Editor: I. Mallikarjuna Sharma Volume 11: 15-31 March 2015 No. 5-6

(2015) 1 LAW Shreya Singhal v. Union of India [IND-SC] ISC-165
otherwise invalid, it cannot be saved by an assurance
from the learned Additional Solicitor General that it
will be administered in a reasonable manner.
Governments may come and Governments may go but
Section 66A goes on forever. An assurance from the
present Government even if carried out faithfully
would not bind any successor Government. It
must, therefore, be held that Section 66A must be
judged on its own merits without any reference to
how well it may be administered.
Severability:
93. The argument of the learned Additional
Solicitor General on this score is reproduced by
us verbatim from one of his written submissions:
“Furthermore it is respectfully submitted that in
the event of Hon’ble Court not being satisfied
about the constitutional validity of either any
expression or a part of the provision, the
Doctrine of Severability as enshrined under
Article 13 may be resorted to.”
94. The submission is vague: the learned
Additional Solicitor General does not indicate
which part or parts of Section 66A can possibly
be saved. This Court in Romesh Thappar v. The
State of Madras, [1950] S.C.R. 594, repelled a
contention of severability when it came to the
courts enforcing the fundamental right under
Article 19(1)(a) in the following terms:
“It was, however, argued that Section 9(1-A)
could not be considered wholly void, as, under
Article 13(1), an existing law inconsistent with a
fundamental right is void only to the extent of
the inconsistency and no more. Insofar as the
securing of the public safety or the maintenance
of public order would include the security of the
State, the impugned provision, as applied to the
latter purpose, was covered by clause (2) of
Article 19 and must, it was said, be held to be
valid. We are unable to accede to this contention.
Where a law purports to authorise the imposition of
restrictions on a fundamental right in language wide
enough to cover restrictions both within and without the
limits of constitutionally permissible legislative action
affecting such right, it is not possible to uphold it even so
far as it may be applied within the constitutional limits,
as it is not severable. So long as the possibility of its being
applied for purposes not sanctioned by the Constitution
cannot be ruled out, it must be held to be wholly
unconstitutional and void. In other words, clause (2)
of Article 19 having allowed the imposition of
restrictions on the freedom of speech and
expression only in cases where danger to the
State is involved, an enactment, which is capable
of being applied to cases where no such danger
could arise, cannot be held to be constitutional and
valid to any extent.” (At page 603) (emphasis ours)
95. It has been held by us that Section 66A purports
to authorize the imposition of restrictions on the
fundamental right contained in Article 19(1)(a) in
language wide enough to cover restrictions both within
and without the limits of constitutionally permissible
legislative action. We have held following K.A.
Abbas’ case (Supra) that the possibility of Section
66A being applied for purposes not sanctioned by the
Constitution cannot be ruled out. It must, therefore, be
held to be wholly unconstitutional and void. Romesh
Thappar’s Case was distinguished in R.M.D.
Chamarbaugwalla v. The Union of India, [1957]
S.C.R. 930, in the context of a right under Article
19(1)(g) as follows:
“20. In Romesh Thappar v. State of Madras
[(1950) SCR 594], the question was as to the
validity of Section 9(1-A) of the Madras
Maintenance of Public Order Act, 23 of 1949.
That section authorised the Provincial
Government to prohibit the entry and circulation
within the State of a newspaper “for the purpose
of securing the public safety or the maintenance
of public order.” Subsequent to the enactment of
this statute, the Constitution came into force, and
the validity of the impugned provision depended
on whether it was protected by Article 19(2),
which saved “existing law insofar as it relates to
any matter which undermines the security of or
tends to overthrow the State.” It was held by this
Court that as the purposes mentioned in Section
9(1-A) of the Madras Act were wider in
amplitude than those specified in Article 19(2),
and as it was not possible to split up Section 9(1-
A) into what was within and what was without
the protection of Article 19(2), the provision
must fail in its entirety. That is really a decision
that the impugned provision was on its own
contents inseverable. It is not an authority for the
position that even when a provision is severable, it must
be struck down on the ground that the principle of
severability is inadmissible when the invalidity of a
statute arises by reason of its contravening
constitutional prohibitions. It should be mentioned
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Law Animated World, 15-31 March 2015