journal of european integration history revue d'histoire de l ...

70
Melissa Pine
informed that the Americans knew. 50 Moreover, the FCO had begun to prepare for
the possibility of a French leak on 12 February, when comments by the Swedish
ambassador in London indicated to them that the French were already up to
something, perhaps by stirring up trouble for Britain in the European Free Trade
Association (EFTA). 51
Meanwhile, Wilson was still in Bonn. Foreign minister Willy Brandt warned
him that de Gaulle would be ‘highly resentful’ that the British had revealed the
content of the talk, but recognised the force of Wilson’s argument that he would be
left in a difficult position if Kiesinger heard of the proposal and realised that Wilson
had kept it from him. They speculated about de Gaulle’s motives, concluding that it
was extremely important to continue the closest consultation. Palliser, who was
keeping the record, noted
‘a strong current of hostility on Herr Brandt’s part towards France and the General,
such as had also been perceptible in Dr Kiesinger’s comments. This was patent and
obviously sincere’.
While Brandt did not see anything particularly new in de Gaulle’s proposals, he
expressed himself ‘strongly’ about German difficulties when having to deal with him. 52
The Anglo-German declaration issued that evening, 13 February, affirmed the two
countries’ ‘determination to go forward in partnership’. It said that ‘a united Europe is
inconceivable without Britain’ and that both governments pledged themselves to further
the aim of British membership. They agreed ‘to work out together with other European
Governments, the means by which a new impetus can be given to the political unity of
Europe’ – a reference to the work in WEU. Concluding with a mention of the
‘continuation and strengthening of the Atlantic Alliance’, the declaration was a
powerful reaffirmation of Anglo-German entente – and a total rejection of de Gaulle’s
conception of Europe. 53 Wilson hoped to be able to use the declaration to ensure a
German commitment that they would keep Britain informed of any developments in the
EC which could affect British interests as potential members:
‘this should enable us to have something of a say in the deliberations on these matters
that take place within the EEC’. 54
Wilson did ‘not like guff for guff’s sake’, Palliser noted, so that the declaration
‘represent[ed] a useful step forward’. 55 Wilson’s handling of the ‘Soames affair’
therefore seemed to have succeeded in strengthening German support of the British
position.
50. Telegrams, Washington to FCO, 12 February 1969, No.422; Rome to FCO, 13 February 1969, No
158, both UKNA/PREM/13/2628.
51. Telegram, FCO to Bonn, 12 February 1969, No.136, UKNA/FCO/30/414; minute, Killick to
Morland and Robinson, 12 February 1969, UKNA/FCO/30/417.
52. ‘Extract from Record of Conversation between the Prime Minister and Herr Willy Brandt, Federal
German Foreign Minister in Bonn, on Thursday February 13, 1969’, UKNA/PREM/13/2628.
53. ‘Joint Declaration by the British Prime Minister and the Chancellor of the Federal Republic’, Bonn,
13 February 1969, UKNA/FCO/30/418.
54. Minute, Palliser to Barrington and Wilson’s note thereon, 10 March 1969, UKNA/PREM/13/2629.
55. Telegram, FCO to Washington, 18 February 1969, No.378, UKNA/PREM/13/3217