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The Soames Affair 69
Spreading the word
Wilson therefore reviewed the Soames-de Gaulle talk with Kiesinger ‘as per the
telegrams’, and outlined the British response. Kiesinger was surprised: while de
Gaulle had often said that British entry would change the Communities, he had
never said that they should disappear. Kiesinger concluded that he
‘would welcome talks between Britain and France, provided that there was first
agreement between Britain and the Five on the maintenance and strengthening of
NATO, on the development of the EEC and on its enlargement to include Britain’.
In other words, Kiesinger rejected the very basis of the proposals – as the
British had expected. He agreed with Wilson that the British and Germans should
exchange information and co-ordinate their views, and undertook to keep Wilson
informed of his own talks with de Gaulle. Germany would not accept a free trade
area and four-power directorate: it would be very dangerous if the EC were to be
undermined. Instead, ‘we should all show patience and determination to see Britain
as a member of the EEC’. 45 Kiesinger’s was ‘obviously shaken’, and his response
indicated that Wilson had chosen the correct course. 46 Wilson’s revelations seemed
to have pushed the Germans towards greater support of the principal British aim,
admission into the EC, an aim that ‘Her Majesty’s Government intended to advance
[…] with all the means in their power’. 47
The other member states were informed of the whole affair the same day, 12
February, and the Commission the following day. Ambassadors were instructed to
say that Soames would seek an interview with Debré that evening to say that HMG
regarded the proposals as significant and far-reaching, but that it was too much to
expect Wilson not to say anything in Bonn when the UK had just committed to
increased consultation in WEU. HMG rejected de Gaulle’s ideas about NATO and
the EC, but were willing to have bilateral discussions, provided that their partners
were kept in the picture. 48 The governments of the Benelux states and Italy felt that
the British had responded correctly to de Gaulle’s proposals, appreciated being
informed and wondered, often suspiciously, at de Gaulle’s motives. 49
In a move almost designed to infuriate the French, and in the knowledge that
Nixon was soon to visit Paris, the British also informed the Americans of the
‘Soames affair’. Although they were sworn to secrecy, efforts at discretion were
destroyed when the Italians, who asked specifically who had been told, were
45. ‘Record of a Meeting between the Prime Minister and the Federal German Chancellor at the
Federal Chancellery, Bonn, at 4pm on Wednesday, February 12, 1969’, UKNA/PREM/13/2628.
46. Draft telegram, Greenhill (in Bonn) to FCO, 12 February 1969, No.159, UKNA/PREM/13/2628.
47. ‘Record of a meeting between the Prime Minister and the Federal German Chancellor at the Federal
Chancellery, Bonn, at 5.15pm on Wednesday, February 12, 1969’, UKNA/PREM/13/2628.
48. Telegrams, FCO to Brussels etc, 12 February 1969, No.35, UKNA/FCO/30/414; FCO to UKDel
Brussels, 13 February 1969, No.14, UKNA/FCO/73/32.
49. Telegrams, Brussels to FCO, No.48; Luxembourg to FCO, No.49; Hague to FCO, No.80, all 13
February 1969; Rome to FCO, 15 February 1969, No.167, UKNA/FCO/30/414; minute, Robinson
to Hancock, 17 February 1969, UKNA/FCO/30/415.