, Item 9, Proposed New DZ/PLA. It was pointed out that the diameter of the DZ
quoted in the 4 th para should read 3 nautical miles and not 3km as stated.
3. RIGGERS’ SUB-COMMITTEE MEETING OF THE 22 NOVEMBER 2012
Paul Applegate stated that he had nothing to report from the previous Riggers Meeting.
There being no matters arising, it was proposed by Paul Applegate and seconded by Pete
Sizer that the Minutes of the Riggers’ Sub-Committee meeting of the 22 November 2012 be
accepted.
Carried Unanimously
Paul Applegate reported on the meeting held that afternoon and stated that the Committee
had discussed the Safety Bulletin issued by Airtec regarding Cypres 2 units manufactured
February 2009 through December 2012. To perform a mandatory system check before each
jump.
Paul Applegate reported that the Riggers Committee had agreed to adhere to the actions set
out in Airtec’s Bulletin. He stated that there had been some concerns expressed that the
action to be taken in this bulletin may not be acceptable, as having to carry out a pre-boarding
check did not give a great deal of confidence that the unit may be effective after that check. It
was also felt that the situation may be unmanageable as who was going to be responsible for
flight line checking on some units while others are OK. This situation could persist for up to 4
years.
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However, the Riggers Chair and TO had both spoken at great length to Helmut Cloth of Airtec
on this matter and he had assured them that the actions in their Safety Bulletin were the best
way forward and he was also able to answer any questions put to him.
It had been suggested that all jumpers should perhaps get into the habit of checking all
Cypres units on the flight line, as part of their standard/normal safety checks. CCIs were
urged to instigate a system at their Clubs for ensuring that these checks are carried out.
4. PILOTS’ SUB-COMMITTEE MEETING OF THE 26 JANUARY 2013
Kieran Brady reported that this meeting had been quite lengthy due to the time spent
discussing the Pilots Age Working Group (PAWG).
Kieran stated that during this discussion, a pilot had called for a vote of no confidence in
Kieran as Chair of Pilot’s Sub-Committee, as the pilot believed Kieran had not served the best
interest of pilots in relation to the PAWG. Kieran stated that he was supported by only three
other pilots of the twenty present. Jane Buckle-Hopkins had stated at the Pilots’ meeting that
she believed that the majority present had full confidence in the Chair.
Kieran stated that the person making this proposal was not even a full member of the BPA
and he found this to be personally insulting.
Kieran stated that he had been personally upset and disappointed, as the work that he had
carried out was on behalf of STC. He had been asked to Chair the PAWG and he went away
in all good faith with the other members, and he felt he had done the best he could. He stated
that he did not get involved in any of the arguments and electronic communications regarding
the PAWG and he had tried to remain neutral and impartial throughout.
Kieran voiced his concern at Ian Rosenvinge’s Resolution 2 at the AGM in that he believed it
was personally directed at him.
It was proposed by Kieran Brady and seconded by Stuart Meacock that the Minutes of the
Pilot’s Sub-Committee meeting of the 26 January 2013 be accepted.
Carried Unanimously
5. FATALITY - SIBSON
The Chair reported that at the last STC meeting the Committee had been informed that the
Board of Inquiry Report Resume was being put back until this meeting because the Panel of
Inquiry which was formed after the Board of Inquiry had found other evidence to suggest that
the Board’s conclusions may not be correct. The Board therefore asked the Panel to continue
with their investigations. The amended Board Report Resume had been circulated with the
agenda for this meeting.
At approximately 15.10 hours on Saturday 22 September 2012, Patrick David Sandeman
boarded a Cessna 208B aircraft along with sixteen other parachutists: This was the thirteenth
parachuting lift of the day and the eighth from that aircraft.
The aircraft climbed to approximately 15,000ft AGL. A ‘jump run’ was made over the PLA.
Once the aircraft was at the exit point, the parachutists exited in groups. The first group to exit
were a group of nine, including Matthieu Le Berre, the other parachutist involved in the
accident, who was intending to carry out an FF type of jump, which involved eight parachutists
flying around Matthieu who was holding a ‘tube’. The next group to exit was a 4-way group,
including Patrick, who were also carrying out an FF type jump, with three of them flying
around another ‘tube’, Patrick being one of the flyers. The remaining two 2-way FF groups
exited shortly after.
Patrick was 53 years of age. He had completed 678 jumps prior to the accident and was
jumping a Sabre 150 canopy. Matthieu is 28 years of age. He had completed 459 jumps prior
to the accident and was jumping a Katana 150 canopy.
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The free fall portion of the jumps for all groups appeared to go without incident. All
parachutists’ canopies were seen to deploy at the correct altitude (between 2-4,000ft AGL),
and all were observed to be flying correctly.
Towards the lower portion of the parachute descent, the deceased’s parachute and the
parachute of Matthieu Le Berre were observed to collide and become entangled, partially
collapsing both parachutes. This occurred at approximately 40-50ft AGL near the intended
landing area. Both parachutists were then observed to impact heavily with the ground.
A BPA Board of Inquiry was immediately instigated. The members of the Board were; John
Hitchen – National Coach & Safety Officer, Tony Butler – Technical Officer and John Page -
BPA Instructor Examiner.
Following their investigations the Board came to the following Conclusions:
‘That: (i) Patrick made an uneventful free fall descent; (ii) he and all the other parachutists
deployed their parachutes at an appropriate height; (iii) the majority of Patrick’s parachute
descent went without incident, until he had ‘set up’ ready for landing.
Matthieu also started to prepare for landing, having made a 90 degree riser turn behind and
higher than Patrick. However, Matthieu’s parachute being a higher performance parachute
and traveling at high speed, caught up with Patrick’s parachute, at which point the parachutes
collided. One or both of the parachutists may have attempted to steer away. However, it is
believed, Patrick’s pilot chute and bridle line caught around the rigging lines and/or pilot chute
and bridle line of Matthieu’s parachute, causing both parachutes to become entangled,
resulting in them partially collapsing. Both parachutists then impacted with the ground at high
speed’.
The Board also made the following Recommendations:
‘That parachutists should be reminded of the importance of ‘all round observation’ throughout
the entire parachute descent and that they check carefully for other parachutists before
turning or carrying out any manoeuvres’.
However, since the Board of Inquiry was finalised on the 8 October 2012, additional evidence
had come to light as part of the Panel of Inquiry’s investigations into the peripheral aspects of
the fatality. In light of the evidence and as part of their deliberations, the Panel was asked to
review the Board of Inquiry’s Conclusions. The Panel of Inquiry consisted of Gary Small –
Instructor Examiner (Chairman), Jay Webster – Advanced Instructor, Club Chief Instructor
and Malcolm Richardson - Advanced Instructor, Club Chief Instructor.
The Panel’s Conclusions were as follows:
‘The Panel agrees with the majority of the Board of Inquiry report. The only differences are
that the Panel believes that it was more likely that Patrick Sandeman collided with Matthieu Le
Berre, though the evidence is not conclusive either way. The Panel’s conclusions are as
follows:
The incident between Patrick Sandemann and Matthieu Le Berre occurred during normal
parachuting operations at UK Parachuting Sibson. The lift on which the incident occurred was
the 13 th lift of the day but only the 8 th lift from the Cessna Caravan (N208AJ). The freefall part
of the descents went according to plan with all groups separating and deploying their
parachutes between 2000ft and 4000ft.
Matthieu Le Berre should have deployed his main parachute at 5000 ft due to the fact he was
flying a tube. However, he deployed parachute at approximately 4000ft.
The majority of the canopy descents went according to plan. It is the Panel’s opinion that it is
most likely that Patrick Sandemann instigated a radical turn at a low altitude, possibly a spiral
turn and flew into the rear of Matthieu Le Berre’s canopy. This would have been a major
contributory factor leading to this incident. Both canopies touched, briefly separated and then
entangled. Both canopies collapsed resulting in both parachutists impacting the ground at
high speed’.
The Panel came to the above Conclusions after interviewing additional witnesses and
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studying additional video footage.
Members of the BPA Board of Inquiry were grateful to the Panel of Inquiry for bringing the
additional evidence to their attention and the conclusions of the Panel were fully endorsed by
the Board members.
The Recommendations of the Board remain as stated above.
It was proposed by Jason Webster and seconded by Mike Rust that the Board of Inquiry
Report, including the recommendations and conclusion be accepted.
Carried Unanimously
The Chair reported that the Panel of Inquiry Report was a main agenda item and he
expressed his thanks to the Panel for their work in this matter.
6. FATALITY - STRATHALLAN
The Chair reported that unfortunately, there had been a fatal accident at Skydive Strathallan
on the 5 January 2013. The Board of Inquiry Report resume had been circulated to CCIs with
the agenda. A copy of the resume was also tabled to those present.
At approximately 12:30 hours on Saturday 5 January 2013 at Skydive Strathallan, David Ball
boarded a Cessna 206 aircraft along with two other parachutists. This was to be the sixth
parachuting lift of the day. The aircraft climbed to approximately 2,400ft AGL. A ‘jump run’
was made over the centre of the PLA. Once the aircraft was at the correct exit point the
parachutists exited individually, leaving at intervals of approximately three to five seconds
between each parachutist. David was the last parachutist to exit the aircraft.
David was carrying out a short freefall delay jump in order to have his parachute open by
2,000ft AGL. His parachute was seen to have fully deployed but was observed to be turning to
the left. His parachute continued to turn, gradually increasing in speed during the decent and
he was observed attempting to kick out of twists. At approximately 400ft AGL the David’s
main parachute was seen to cutaway and he was observed to fall away until he was lost from
view behind some tall trees. No reserve parachute deployment was observed.
A BPA Board of Inquiry was immediately instigated. The members of the Board were; Tony
Butler – Technical Officer and Rob Noble-Nesbitt - BPA Instructor Examiner.
David was 56 years of age. He was a ‘B’ Licenced parachutist with 123 descents prior to the
accident. He had been parachuting since September 2011. He was trained at in Portugal,
where he made his first 50 jumps. The majority of his jumps since then had also made in
Portugal. He had completed a total of 22 jumps in the UK, of which 18 were made at Skydive
Strathallan.
When examining the equipment it was noted that the steering toggles of the main parachute
were still fully stowed in their keepers. The main parachute cutaway pad was not with the
equipment and was not found. The reserve parachute pilot chute, the bridle-line and the
reserve parachute deployment bag were outside of the container, but none of the rigging lines
or reserve parachute had deployed. It was also noted that the AAD had not activated and that
the reserve container closure loop had not been cut, but had broken below the loop, most
probably on impact. The equipment was not fitted with a RSL.
The conclusions of the Board are that David was used to jumping from higher altitudes and
had made very few of his jumps from lower altitudes. He had experienced twists in the
canopy’s rigging lines on previous occasions and presumably had had the time and height to
kick out of the twists without further problem. However, on this occasion he opened his
parachute at a lower altitude than he was used to (approximately 1,900ft AGL). He was
jumping a high performance canopy and it is known that it can be extremely difficult (in some
instances impossible) to clear twists when jumping a canopy of this type.
The Board believe that he continued to attempt to kick out of the twists past the point at which
he should have initiated his emergency procedures. The Board also believe that it is unlikely
that he realised how low he was when he decided that he was unable to clear the twists and
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take control of the parachute. This resulted in him initiating his emergency procedures at the
extremely low altitude of approximately 400ft AGL.
He then cutaway his main canopy and probably attempted to pull his reserve ripcord handle.
He may not have fully had hold of the handle, as it was later found to be partially dislodged
from its pouch. He may have, instead, pulled on the ripcord cable enough to open the reserve
container just before impact. In addition, he was jumping a full-faced helmet which may have
partially obscured his vision. However, it is also possible that he may not have opened the
container and that it opened on impact.
From 400ft, if David had pulled (or been able to pull) his reserve ripcord immediately after he
had cutaway, or if an RSL had been fitted, there is a possibility that the reserve parachute
may have been able to deploy prior to impact.
The Recommendations of the Board were as follows:
a) That parachutists should be reminded of the importance of carrying out their reserve
procedures as soon as possible and that they must not wait to carry them out at too
low an altitude.
a) That Licensed parachutists should consider the benefits of using equipment fitted with
RSLs.
It was proposed by Paul Floyd and seconded by Richard Wheatley that the Board of Inquiry
Report, including the recommendations and conclusion be accepted.
Carried Unanimously
The Chair reported that it was Council Policy that a Panel of Inquiry is formed following a
Board of Inquiry to investigate any peripheral aspects of the fatality.
He stated that a Panel had been formed and comprised the following members: Mark Tether
(Chair), Jane Hopkins and Brucie Johnson. There were a number of aspects the Board
wished to be considered, that had been highlighted because of their investigations, which
included the following:
a. Should certain licensed parachutist’s minimum opening height be increased. Most
jumpers these days open above 2,000ft AGL. The 2,000ft rule came into force when
most parachutists were jumping round and then docile ram-air canopies. These days
with high performance canopies, if parachutists encounter a problem, altitude is likely
to be lost very quickly. Possibly worth considering, for example, having a minimum
altitude of 2,500ft for parachutists between A & C licence.
b. Parachutists are taught when initially trained that twists are a nuisance factor and not
a malfunction. Should there be some kind of formal briefing/training when parachutists
move to a higher performance canopy, that includes information that encountering
twists on opening may quickly turn into a malfunction type of situation.
c. AADs are required for all parachutists up to B Licence, yet RSLs are only required up
to A Licence. Should RSLs be required up to at least B Licence also?
d. Full-faced helmets can restrict vision, which could affect the location of emergency
pads/handles, yet a parachutist with a B Licence could jump one, if their CCI permits
it. Should there be further restrictions.
The TO stated that he believed that all parachutists should be reminded that when practicing
their emergency drills, to make them as realistic as possible, i.e. put on their jumpsuits,
gloves, goggles, helmets (especially if they jump a full-faced helmet).
The Chair stated that any CCI who wished the Panel to consider any other areas to please
contact the Panel Chair.
7. INCIDENT REPORTS – RESUME
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The Chair reported that there had not been a great deal of parachuting taking place since the
last STC meeting and the number of reports received reflected this.
i) There had been 2 Student Injury Reports received since the last STC meeting. Both
male.
ii)
iii)
iv)
Since the last meeting there had been 1 Injury Report received for an ‘A’ Licence
parachutist or above. A male.
There had been 6 Student Malfunction/Deployment Problem Reports received since
the last meeting. 5 male and 1 female.
There had also been 17 Malfunction/Deployment Problem Reports received for ‘A’
Licence parachutists or above. All male.
v) Since the last STC there had been 2 Tandem Injury reports received. Both male.
vi)
vii)
viii)
ix)
There had also been 3 Tandem Malfunction/Deployment Problem reports received.
There had been 1 report received of an AAD fire. An aircraft had to descend with a
Student on board. The aircraft descended too quickly and the Student’s Cypres fired.
A report had been received of a helmet coming off in freefall.
Seven reports had been received of ‘off landings’. All at Clubs.
x) A report was received of a jumper with 26 jumps caught with camera on his wrist on
the flight-line.
8. PANELS OF INQUIRY
The Chair reported that as he had previously stated it was Council Policy that a Panel of
Inquiry is formed following a Board of Inquiry to investigate any peripheral aspects to the
accident. He stated that three Panel of Inquiry reports had been circulated with the agenda.
Two following fatalities.
a. Black Knights Parachute Centre
The Panel of Inquiry was conducted by Mark Bayada (Chairman), Noel Purcell and
Richard Wheatley.
A number or areas of concern were highlighted in the Panel report, including
breaches of the BPA Operations Manual. Following the Panel’s conclusions, they
made the following recommendations:
To the Black Knights Parachute Centre
An external audit to be carried out at BKPC as soon as feasibly possible, by the TO,
NCSO or an Instructor Examiner nominated by them, to check that control and
standardization has been made across the student training program and that
appropriate systems have been put in place to stop the above breaches of the
Operations Manual reoccurring.
The Chair reported that an audit of the Club was scheduled for the 6 March 2013.
To all BPA Clubs and Centres
All centres/clubs be reminded that as part of their re-affiliation agreement , all
students must be made BPA members (Provisional, Temporary or Full) prior to
commencement of training.
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The “written test” must correspond to the syllabus being taught at that centre/club. If
an answer has to be corrected then the corrective action should be recorded by the
instructor. Both the student and instructor should initial to confirm corrective action
has been taken and comprehended.
To the BPA
The BPA should consider ways to look at examining the implications of a change of
CCI. All new CCIs should be reminded that should they feel it beneficial, they may
request assistance and advice from the BPA and that they may request an audit
whenever suitable.
The Chair reported that this recommendation has been noted and will be
implemented.
Recommended Actions
Due to the seriousness of the incident and the irregularities in the documentation,
Paul Yeoman has his Advanced Instructor rating revoked for one year. This should
be suspended for one year from the time of the incident.
Paul Yeoman is sent a letter to remind him of his responsibilities regarding the control
of the student training program and a copy of this letter to remain on file at the BPA.
The Chair reported that Paul Yeoman has accepted the recommendations of the
Panel.
It was proposed by Kieran Brady and seconded by Noel Purcell that the Panel of
Inquiry Report be accepted, along with their recommendations.
b. UK Parachuting - Sibson
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Carried Unanimously
The Panel of Inquiry was conducted by Gary Small (Chairman), Jay Webster and Mal
Richardson.
A number or areas of concern were highlighted in the Panel report. Following the
Panel’s conclusions, they made the following recommendations:
Recommendations to the Club.
The recommendations (below) are made in an effect to improve Club safety and
control and in the opinion of the Panel would unlikely have affected the outcome of
the tragic incident involving Patrick Sandeman and Matthieu Le Berre.
The Club has already put into operation a number of procedures to improve the Club
operation:
i. The CCI monitors the DZ control/flight line area to a greater extent than
previously.
ii. More control is enforced on the parachuting operations.
iii. A permanent member of staff is now manning the minibus, which
collects jumpers from the landing area.
iv. There was some concern about cars parking adjacent to the
Tandem/experienced landing area. The Panel found no signs of this.
However, the CCI has informed the Panel that no unauthorized vehicles
are permitted in the area and signs are being produced and will be put
by the spectator car park area.
The Panel has made a number of additional recommendations to the Club in addition
to those already implemented by the CCI:
v. That UK Parachuting (Sibson) enforce the Club rule that parachutists
who are not qualified to land in the experienced landing area do not fly
over that landing area.
vi. Aircraft loading should be supervised by preferably a CSI minimum

acting as DZ control/flight line or an authorized jumpmaster
vii. The DZ bus driver who is now a member of Staff, should preferably be
a FAI/BPA ‘B’ certificate parachutists and be in radio communications
with the DZ controller throughout his/her period of duty. He/she should
be fully briefed on his/her duties and responsibilities for the period whilst
on duty, and be given an adequate method of informing the DZ
controller or CCI when parachutists are not conforming to safe canopy
handling during their descent.
viii. There should be clear defined separation between landing areas. This
is to avoid club jumpers who are not permitted to land in the
Tandem/experienced landing area swooping/flying through the
Tandem/experienced landing area to avoid a walk to the pickup point.
ix. A landing pattern should be set by the CCI/ DZ controller at the start of
each day. This information should be displayed at the flight line and
conveyed to all parachutists intending on making a jump. The Aircraft
loader/jumpmaster should remind jumpers verbally of the landing
direction and pattern. If however the conditions are light and variable a
large landing direction arrow which can be seen by jumpers making a
jump could dictate the landing direction. The direction of this arrow
would be decided upon by the CCI or DZ Controller.
Gary Small reported that the CCI has agreed to the Panel’s recommendations.
General Recommendations
x. Parachutists are reminded of the importance of all round observation
throughout the entire parachute descent
xi. Parachutists jumping with ancillary equipment i.e. flags or tubes should
be encouraged to land away from other parachutists to avoid conflict
with other parachuting traffic preparing to land.
It was proposed by Jay Webster and seconded by Kieran Brady that the Panel of
Inquiry Report including the recommendations be accepted.
c. British Parachute Schools - Langar
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Carried Unanimously
The Chair reported that at the last STC meeting, following the accident involving
Steve Castano, it had been decided to form a Panel of Inquiry to investigate the
accident. The Panel was conducted by Bryn Chaffe (Chairman), Nader Afsharian and
Alex Busby-Hicks. The Report had been circulated with the agenda.
Following a full investigation the Panel made to following recommendations:
The Panel recommends the following changes to the BPA Operations Manual:
(Proposed changes in bold italics)
Section 1 (Conduct and Control of Sport Parachuting), Paragraph 4 (Ground
Control Organisation), Sub-Para 4.1 (Briefing and Checking of Parachutists)
4.1.2. All Student Parachutists must be briefed and checked by at least a Basic
Instructor before emplaning, including checking the equipment fitted is an
appropriate system (Ripcord, BOC etc.) for the planned descent. These
checks must be recorded for each individual Student Parachutist, signed by
the instructor who carried out the check, and the Jumpmaster is to refer to
this record before accepting responsibility for the parachutists.
4.1.6. All students must have a pre-jump check. This is an equipment check
made in the aircraft shortly before exit.
The Panel also advises that each Club considers as to how they issue Student
Equipment and what measures they have in place to ensure that only the correct
equipment is issued.
This discussion may lead down the path towards a future change in the Operations

Manual where it may be mandatory that equipment is only issued by an instructor
and/or a CCI authorised person.
The Panel also recommends the following:
a. That Andy Pike be sent letter from the BPA reminding him of his
responsibilities as an instructor.
b. That Dean Fisher be sent letter from the BPA reminding him of his
responsibilities as an instructor.
c. That Bill Miller has his CSI rating removed and be required to attend a CSI
examination course after a period of no less than 6 months (from the date of
the incident), during which time he may act as a CSBI under the direct
supervision of the CCI or a CCI nominated CSI. During this time Bill needs to
work on those areas he has shown to be failing in.
d. Richard Wheatley - Although he was unaware of the practice of the
Instructors signing for each other, Richard should be reminded of his
responsibility for all the operations and procedures at his Club.
The Chair reported that Richard Wheatley has agreed to the Panel’s
recommendations.
It was proposed by Jay Webster and seconded by Chris McCann that the Panel of
Inquiry Report and the recommendations be accepted.
Carried Unanimously
9. MEDICAL/TANDEM WORKING GROUP
The Chair reported that at the last STC meeting the Committee were informed that the report
of the Medical/Tandem Working Group (MTWG) would be ready for this meeting. He stated
that the MTWG Report had been circulated with the Agenda. However, following input
regarding the draft medical forms, the MTWG Chair, John Page had decided to withdraw the
report from the agenda.
John Page reported that it was the Working Group’s intention to submit the report again in
draft format for further comment, and he thanked those for their input so far.
10. PROPOSED CHANGE TO BPA OPERATIONS MANUAL
a. FS1 Requirements
The TO reported that at the STC meeting of the 24 November 2011 the suggested
changes to the BPA Operations Manual regarding who could jump with pre-FS1
Jumpers had been considered, but STC decided that before any changes should be
considered the FS Manuals should be updated. At the STC of the 22 November 2012
the revised FS Manuals had been accepted. After which STC requested that the
suggested amendments be put forward again for consideration at the STC of the 7
February 2013:
BPA Operations Manual, Section 2 (Designation and Classification of Parachutists),
Paragraph 6 (The Grading System), Sub-para 6.4 (Formation Skydiving).
6.4. Formation Skydiving (FS)
6.4.1. To obtain Grade 1 in Formation Skydiving (FS1) the parachutist
must, be introduced to FS by a CCI/Advanced Instructor nominated
FS1 Grade parachutist or equivalent of proven FS
instructional/coaching ability, have received a full safety brief and
demonstrated the ability to:
a) Control fall rate and turn in place.
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) Dive and approach a target and achieve docking techniques.
c) Break-off turn and track away to obtain clear airspace for
deployment.
d) Maintain good altitude awareness throughout the skydive.
e) Control horizontal movement (forwards, backwards and
sideways).
f) Complete four points of 4-way FS.
N.B.(1) Prior to obtaining FS1, an ‘A’ Licence parachutist may make 2-way jumps,
when not carrying out coaching jumps, provided he/she has received a full
safety brief and the other parachutist is at least a ‘C’ Certificate FS1
parachutist or equivalent, approved by the CCI.
The TO reported that NB (2) had been amended slightly to the original amendment
that had been previously circulated. These changes were highlighted (in bold below)
for information.
N.B.(2) Prior to obtaining FS1, during coaching jumps, no more than one non-FS1
jumper parachutist per group (maximum of a 4-way), all other parachutists
must be at least FS1 grade or equivalent, including an FS coach or
equivalent.
N.B.(3) Training programmes other than those contained in the BPA Formation
Skydiving (FS) Manuals are acceptable for training for FS1, provided all the
requirements of sub-para 6.4.1. (above) are met.
N.B.(4) The qualifications to become an FS coach may be found on BPA Form 134.
It was also suggested that Section 2, paragraph 6.7(Free Flying), paragraph 6.8
(Skysurfing) and paragraph 6.9 (Wing Suit) be amended as suggested below, to bring
them in line with the FS requirements:
6.7. Freestyle/Freeflying (FF)
6.7.1. To obtain Grade 1 in Freestyle/Freeflying (FF1) the parachutist
must first demonstrate (in a belly to earth position, as in 6.4.1.
above) the ability to:
6.8. Skysurfing (SS)
a) Control fall rate and turn in place.
b) Dive and approach a target and achieve docking techniques.
c) Break-off turn and track away to obtain clear airspace for
deployment.
d) Maintain good altitude awareness throughout the skydive.
e) Control horizontal movement (forwards, backwards and
sideways).
6.8.1. To obtain Grade 1 in Skysurfing (SS1) the parachutist must first be
a ‘C’ Licence holder and demonstrate (in a belly to earth position, as
in 6.4.1. above) the ability to:
a) Control fall rate and turn in place.
b) Dive and approach a target and achieve docking techniques.
11

6.9. Wing Suit (WS)
c) Break-off turn and track away to obtain clear airspace for
deployment.
d) Maintain good altitude awareness throughout the skydive.
e) Control horizontal movement (forwards, backwards and
sideways).
6.9.1. To obtain Grade 1 in Wing Suit (WS1) flying, the parachutist must
be a ‘C’ Licence holder with at least 500 descents or at least 200
descents within the previous 18 months and must demonstrate (in a
belly to earth position, as in 6.4.1. above) the ability to:
a) Control fall rate and turn in place.
b) Dive and approach a target and achieve docking techniques.
c) Break-off turn and track away to obtain clear airspace for
deployment.
d) Maintain good altitude awareness throughout the skydive.
e) Control horizontal movement (forwards, backwards and
sideways).
It was proposed by Stuart Meacock and seconded by Gary Stevens that the above proposed
amendments to the BPA Operations Manual be accepted.
Carried Unanimously
b. Change to Radio Operators Licence Terminology
The Chair reported that the requirements for the issuing of parachutist’s radio licences
had recently changed. With these changes the name of the licence had also changed,
from; ‘Parachuting Aeronautical Radio Operators Licence’ to; ‘Parachuting Radio
Operators Certificate of Competence’. Therefore, the BPA Operations Manual
required updating as follows:
SECTION 4 (INSTRUCTORS), Paragraph 1 (Category System Basic Instructor),
sub-para 1.1.5. change to read:
1.1.5. Holds a current Parachuting Radio Operators Certificate of Competence.
SECTION 4 (INSTRUCTORS), Paragraph 3 (Accelerated Free Fall Instructors),
sub-para 3.1.5. change to read:
3.1.5. Holds a current Parachuting Radio Operators Certificate of Competence.
SECTION 4 (INSTRUCTORS), Paragraph 12 (Instructor Rating Renewals), N.B.(4)
change to read:
N.B.(4)All instructors (excluding TBIs or TIs) are required to hold a current
Parachuting Radio Operators Certificate of Competence.
SECTION 4 (INSTRUCTORS), Paragraph 13 (Non BPA Instructors), sub-para
13.1.4. change to read:
13.1.4. Hold a current Parachuting Radio Operators Certificate of Competence.
It was proposed by Pete Sizer and seconded by Alex Busby-Hicks that the above proposed
amendments to the BPA Operations Manual be accepted.
Carried Unanimously
12

11. PERMISSIONS
i) A letter from Phil Collett had been circulated with the agenda requesting a six-month
extension to the CSBI rating of Niel Flanagan (until 31 August 13).
Phil’s letter had stated that due to his commitments with the RAF Falcons Parachute
Display Team and the Military, Niel had been unable to fulfil the requirements to
attend a further course. He was preparing for the AFF Instructor course, dates just
announced for the 29 April 2013 at Hibaldstow. Niel was a current BPA TI and a
Military AFF Instructor, Tandem Instructor and Military Static-Line Instructor. This was
the second extension that had been requested and no further request would be
submitted if Niel did not attend that course.
It was proposed by Phil Collett and seconded by Paul Floyd that the above request be
accepted.
Carried Unanimously
ii)
A letter from Gary Stevens had been circulated with the agenda requesting that Kevin
McCarthy be permitted to attend an instructor course to re-gain AFFI and TI ratings.
Kevin had not been a BPA member since 2008, although he is a current APF AFF
and Tandem instructor. Gary’s letter had provided details of Kevin’s currency, having
completed 134 AFF and 164 Tandem descents since 2010.
Following some consideration, it was proposed by Gary Stevens and seconded by
Mike Rust that Kevin McCarthy attends a CSBI Course and following the Course be
evaluated by an independent NCSO/TO nominated Examiner for both AFF and
Tandem.
Carried Unanimously
12. A.O.B
i) A letter from Nader Afsharian had been previously circulated to CCIs last week
requesting that Old Buckenham be cleared again for parachuting. The Chair reported
that this item had been withdrawn.
ii)
iii)
A letter from Jane Hopkins (Buckle) had been previously circulated to CCIs
requesting a permission against the minimum diameter 50 metre rule for displays.
Jane’s letter stated that she had been asked to supply an all female display team to
jump into the Epsom Derby on 1 June 2013. Having recced the site the landing area
(it is the racetrack) falls short of the minimum width requirement. An area of 5,000
square metres is no problem as the track is very long but only 25 metres wide. Jane
would like to apply for an exemption to the 50 metre rule under the following
conditions:
All team members will have in excess of 1,000 jumps.
If the wind is from the 340° to 040° or 160° to 220° and stronger than 15 knots then
the display will be cancelled.
It was proposed by Pete Sizer and seconded by Brucie Johnson that the above
request be accepted with the above stated conditions.
Carried Unanimously
A letter had been received from Maggie Penny and circulated to those present
requesting a six-month extension (until 31 August 2013) to the CSBI rating of Peter
Lehane.
It was proposed by Maggie Penny (proxy) and seconded by Kieran Brady that the
above request be accepted.
Carried Unanimously
iv)
Two requests had been received from Mark Scobie, Team Leader of the Red Devils
and had been circulated to those present requesting a permission against the
minimum diameter 50 metre rule for displays. The request was for two displays, one
13

at Aintree Racecourse on the 4 April and the other at Silverstone Racecourse on the
14 April. Both had a width of 30 metres instead of the required 50 metres. The
request is for permission under the following caveats:
i) 15 knots crosswind limit in the arena for all jumpers.
ii) No landing of any CF in the arena.
iii) Each parachutist must have completed a minimum of 700 jumps to take part
in the display.
iv) Each parachutist must have completed a minimum of 30 parachute displays.
It was proposed by Jay Webster and seconded by Alex Busby-Hicks that these
requests be accepted with the above stated conditions.
Carried Unanimously
v) Circulated to those present was a letter from Alex Busby-Hicks requesting permission
for Spencer Hogg to attend a CSI Course without having to wait the six-month
required period after successfully completing a CSBI Course. Spencer had held a
CSBI rating in the past and had also previously attended an AFF Course.
It was proposed by Alex Busby-Hicks and seconded by Mike Bolton that the above
request be accepted.
Carried Unanimously
The Chair reported that as most CCIs were already aware, after 30 years of working for the
BPA he had announced that would be retiring. However, he expected to still be chairing the
next STC meeting in April. He said that it had been an honour to work for CCIs and the
membership. He stated that there had been some criticism in some quarters over the way he
had chaired the STC meeting in August when the Pilot Working Group Report was presented.
He stated that this had upset him and he hoped that CCIs did not feel that he had conducted
the meeting unfairly.
Date of next Meeting: Thursday 4 April 2013
BPA Offices, Glen Parva, Leicester
at 7.00 p.m
12 February 2013
Distribution: Chairman BPA, Council, CCIs, All Riggers, Advanced Packers, CAA, Editor – Skydive,
File
14

BRITISH PARACHUTE ASSOCIATION
Wharf Way, Glen Parva, Leicester, LE2 9TF
Tele: 0116 278 5271, Fax: 0116 247 7662, e-mail: skydive@bpa.org.uk
www.bpa.org.uk
AMENDMENTS TO BPA OPERATIONS MANUAL
At the STC meeting of the 7 th February 2013 the following amendments were made to the BPA
operations Manual:
SECTION 1 (CONDUCT AND CONTROL OF SPORT PARACHUTING), Paragraph 4 (Ground
Control Organisation), Sub-Para 4.1 (Briefing and Checking of Parachutists) Change 4.1.2 & 4.1.6 to
read:
4.1.2. All Student Parachutists must be briefed and checked by at least a Basic Instructor before emplaning,
including checking the equipment fitted is an appropriate system (ripcord, BOC etc.) for the planned
descent. These checks must be recorded for each individual Student Parachutist, signed by the
instructor who carried out the check, and the Jumpmaster is to refer to this record before accepting
responsibility for the parachutists.
4.1.6. All Student Parachutists must have a pre-jump check. This is an equipment check made in the aircraft
shortly before exit.
SECTION 2 (DESIGNATION AND CLASSIFICATION OF PARACHUTISTS), Paragraph 6 (The
Grading System), Sub-para 6.4 (Formation Skydiving). Change to read:
6.4. Formation Skydiving (FS)
6.4.1. To obtain Grade 1 in Formation Skydiving (FS1) the parachutist must, be introduced to FS by
a CCI/Advanced Instructor nominated FS1 Grade parachutist or equivalent of proven FS
instructional/coaching ability, have received a full safety brief and demonstrated the ability to:
a) Control fall rate and turn in place.
b) Dive and approach a target and achieve docking techniques.
c) Break-off turn and track away to obtain clear airspace for deployment.
d) Maintain good altitude awareness throughout the skydive.
e) Control horizontal movement (forwards, backwards and sideways).
f) Complete four points of 4-way FS.
N.B.(1) Prior to obtaining FS1, an ‘A’ Licence parachutist may make 2-way jumps, when not carrying
out coaching jumps, provided he/she has received a full safety brief and the other parachutist
is at least a ‘C’ Licence FS1 parachutist or equivalent, approved by the CCI.
N.B.(2) Prior to obtaining FS1, during coaching jumps, no more than one non-FS1 parachutist per
group (maximum of a 4-way), all other parachutists must be at least FS1 grade or equivalent,
including an FS coach or equivalent.
N.B.(3) Training programmes other than those contained in the BPA Formation Skydiving (FS)
Manuals are acceptable for training for FS1, provided all the requirements of sub-para 6.4.1.
(above) are met.
N.B.(4) The qualifications to become an FS coach may be found on BPA Form 134.
15

SECTION 2 (DESIGNATION AND CLASSIFICATION OF PARACHUTISTS), Paragraph 6 (The
Grading System), Sub-para 6.7 (Freestyle/Freeflying). Change to read:
6.7. Freestyle/Freeflying (FF)
6.7.1. To obtain Grade 1 in Freestyle/Freeflying (FF1) the parachutist must first demonstrate (in a
belly to earth position, as in 6.4.1. above) the ability to:
a) Control fall rate and turn in place.
f) Dive and approach a target and achieve docking techniques.
g) Break-off turn and track away to obtain clear airspace for deployment.
h) Maintain good altitude awareness throughout the skydive.
i) Control horizontal movement (forwards, backwards and sideways).
SECTION 2 (DESIGNATION AND CLASSIFICATION OF PARACHUTISTS), Paragraph 6 (The
Grading System), Sub-para 6.8 (Skysurfing). Change to read:
6.8. Skysurfing (SS)
6.8.1. To obtain Grade 1 in Skysurfing (SS1) the parachutist must first be a ‘C’ Licence holder
and demonstrate (in a belly to earth position, as in 6.4.1. above) the ability to:
a) Control fall rate and turn in place.
f) Dive and approach a target and achieve docking techniques.
g) Break-off turn and track away to obtain clear airspace for deployment.
h) Maintain good altitude awareness throughout the skydive.
i) Control horizontal movement (forwards, backwards and sideways).
SECTION 2 (DESIGNATION AND CLASSIFICATION OF PARACHUTISTS), Paragraph 6 (The
Grading System), Sub-para 6.9 (Wing Suit). Change to read:
6.9. Wing Suit (WS)
6.9.1. To obtain Grade 1 in Wing Suit (WS1) flying, the parachutist must be a ‘C’ Licence holder
with at least 500 descents or at least 200 descents within the previous 18 months and must
demonstrate (in a belly to earth position, as in 6.4.1. above) the ability to:
a) Control fall rate and turn in place.
f) Dive and approach a target and achieve docking techniques.
g) Break-off turn and track away to obtain clear airspace for deployment.
h) Maintain good altitude awareness throughout the skydive.
i) Control horizontal movement (forwards, backwards and sideways).
SECTION 4 (INSTRUCTORS), Paragraph 1 (Category System Basic Instructor), sub-para 1.1.5. Change
to read:
1.1.5. Holds a current Parachuting Radio Operators Certificate of Competence.
SECTION 4 (INSTRUCTORS), Paragraph 3 (Accelerated Free Fall Instructors), sub-para 3.1.5. Change
to read:
16

3.1.5. Holds a current Parachuting Radio Operators Certificate of Competence.
SECTION 4 (INSTRUCTORS), Paragraph 12 (Instructor Rating Renewals), N.B.(4) Change to read:
N.B.(4) All Instructors (excluding TBIs or TIs) are required to hold a current Parachuting Radio Operators
Certificate of Competence.
SECTION 4 (INSTRUCTORS), Paragraph 13 (Non BPA Instructors), sub-para 13.1.4. Change to read:
13.1.4. Hold a current Parachuting Radio Operators Certificate of Competence.
17