financial stability report - Banka Qendrore e Republikës së Kosovës
financial stability report - Banka Qendrore e Republikës së Kosovës
financial stability report - Banka Qendrore e Republikës së Kosovës
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Financial Stability Report<br />
Number 3<br />
In the absence of non-performing loans data for individual banks, the dependent variable in<br />
our regression is composed by the share of loan-loss provisions to total loans (prov_loans).<br />
The variable representing banking sector competition (Hstat) is the Panzar-Rosse H-<br />
statistic which has been estimated in section 2. The model also contains several bankspecific<br />
and country-specific control variables. The bank-specific control variables include:<br />
total assets (ta) which are a measure of bank size; the share of non-interest income to total<br />
assets (nonint) which is included to control for the structure of bank activity; the share of<br />
equity to total assets (equity_ta) which is included to control for the risk-taking attitude of<br />
the bank; and the Net Interest Margin (nim) which is included to control for the effect of<br />
interest rates. The variables nonint, equity_ta and nim are specified in the first lags in<br />
order to tackle the potential endogeneity with the dependent variable. The country specific<br />
control variables in our model include: the market concentration ratio, i.e. the<br />
Herfindahl_Hirschman Index for deposits (hhi_dep); the real GDP growth rate<br />
(rgdpgrowth); the annual growth rate of the Consumer Price Index (cpi); the rule of law<br />
index formulated by the World Bank (rule_law); and the Financial Freedom Index<br />
formulated by the Heritage Foundation (fin_freed). The model also contains dummy<br />
variables for each year (dv_year) and each country (dv_country).<br />
The method chosen to run the regression is the Fixed Effects method. However, because a<br />
pooled sample composed of several countries data is used, the inclusion of country dummies<br />
is considered as necessary. Since the Fixed Effects method does not allow the inclusion of<br />
country dummies, which are time invariant variables, the method used to run our<br />
regression is the Fixed Effects Vector Decomposition method, which allows also the<br />
inclusion of time-invariant variables. Nevertheless, for robustness test of our results, also<br />
the simple fixed effects and the random effects (given that the Haussman Test does not<br />
preclude the possibility of using it) are used.<br />
8.4.2 Estimation results<br />
The estimation results suggest a negative relationship between banking sector competition,<br />
measured by the Panzar-Rosse H-statistic, and the level of risk in the banks loan portfolio,<br />
measured by the share of loan-loss provisions to gross loans. In other words, the results<br />
suggest that more competition leads to a better quality loan portfolio. This result is in line<br />
with a number of empirical studies on this field, such as Schaeck and Čihák (2007),<br />
Schaeck et al. (2006), Beck et al. (2003), Jayaratne and Strahan (1998). A great deal of the<br />
theoretical literature on this field argues why competition should not lead to higher risktaking,<br />
but the literature is quite limited in terms of the arguments why competition should<br />
reduce banks’ risk-taking. However, in our view, the negative relationship between<br />
competition and banks risk-taking may primarily be attributed to the fact that under more<br />
competition depositors have more alternatives to place their deposits and as a result of this<br />
they are more likely to “penalize” the banks with excessive risk-taking by moving their<br />
deposits to safer banks. In addition, as argued by Chen (2007), when competition increases<br />
banks may apply more screening since better quality borrowers may want to be better<br />
screened in order to distinguish themselves from potentially weaker borrowers.<br />
The regression controls also for the market concentration index, measured by the<br />
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) which is also argued to represent a measure of<br />
competition. However, the impact of market concentration on bank risk resulted to be<br />
statistically insignificant. The inclusion or not of the HHI into the regression does not<br />
appear to affect neither the sign not the statistical significance of the H-statistic, thus<br />
providing support to the view of Claessens and Laeven (2003) who claimed that<br />
concentration and competition describe different features of a banking market, and<br />
therefore they have independent effects on the <strong>stability</strong> of the banking system.<br />
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