journal of european integration history revue d'histoire de l ...

76
Melissa Pine
Conclusions
In an article on British policy actions, de Gaulle’s real intentions in the ‘Soames
affair’ are less important than British perceptions of them: as noted above, the British
side of the story is one thread in a complex diplomatic incident. For HMG, the
proposals were placed in the context both of Wilson’s continuing pressure for entry
into the EC, and of the signs of progress in the embryonic foreign policy co-operation
in WEU. Britain, with the help of her allies, had succeeded not only in dominating
the EC agenda but also in taking concrete steps towards European integration
in a new and significant policy area. The proposals were thus seen as evidence
of the success of British European policy since the French veto of 1967.
Moreover, the British handling of the affair, clearly dominated by Wilson and
Stewart, consolidated their relations with the Five and particularly with Germany,
at a time when they were preparing to work together in the sensitive area of foreign
policy. Over the previous eighteen months it had proved difficult to hold the
Germans to their promises to support Britain: confiding de Gaulle’s seeming
treachery to Kiesinger seemed to have the desired effect. Of course, there may have
been other reasons for the strengthened German position: as noted above, by
February 1969 their patience with French European policy had worn extremely
thin. However, Wilson’s decision to reveal de Gaulle’s seeming perfidy may have
been the final straw. Soames may have hoped that the whole affair could have been
handled differently, but in the aftermath of the ‘Soames affair’ the Germans not
only gave new commitments to consult with the British on European affairs and to
keep them informed of EC developments: they also immediately followed through
on these commitments. 89
As a result of the strengthened solidarity between Britain and the Five, and despite
traditional French tactics of attempted veto and then boycott, consultations on foreign
policy in WEU continued. Although they were soon overshadowed by de Gaulle’s
resignation, these consultations should not be overlooked: they are evidence of Britain’s
real engagement with European allies, and of those allies’ reciprocal willingness to
move towards integration in significant policy areas with Britain.
Finally, HMG’s and particularly Wilson’s actions in February 1969 made it
crystal clear that entry into the EC was a top priority for the UK. De Gaulle’s
resignation two months later relegated the ‘Soames affair’ to the status of a storm
in a teacup, but it had provided Wilson with a key opportunity to match his actions
to his pro-European rhetoric. As a result, when de Gaulle left the political scene
and was eventually succeeded by Georges Pompidou, the expectations of Wilson
and the Five for a reappraisal in French policy were high. Although many factors
were involved in Pompidou’s lifting of the French veto on British entry at The
Hague in December, the constant British pressure for closer European relations,
shown so clearly in the ‘Soames affair’, played a crucial part.
89. Letter, Soames to Wilson, 11 March 1969, UKNA/FCO/30/417.