Editor: I. Mallikarjuna Sharma Volume 11: 15-31 March 2015 No. 5-6

ISC-160 Shreya Singhal v. Union of India [IND-SC] (2015) 1 LAW
passage is not in the context of an argument that
the word “terrorism” not being separately defined
would, therefore, be struck down on the ground
of vagueness. The cited passage was only in the
context of upholding the conviction of the
accused in that case. Similarly, in Zameer Ahmed
Latifur Rehman Sheikh v. State of Maharashtra &
Ors., (2010) 5 SCC 246, the expression
“insurgency” was said to be undefined and would
defy a precise definition, yet it could be
understood to mean break down of peace and
tranquility as also a grave disturbance of public
order so as to endanger the security of the State
and its sovereignty. This again was said in the
context of a challenge on the ground of legislative
competence. The provisions of the Maharashtra
Control of Organised Crime Act were challenged
on the ground that they were outside the
expression “public order” contained in Entry 1 of
List I of the 7 th Schedule of the Constitution of
India. This contention was repelled by saying that
the expression “public order” was wide enough to
encompass cases of “insurgency”. This case again
had nothing to do with a challenge raised on the
ground of vagueness.
78. Similarly, in State of M.P. v. Kedia Leather &
Liquor Limited, (2003) 7 SCC 389, paragraph 8
was cited to show that the expression “nuisance”
appearing in Section 133 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure was also not capable of precise
definition. This again was said in the context of
an argument that Section 133 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure was impliedly repealed by
the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution)
Act, 1974. This contention was repelled by
saying that the areas of operation of the two
provisions were completely different and they
existed side by side being mutually exclusive.
This case again did not contain any argument that
the provision contained in Section 133 was vague
and, therefore, unconstitutional. Similarly, in
State of Karnataka v. Appa Balu Ingale, 1995 Supp.
(4) SCC 469, the word “untouchability” was said
not to be capable of precise definition. Here
again, there was no constitutional challenge on
the ground of vagueness.
79. In fact, two English judgments cited by the
learned Additional Solicitor General would
demonstrate how vague the words used in Section
66A are. In Director of Public Prosecutions v.
Collins, (2006) 1 WLR 2223, the very expression
“grossly offensive” is contained in Section
127(1)(1) of the U.K. Communications Act,
2003. A 61 year old man made a number of
telephone calls over two years to the office of a
Member of Parliament. In these telephone calls
and recorded messages Mr. Collins who held
strong views on immigration made a reference to
“Wogs”, “Pakis”, “Black bastards” and
“Niggers”. Mr. Collins was charged with sending
messages which were grossly offensive. The
Leicestershire Justices dismissed the case against
Mr. Collins on the ground that the telephone calls
were offensive but not grossly offensive. A
reasonable person would not so find the calls to
be grossly offensive. The Queen’s Bench agreed
and dismissed the appeal filed by the Director of
Public Prosecutions. The House of Lords
reversed the Queen’s Bench stating:
“9. The parties agreed with the rulings of the
Divisional Court that it is for the Justices to
determine as a question of fact whether a
message is grossly offensive, that in making this
determination the Justices must apply the
standards of an open and just multi-racial
society, and that the words must be judged taking
account of their context and all relevant
circumstances. I would agree also. Usages and
sensitivities may change over time. Language
otherwise insulting may be used in an
unpejorative, even affectionate, way, or may be
adopted as a badge of honour (“Old
Contemptibles”). There can be no yardstick of
gross offensiveness otherwise than by the
application of reasonably enlightened, but not
perfectionist, contemporary standards to the
particular message sent in its particular context.
The test is whether a message is couched in
terms liable to cause gross offence to those to
whom it relates.
10. In contrast with section 127(2)(a) and its
predecessor subsections, which require proof of
an unlawful purpose and a degree of knowledge,
section 127(1)(a) provides no explicit guidance
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