Editor: I. Mallikarjuna Sharma Volume 11: 15-31 March 2015 No. 5-6

F-188 Quake Outcasts v. Minister for Canterbury Earthquake Recovery [NZ-SC: Eliyas CJ] (2015) 1 LAW
consents, and the status of affected land were
largely on hold, preventing affected communities
from being able to move forward, while expert
assessment identified where remediation of land
was feasible. Ministers were understandably
anxious to provide as much certainty as was
possible so that decisions could be taken where
rebuilding was appropriate. Considerable
engineering information had been obtained by the
Government in the months since the 22 February
2011 earthquake and there was urgency in its
public release. The Cabinet paper of 24 June
2011 which recorded the decisions taken on 22
June spoke of the need for a “circuit-breaker …
to arrest the current decline in confidence and to
form a solid basis for recovery”. 253
[240] Further earthquakes in June 2011 added to
the uncertainty and led to the Cabinet decision on
20 June to delegate decision-making about land
remediation directions to a group of eight senior
ministers. 254 They were empowered by Cabinet to
act until 27 June (the date of the next Cabinet
meeting). The senior ministers made the decisions
as to future directions on 22 June and they were
announced publicly on 23 June 2011. The
decisions and the basis for them were reported to
Cabinet in a paper of 24 June 2011.
[241] Cabinet was advised by the Minister for
Earthquake Recovery in the paper of 24 June
2011 that, instead of a programme to assess each
parcel of land individually for suitability for
remediation, “a full area-wide land remediation
solution” was necessary. 255 The paper described
the process adopted for classifying affected areas
according to whether immediate repairs were
feasible (a “green” zone), those where further
work was necessary to decide whether repairs
were feasible (the “orange” and “white” zones)
and those where remediation of the land was
253 Memorandum for Cabinet “Land Damage from the
Canterbury Earthquakes” (24 June 2011) at [19].
254 Similar delegation was conferred on 23 May 2011 but
had expired on 6 June.
255 Memorandum for Cabinet “Land Damage from the
Canterbury Earthquakes” (24 June 2011) at [38].
considered uneconomic (“red” zones). 256 The
classification of land according to these
categories was based on “the severity and extent
of land damage, the cost-effectiveness and social
impacts of land remediation”. 257 The land within
the red zones was assessed to be at risk of further
damage in the event of further seismic activity,
floods, and spring tides and to require rebuilding
of infrastructure. The paper indicated that the red
zone comprised areas where rebuilding “may not
occur in the short-to-medium term because the
land is damaged beyond practical and timely
repair”. 258
[242] In the residential red zone, properties
relatively undamaged would be caught up in the
remedial works on neighbouring properties and
could be “at risk” from the work. 259 It was
estimated that the works necessary could take
more than five years and that it was desirable to
relocate all residents while they were carried
out. 260
[243] The paper reported and explained the
decision to make offers of purchase to owners of
insured residential properties within the red zone.
Ministers had taken the view that it was not
appropriate to leave private insurance claims
within the red zone to “play out without any
intervention”. 261 There was uncertainty about the
extent to which private insurance would cover the
costs of the extensive remedial work required.
The ministers considered that leaving things to be
worked out between individuals affected and their
insurers would not meet the objects of the
legislation in providing certainty and confidence
through a simple process. 262
[244] These considerations led to the offers to
purchase at 100 per cent of the 2007 rating
256 At [10].
257 At [10].
258 At [10](c).
259 At [38].
260 At [39].
261 At [50].
262 At [50].
Law Animated World, 15-31 March 2015 130