journal of european integration history revue d'histoire de l ...

The Soames Affair 71
Relations with the French, in contrast, descended to icy depths. Instructions
were sent to Paris late on 12 February – explicitly mentioning progress in WEU
alongside the Soames affair. 56 However, by the time Soames received them it was
too late to see Debré, and instead he told the secretary general of the Quai d'Orsay,
Hervé Alphand, of the British actions. Alphand ‘reacted badly’: he feared that the
news would ‘deeply anger’ both de Gaulle and Debré. 57 Debré was indeed
distressed that Wilson had seen fit to discuss the affair with Kiesinger, but said that
he would give the matter more thought, and talk to Soames again in a few days.
Although the British were still trying to handle the matter discreetly – indeed,
Soames emphasised to Debré that there had ‘not even been the whiff of a rumour’
about the affair in the press – indications that it would soon leak catalysed the FCO
to send a detailed account to EFTA, Commonwealth and other missions, putting
them on ‘leak-watch’ at the same time. 58 Later, the British decision to inform the
Five was validated when it became clear that the French themselves had told at
least the Austrians before the matter leaked. 59
In the midst of these diplomatic manoeuvres and before the extent of the French
reaction became clear, the WEU meeting that had been proposed by Stewart in
Luxembourg went ahead: the permanent representatives (PRs) of Britain and the
Five met in London to discuss the Middle East. 60 The French did not attend and
tabled a protest, arguing that ‘cette réunion, qui c’est tenue en violation des règles
statutaires, ne peut être considérée comme une réunion du Conseil de notre
organisation’. De Gaulle described the meeting as ‘nulle et non avenue’. 61 Shortly
afterwards the French announced a boycott on WEU activities, causing great
anxiety, no doubt as intended, in Germany. 62 Stewart believed that the French were
‘deliberately trying to block the political consultations which we were trying to
promote’. 63
56. Telegrams, FCO to Paris, 12 February 1969, No.81, UKNA/FCO/30/414 and No.82, UKNA/
PREM/13/2628.
57. Telegram, Paris to FCO, 12 February 1969, No.154, UKNA/PREM/13/2628.
58. Telegrams, Paris to FCO and FCO to Oslo etc, 14 February 1969, No.30, both UKNA/FCO/30/
414.
59. Telegram, Vienna to FCO, 24 February 1969, No.35, UKNA/FCO/30/416.
60. Keesings Contemporary Archive (henceforth KCA) 23265-6 (29 March – 5 April 1969).
61. Brouillon au sujet de l’Union de l’Europe Occidentale, 24 février 1969, Charles de Gaulle, Lettres
Notes et Carnets Juillet 1966-Avril 1969, Librairie Plon, Paris, 1987.
62. Letter, French Ambassador to WEU to Secretary-General of WEU, 16 February 1969; see also
telegram, Paris to FCO, 19 February 1969, No.175, both UKNA/PREM/13/2628; KCA23265-6
(29 March – 5 April 1969); letters, Palliser to Maitland and Maitland to Palliser; report of German
Press Conference; telegram, Bonn to FCO, No.203, all 19 February 1969; telegram, Bonn to FCO,
19 February 1969, No.203, all UKNA/PREM/13/2628.
63. Telegram, FCO to Bonn, 20 February 1969, No.166, UKNA/PREM/13/2628.