journal of european integration history revue d'histoire de l ...

68
Melissa Pine
The debate continued after Wilson arrived in Bonn. Stewart entirely rejected
both Soames’ and Palliser’s positions. If Wilson gave Kiesinger only a partial
account, the Germans would surely elicit the rest from the British advisers or the
French. He recommended that Wilson give a fairly full account, and did not want
the French to have advance warning of the denouement. 39 The British ambassadors
to the Five supported this advice, and the speaking note prepared for Wilson
reflected almost word for word Soames’ original telegrams of 4-5 February. 40
Wilson appeased Soames by promising to ‘test the atmosphere in Bonn’ and
consult again with Stewart before deciding what to do, but he told Stewart that his
object in Bonn would be to turn the traditional four-two combination in Europe
(where Germany typically sided with France) into a five-one combination (with
France isolated). He would open by reminding Kiesinger that HMG was 100%
determined to join the EEC. Stewart reiterated that Wilson ‘should not leave Bonn
without telling Kiesinger the whole story’. The risks that the French would leak
and that the Five would see any British consideration of de Gaulle’s ideas as a
breach of confidence were too great. Soames should tell Debré that Wilson
accepted the idea of bilateral talks only on the basis of current British policy, and
tell him that he was informing Kiesinger of the general’s proposals. 41
Stewart sent telegrams to Community posts instructing ambassadors to prepare
to tell their host governments about the ‘Soames affair’ before Wilson met
Kiesinger, so he clearly expected that Wilson would follow his advice. 42 He was
correct: Wilson telegrammed on 12 February to say that
‘I intend to put Kiesinger fully in the picture about what de Gaulle has said to
Soames […] on the condition that the implications of the communication are pressed
to their logical conclusion’.
In other words, if Kiesinger did not react ‘in the right way’, Wilson wanted both
the original proposals (showing de Gaulle’s disloyalty to the EC) and, potentially,
Kiesinger’s ‘unsatisfactory reaction’ (showing his subservience to de Gaulle) to be
made public. 43 Wilson took this decision himself, choosing between different
strategies suggested by Soames, Palliser and Stewart. His later account in The
Labour Government, in which he blamed the FCO for effectively forcing him to
tell Kiesinger about de Gaulle’s proposals, is therefore deeply misleading. 44
39. Minute, Maitland to Palliser, 11 February 1969, UKNA/PREM/13/2628.
40. For example, letter, Garran to Hood, 11 February 1969, UKNA/FCO/30/414; Speaking Note,
‘Prime Minister’s visit to Bonn, February 1969: General de Gaulle’s Approach to HM Ambassador,
Paris: Talking Points’, Maitland to Palliser, 11 February 1969, UKNA/PREM/13/2628.
41. Telegrams, FCO to Paris, No 77; FCO to Wilson (in Bonn), No.118, both 11 February 1969,
UKNA/PREM/13/2628.
42. Telegrams, FCO to Brussels etc, 11 February 1969, Nos.32-33, UKNA/FCO/30/414.
43. Telegram, Wilson (in Bonn) to FCO, 12 February 1969, No 145, Prime Minister’s Personal Message
Serial No.T19/69.
44. H. WILSON, op.cit., pp.610-611.