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66 Melissa Pine Two other incidents raised the stakes as Wilson prepared to leave for Germany. First a French Foreign affairs minister asserted that de Gaulle wanted to ‘discuss seriously the possibility of nuclear weapons co-operation’. 25 Second, the British ambassador in Rome, who saw de Gaulle’s proposals as an effort to ‘relieve the pressure’ caused by British persistence with the Harmel proposals, began pressing for authority to tell the Italian government of de Gaulle’s proposals. 26 Although Wilson never seriously contemplated the nuclear option – as far as can be told from the official record – these moves added to the diplomatic strain. The Western European Union setting On the same day that de Gaulle and Soames met, the seven WEU Foreign ministers gathered to discuss the Italian paper mentioned above. It was already clear that France would not participate in this new foreign policy initiative, and others feared that the Germans would therefore back out. 27 However, in a long and acrimonious discussion, the isolation of the French became apparent. 28 While all seven agreed that foreign policy consultations should be improved, Britain and the Five supported a Benelux commitment to draw up a list of foreign policy topics on which they would consult in WEU, in order to ‘further the adoption of positions agreed and harmonised to the fullest possible extent’. 29 The French reserved their position, and at first implied that there had been no acute conflict. 30 In contrast, Stewart told cabinet that the meeting had both emphasised French isolation and ‘established that our not being members of [EEC] did not exclude us from consultation with those EEC powers who wished to consult with us, and that the EEC was not the only forum for consultation’. 31 As work among Britain and the Five proceeded, this division in WEU became more apparent. 32 25. ‘Record of Conversation between Lord Chalfont and M. de Lipowski, French Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, at Luxembourg on 6 February 1969’, UKNA/FCO/30/414. 26. Telegrams, Rome to FCO, 7 February 1969, Nos.132-133, UKNA/PREM/13/2628. 27. Telegrams, Luxembourg to FCO, No.33, UKNA/FCO/30/537; Paris to FCO, No.122; Rome to FCO, No.123, all 4 February 1969, UKNA/FCO/30/357. 28. Telegram, Stewart (in Luxembourg) to FCO, 7 February 1969, No.42, UKNA/PREM/13/2628. 29. Telegram, Stewart (in Luxembourg) to FCO, 7 February 1969, No.43, UKNA/FCO/30/537. 30. Telegram, Paris to FCO, 7 February 1969, No.136, UKNA/FCO/30/537. 31. CC(69)8, 11 February 1969, UKNA/CAB/128/44. 32. ‘Note of a Meeting between the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and the Italian Foreign Minister at the Kirchberg at 11.30am on 7 February 1969’, UKNA/PREM/13/2628.

The Soames Affair 67 Divided Counsel During this small but real step towards new co-operation in WEU, HMG continued to deliberate over de Gaulle’s proposals. On 7 February Stewart returned to the offensive, pressing the case for concentrating on building relations with the FRG. 33 Palliser increasingly shared Stewart’s suspicions but feared the consequences of rejecting talks, while the British ambassador in Rome again warned of the dangers of accepting talks in an appraisal that Wilson described as ‘quite good. 34 Soames, who had taken the precaution of having the French check his record of the original talk, took the opposite view. When he met with Debré on 8 February, the latter continued to press for bilateral talks on Europe, ‘in the strictest secrecy until we knew whether or not we could see the seeds of agreement’. Soames now concluded that the idea for bilateral talks had originally been Debré’s and should be taken seriously. He asked to return to London for immediate consultations before Wilson went to Bonn. 35 Faced with such contradictory counsel but already leaning towards his foreign secretary’s position, Wilson met Stewart on 10 February to discuss tactics. They agreed that ‘in the spirit of consultation’ just agreed at WEU, they should inform Kiesinger and the others of the French approach, and should tell the French that this action was being taken. They would say that they would not return a flat negative to the French: any talks must be in consultation with the Germans and others, while they would not accept de Gaulle’s approach to NATO and the EEC. The FCO would prepare a brief for Wilson with ‘particular emphasis on “the disruptive approach to [the] EEC inherent in General de Gaulle’s approach”’. 36 The harmony between Wilson and Stewart on this matter was evident, and the FCO brief reflected it despite Soames’ protests that the government had taken ‘a too clear-cut and too dramatic’ picture of his talk with de Gaulle from his original telegrams. He suggested that Wilson give only a highly sanitised version of events to Kiesinger. 37 Palliser too advised Wilson to consider very carefully whether he really wished to speak as fully to Kiesinger and the rest and, if he did, whether his own relationship with de Gaulle could stand the strain. 38 The debate went on, with Stewart taking a hard line, Soames urging a more careful approach and Palliser falling somewhere in between. 33. Minute, Stewart to Wilson and Wilson’s notes thereon, 7 February 1969, PM/69/13, UKNA/ PREM/13/2673. 34. Minute, Palliser to Wilson; telegram, Rome to FCO, No.133, and Wilson’s note thereon, both 9 February 1969, UKNA/PREM/13/2628; see also letter, Garran to Hood, 11 February 1969, UKNA/FCO/30/414. 35. Telegram, Paris to FCO, 8 February 1969, No.138, UKNA/PREM/13/2628. 36. Record of a Meeting between the Prime Minister and the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and 10 Downing Street at 11.40am on Monday, February 10, 1969’, UKNA/PREM/13/2628. 37. Report of visit to Soames and attached paper, Hancock to Maitland, 10 February 1969; Telegram, Paris to FCO, 10 February 1969, No.143, UKNA/PREM/13/2628. 38. Minutes, Palliser to Wilson, 10 February 1969 and Wilson’s note thereon; 11 February 1969, both UKNA/PREM/13/2628.

66<br />

Melissa Pine<br />

Two other inci<strong>de</strong>nts raised the stakes as Wilson prepared to leave for Germany.<br />

First a French Foreign affairs minister asserted that <strong>de</strong> Gaulle wanted to ‘discuss<br />

seriously the possibility <strong>of</strong> nuclear weapons co-operation’. 25 Second, the British<br />

ambassador in Rome, who saw <strong>de</strong> Gaulle’s proposals as an effort to ‘relieve the<br />

pressure’ caused by British persistence with the Harmel proposals, began pressing<br />

for authority to tell the Italian government <strong>of</strong> <strong>de</strong> Gaulle’s proposals. 26 Although<br />

Wilson never seriously contemplated the nuclear option – as far as can be told from<br />

the <strong>of</strong>ficial record – these moves ad<strong>de</strong>d to the diplomatic strain.<br />

The Western European Union setting<br />

On the same day that <strong>de</strong> Gaulle and Soames met, the seven WEU Foreign ministers<br />

gathered to discuss the Italian paper mentioned above. It was already clear that<br />

France would not participate in this new foreign policy initiative, and others feared<br />

that the Germans would therefore back out. 27 However, in a long and acrimonious<br />

discussion, the isolation <strong>of</strong> the French became apparent. 28 While all seven agreed<br />

that foreign policy consultations should be improved, Britain and the Five supported<br />

a Benelux commitment to draw up a list <strong>of</strong> foreign policy topics on which<br />

they would consult in WEU, in or<strong>de</strong>r to ‘further the adoption <strong>of</strong> positions agreed<br />

and harmonised to the fullest possible extent’. 29 The French reserved their position,<br />

and at first implied that there had been no acute conflict. 30 In contrast, Stewart told<br />

cabinet that the meeting had both emphasised French isolation and<br />

‘established that our not being members <strong>of</strong> [EEC] did not exclu<strong>de</strong> us from consultation<br />

with those EEC powers who wished to consult with us, and that the EEC was<br />

not the only forum for consultation’. 31<br />

As work among Britain and the Five procee<strong>de</strong>d, this division in WEU became<br />

more apparent. 32<br />

25. ‘Record <strong>of</strong> Conversation between Lord Chalfont and M. <strong>de</strong> Lipowski, French Minister <strong>of</strong> State for<br />

Foreign Affairs, at Luxembourg on 6 February 1969’, UKNA/FCO/30/414.<br />

26. Telegrams, Rome to FCO, 7 February 1969, Nos.132-133, UKNA/PREM/13/2628.<br />

27. Telegrams, Luxembourg to FCO, No.33, UKNA/FCO/30/537; Paris to FCO, No.122; Rome to<br />

FCO, No.123, all 4 February 1969, UKNA/FCO/30/357.<br />

28. Telegram, Stewart (in Luxembourg) to FCO, 7 February 1969, No.42, UKNA/PREM/13/2628.<br />

29. Telegram, Stewart (in Luxembourg) to FCO, 7 February 1969, No.43, UKNA/FCO/30/537.<br />

30. Telegram, Paris to FCO, 7 February 1969, No.136, UKNA/FCO/30/537.<br />

31. CC(69)8, 11 February 1969, UKNA/CAB/128/44.<br />

32. ‘Note <strong>of</strong> a Meeting between the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and the Italian Foreign<br />

Minister at the Kirchberg at 11.30am on 7 February 1969’, UKNA/PREM/13/2628.

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