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The Soames Affair 75
After effects
The ramifications of the ‘Soames affair’ played out for the rest of the spring, and
were mainly positive for Britain. The governments of the Five accepted the British
account of events. 83 As people continued to debate the rights and wrongs of the
affair, British aims in Europe were plastered across European newspapers, almost
all of which supported the UK, and which gave the government an opportunity to
display its European character: Chalfont characterised the application as
‘an important and courageous task which will be crowned with success and which
will bring great benefit to a Europe really united’. 84
The ‘Soames affair’ therefore raised the profile of the British application in the
Community states. More practically, the Germans provided the UK with an account
of Debré’s first meeting with the ambassadors of the Five in Paris, despite an appeal
from the French Foreign minister for Franco-German solidarity. This fulfilment of
undertakings made during Wilson’s visit suggested that the Germans put increased
priority on relations with Britain in the aftermath of the general’s proposals. 85
Wilson was careful to reinforce that new solidarity, working to ensure that the
French boycott of WEU did not undermine German commitment to increased
consultation with Britain. He sent a personal message to Kiesinger, noting that they
had agreed in Bonn that the decision taken at Luxembourg was a ‘welcome step
forward and should be encouraged’. They must not let themselves be diverted by
the French actions. Wilson concluded with a plea.
‘What is at stake now is not the interpretation of a single article in the Brussels
Treaty but the continuation of the efforts, on which we have worked together for so
many months, to develop political consultation in the WEU as a step towards the
development of European unity. I hope you will see this matter in terms of Anglo/
German relations as well as in the context of wider European policy […].This is the
time to build on what has so far been achieved’. 86
Wilson’s letter had the desired effect, and the Germans attended the next WEU
meeting – in the absence of France. 87 It covered only procedural points, but the
WEU assembly later passed a resolution welcoming political consultations and the
Council met, again without France, on 12 March to consider the Nigerian civil
war. 88 If it was his intention, the general’s proposals failed to distract from the real
progress towards co-operation being made in WEU.
83. See especially telegram, Luxembourg to FCO, 22 February 1969, No.69, UKNA/PREM/13/2628.
84. Il Messagero, 22 February 1969, reported in telegram, Rome to FCO, 25 February 1969, No.1 Saving.
For other press reports, see for example, telegrams, Brussels to FCO, No.75; Bonn to FCO, No.216;
Hague to FCO, No.111; Rome to FCO, No.186, all 22 February 1969, UKNA/FCO/30/415.
85. Telegram, Paris to FCO, 25 February 1969, No.209, UKNA/FCO/30/416.
86. Telegram, FCO to Bonn, 21 February 1969, No.169, Prime Minister’s Personal Message Serial No
T22/69, UKNA/PREM/13/2628.
87. KCA23266-7 (29 March – 5 April 1969).
88. Intriguingly, the French WEU delegation split over the resolution: the six Gaullist deputies voted
against, the four non-Communist left-wing deputies voted for and three others abstained; letter, Marjoribanks
to Robinson, 5 March 1969, UKNA/FCO/30/538; KCA23266 (29 March – 5 April 1969).