journal of european integration history revue d'histoire de l ...
journal of european integration history revue d'histoire de l ...
journal of european integration history revue d'histoire de l ...
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74<br />
Melissa Pine<br />
atmosphere. Soames ad<strong>de</strong>d, however, that ‘the French government [were] not<br />
telling the truth and they know it’. 77<br />
Mending fences<br />
Following Soames’ advice, Stewart informed Debré that the British government<br />
had had no intention <strong>of</strong> misrepresenting <strong>de</strong> Gaulle’s views, and in<strong>de</strong>ed, had not. He<br />
was willing to show Debré HMG’s instructions to ambassadors. He again accepted<br />
the invitation to bilateral talks, saying that he knew that<br />
‘we start with serious differences between us but I do not see why we should not<br />
come, together with our partners, to a common view on the structure, purpose, and<br />
future <strong>of</strong> Europe’. 78<br />
He resisted domestic attempts to get him to associate himself with more critical<br />
remarks about <strong>de</strong> Gaulle, and repeatedly expressed British willingness to talk to the<br />
French. 79 This conciliatory attitu<strong>de</strong> may have had some effect: when FCO minister<br />
Lord Alun Chalfont met ambassador Ge<strong>of</strong>froy <strong>de</strong> Courcel the latter spoke <strong>of</strong><br />
‘genuine and serious misun<strong>de</strong>rstanding’ rather than anything malicious. De<br />
Courcel said that Wilson’s actions in informing others <strong>of</strong> the talks without warning<br />
the French, and the British leaks to the press were the cause <strong>of</strong> French anger. When<br />
Chalfont pointed out that the first leaks had appeared in Le Figaro, <strong>de</strong> Courcel said<br />
he could only assume that they had come from WEU, ‘a notably incontinent<br />
organisation’. It would be difficult to retrieve the situation, but he hoped that they<br />
would stay closely in touch and that the whole affair would soon be resolved. 80<br />
In<strong>de</strong>ed, in their relations with the Five, the French played the ‘whole affair down<br />
rather than up’, perhaps in the knowledge that they had not shown themselves to be<br />
very ‘European’ and nee<strong>de</strong>d to regain face. 81 Notes exchanged between the British<br />
and French governments indicated that it would take some time to rebuild relations,<br />
but Soames never gave up on the possibility. 82<br />
77. Telegrams, Paris to FCO, 24 February 1969, Nos.195-196 and 199, UKNA/FCO/30/415; No.201,<br />
UKNA/PREM/13/2628.<br />
78. Telegrams, FCO to Paris, 24 February 1969, No.104, UKNA/PREM/13/2628, and No.110,<br />
UKNA/FCO/30/416.<br />
79. Telegram, FCO to Paris, 24 February 1969, No.111, UKNA/FCO/30/416.<br />
80. Minute, Chalfont to Stewart, 24 February 1969, UKNA/FCO/30/416. See also telegram, FCO to<br />
Paris, 28 February 1969, No.121, UKNA/FCO/30/417.<br />
81. Telegram, Paris to FCO, 25 February 1969, No.209, UKNA/FCO/30/416.<br />
82. Telegrams, FCO to Paris, 27 February 1969, No.114; Paris to FCO, 28 February 1969, Nos.217-218<br />
and 1 March 1969, Nos.223-224, all UKNA/PREM/13/2628; letter, Soames to Stewart, 21 March<br />
1969; telegrams, Paris to FCO, 24 March 1969, Nos.312-313, all UKNA/FCO/30/418.